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Abstract

This dissertation is a comparative study of first person narrative in Marcel Proust’s A la
recherche du temps perdu (Remembrance ofThinps Past), and selected novels of
William Faulkner, primarily those in which the character o f Quentin Compson appears:
The Sound and the Fury and Absalom. Absalom? This comparison is based upon the
assumption that the attempts to represent the patterns o f thought, memory, or
consciousness in these novels is symptomatic o f many twentieth-century novels, which
dramatize an anxiety about the possibility of a solid ground for knowledge o f the world
or of the self. The language o f these novels displays the instability or incoherence o f
human knowledge o f self and world, thus destabilizing the notion of the individual as a
coherent, self-knowing entity. Subjectivity is portrayed as the weaving o f relations
between signifiers. This implies a conception o f being which is not that o f a positive,
substantial entity, but o f relation. In chapter two, the role o f language in the formation o f
memory, and the relationship between narrative and time is examined in Proust. In
chapter three, the narrative structure o f Faulkner’s novels is examined from the
perspective o f Suassurian linguistics and through Continental criticism o f Proust. In
chapter four, the role o f the proper name in the formation o f a sense of social hierarchies
is seen as central to the narrating hero’s formation o f a sense o f self and other, and is one
aspect of rhe role o f sign systems in the formation o f memories and personal identities.
The role o f an and representation in the formation o f self-awareness leads to a
consideration of the mises en abyme, or textual mirrors, in the novels, in chapter five.
Finally, the question o f identity and its expression in language gives rise to a
consideration of the problems o f reading and interpretation. These problems are also
raised by the narratives under consideration. The activities o f reading, interpretation, and
literary studies are best understood, not as the pursuit o f meaning, but as the production
of meaning through the ongoing activity of recontextualization.

vi
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Introduction: Identity Crises

This dissertation proposes to examine the attempt to represent individual thought
or consciousness in works by Marcel Proust and William Faulkner, through an examination
of Proust’s first person narrator in A la recherche du temps perdu, and the characters who
narrate two of Faulkner’s most canonical novels, most notably the figure o f Quentin
Compson, whose point of view is one of the central features of The Sound and the Furv
and Absalom. Absalom! The attempt to represent thought or memory in Faulkner’s work
is symptomatic o f many twentieth-century novelists since the time of Proust. In novels by
authors such as Marcel Proust, William Faulkner, James Joyce or Samuel Beckett, the
literary production o f the twentieth century has reflected an anxiety about the possibility
for a solid ground for knowledge of the world and o f the self. In these narratives, the unity
and stability o f human personality and identity are ultimately put into question, through
the attempt to imitate the structure of thought in language. The language of these novels
quite often display the instability or incoherence o f human knowledge of self and world,
thus destabilizing the notion of the individual as a coherent, self-knowing entity. The
attempt to represent subjectivity in various forms o f first-person narrative demonstrates the
constitutive role o f language and representation, of the exterior, the “Other,” as expressed
in Rimbaud’s famous statement, “Je est un autre”. This can be seen particularly in the
fragmentation and unreliability of narrative voice. Modern novelistic practice disrupts
traditional narrative forms from within by a language which continually calls into question
its own premises.
Self and Nation
The end o f the nineteenth century saw the culmination of nationalist aspirations in
newly formed governmental entities such as Italy or Germany. This was also a period in
which the academic study of national “literatures” was first institutionalized. The rise of the
nation state and the study of national literatures are both symptoms of a need to impose
new structures which would serve to legitimize and reassure people in their right to exist
1
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and their difference from other groups o f people. It is no simple coincidence that the same
period saw intensive research into the “dark side” of the human psyche. The identity of an
individual and the identity of a culture or nation are bound up in a specular relationship
based on the relationship of self and other, each deffned in relation to the other. This
relation is embodied within the individual in the relationship between consciousness and
the “unconscious.” All over Europe, researchers were studying mental aberrations, and
forming theories about the nature of human consciousness, with the goal of establishing a
framework for understanding personality. The goal of all this research was to establish a
solid basis for an answer to the question o f identity, to find the essence, core or kernel of
being. The technical, political and economical changes in the West seemed to call into
question previous systems of identification. The research into psychology and the violent
consolidation o f the nation state are symptoms o f an identity crisis, a doubt about the
possibility of a guarantee that we are born and remain unique individuals.
It is perhaps this anxiety about the integrity of the self that is at the root of the
violence to be seen in the world today. Individuals and groups of people everywhere feel
themselves threatened with dispersal or assimilation, with the loss o f their specificity as
individuals or as particular groups. The violence with which groups of people defend what
they perceive as their inherent right to a certain territory belies the anxiety that the
intermingling o f cultures, religions or ethnic groups may lead to a situation o f dilution in
which difference disappears.
This situation arose in part because o f a crumbling of faith in religious and political
institutions which were previously seen as monolithic, stable structures allowing individuals
to situate themselves in human society, in space, and in time. The concern with
representing human thought and consciousness in fiction is concurrent with this period in
which the bases of human thought about the world and the self were in question.
Being and Time
Western literature and philosophy have long been preoccupied by the relationship
of the concepts o f being and time. The doubt about the stability and subsistence o f human
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existence has been accompanied by a reconsideration of the concept of time. In £tudes sur
le temps humain. Georges Poulet claims that the Christian in Medieval Europe had quite a
different conception of time and o f his existence in time from that of modern man. The
feeling of existence in the present, he says, did not precede the sense of his own duration:
“II ne se decouvrait pas d’abord dans le moment present, pour se concevoir ensuite existant
dans le temps. Bien au contraire se sentir exister, cetait pour lui se sentir etre, et se sentir
etre, c’dtait se sentir non pas changer, non pas devenir, non pas se succeder a soi-meme,
mais se sentir subsister [.. .] Aussi n’est-ce pas en rermes d’instants independants et
successifs que se concevait la relation des creatures au Createur.” “He did not first discover
himself in the present moment in order to then conceive of himself existing in time. On the
contrary, the sense of existence was the sense of being, and to feel oneself as being was not
to feel oneself changing, becoming or succeeding oneself in time, it was rather to have a
sense of permanence [. ..] Nor was it in terms of independent successive instants that the
relationship of creatures to the creator was conceived.” The technological achievements of
modern scientific practice have accelerated the pace of life in the industrialized West, with
the effect of increasing the importance of the moment, focusing attention on time as a
succession of instants.
But the faith in the permanence and stability of human existence that the Medieval
Christian felt, was also accompanied by what Poulet calls a sense of the “profound lack of
permanence” which characterizes human existence. “Le chretien du moyen age [.. .] s’il
sentait sa propre permanence, il se trouvait concraint de sentir au meme titre son manque
profond de permanence. II se sentait a la fbis, contradictoirement, un etre permanent et un
etre temporel [...] qui ne change jamais et [. ..] qui change toujours.1“While he had a
sense of his own permanence, the Christian of the Middle Ages had also to feel his
profound lack of permanence. He felt himself at once, and in contradiction, a permanent
being and a temporal being. [.. .] who never changes [...] and who changes continually.”
The sense of the mutability of earthly existence was counterbalanced by a belief in a
1Georges Poulet. Etudes sur le temps humain. (Paris: Plon. 1949) i, iii. (my translation).
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spiritual time, oriented toward spriritual perfection, a faith in the linear nature of time, the
progress of which brought the Christian closer to God.
Martin Heidegger has called one of the “essential phenomena” of the modern age:
“the loss of the gods” or “a situation of indecision regarding God and the gods.”’’ The
increasing secularization of Western society, and the acceleration of cross-cultural
exchanges with non-western traditions have also contributed to this tendency. One aspect
of this “loss of the gpds” is the weakening of the sense of duration and subsistence, and o f
the conception of time as a linear progression.
The historical moment at which this resistance was first manifested, the starting
point for what is called the “modern” age is open to endless debate.'* Many historians point
to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when a renewed interest in ancient Latin and
Greek texts, in skeptic philosophies, brought about an increasing sense of the insignificance
of man in the universe and cast doubt on the sense of the permanence of being. Rene
Descartes’ attempts to establish a firm basis for human knowledge was in part a response to
this skepticism and uncertainty.4 His Discours de la methode marked the emergence o f
modern science, based in the subject as self-presence, effectively the new point of reference.
The Discours established a “world view:” Henceforth the world became the object o f a
scientific gaze. The eye of the scientist projects a ground plan of the world, upon which
knowledge can be secured.5The ultimate point of reference for scientific knowledge is the
individual, the speaking subject, the “I” of Descartes’ “I think therefore I am.” It is this self
knowing, autonomous subject who sees the world and is able to represent what he sees in a

2 The Question Concerning Technology, and O ther Essays, trails. William Lovin. (New York: Garland.
1977) 117.
3As Paul De Man has suggested, the terms ‘modem,” and ‘ postmodern” belong to a positivist conception o f
time as progress: ‘The notion of modernity is already very dubious: the notion of postmodernitv becomes a
parody of the notion of modernity [...] ilt strikes me as a very unmodem, a very old-fashioned, conservative
concept of history, where history is seen as a succession” Paul de Man, The Resistance to Theory
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986) 120.
4 Fora more detailed discussion of the influence o f the Greek skeptics on Descartes, see Richard H. Popkin.
The History of Skepticism from Erasm»« m f W m « . (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1960).
5 Heidegger, 117.
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transparent, universal language. Cartesian science established the belief in humanity’s
ability to fully explain the world.
Through Descartes, the “man of science” becomes the model for the W est’s
conception of selfhood, o f being self-knowledge, wholeness or presence.” The faith in
human reason and the power of the human mind in seventeenth century Europe, and the
subsequent technological and scientific explosion o f the next two centuries was made
possible by the supposition that humans were capable of communicating clear, rational
thought in a transparent language.
Jacques Derrida has argued that in Western philosophy identity, being, and
meaning are ultimately guaranteed by reference to the logos, the word of God, which
preceded, and called into being the world. In this view, the logos functions not only as
origin, but as a “transcendental” signifier, linking human language to the world o f essences
or preconceived ideas (on the level of the signified, in Saussurian parlance), and
guaranteeing the presence o f meaning to language. The Platonic world of essence belief in
this world of essences is a religious one, the equivalent of the of ideas. The logos is the link
between incarnation and the transcendental, the spirit in the letter. It is the “word, made
flesh.”
The crisis spoken o f here is the realization o f the anti logical function of language, of
opacity, its resistance to meaning. The resistance of meaning is correlative to the problem
of identity. This crisis of being is thus also a crisis o f meaning, particularly about the
meaning of such terms as consciousness, identity, and being. In his introduction to Being and
Time. Heidegger has pointed out that being is “the most universal and the emptiest
concept. As such it resists every attempt at definition.”7 To define is to identify. T hat which
is undefinable is unknowable, including man. The ability to accurately define a concept
presupposes that it is possible to establish absolute frame of reference and criteria with
which to measure its accuracy. It ignores the contingency of meaning, its dependence on
” Jean-Paul Sartre's term for this concept is that of “being in itself* Tetre en soi."
Martin Heidegger Basic Writings. (New York: Harper & Row, 1977) 4 1.
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conventions-that is to say, the consensus of a majority of designated experts, such as in an
academic setting, where decisions of what is acceptable and unacceptable are made by peers,
whose selection is dependent on committees. Thus the possibility of dissension and revision
is built into such a system. The desire to establish absolutes is antithetical to such a
structure.
In the nineteenth century, science turned its attention to the unreason which
inhabits all human thought. One name eventually given, by psychoanalytical theory, to this
unreason, was that of the “unconscious,” that “other” which inhabits the self, and which
casts doubt on the stability and singularity of human thought and identity. In their positing
of a split between conscious and unconscious processes, these theories effectively called into
question the Cartesian model of subjectivity, as that of a self-knowing, unique, rational
consciousness, while simultaneously asserting the power of scientific thought to unravel the
mystery of the unconscious.
In the modern world, the meaning of being and the being of meaning, as essence, is
threatened by relativistic forces. One of the most important events of the twentieth century
was the publication of Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity. But even Einstein had his
totalitarian dream in his search for a “unified field theory.” Nevertheless the importance of
relativity is not limited to the “hard” science o f physics. The explosion in popularity of the
internet is another example of the increased speed with which people from different
cultures and different regions can communicate to each other. The play of voices and the
ability to create an alter-ego in cyberspace, illustrate and accelerate what has always already
been the case: that that phenomenon which we refer to as personality, the essence of
personal identity itself, is the weaving o f a text, the tracing of a relation in time and among
shifting forces.
This ontological crisis also been reflected in fiction, particularly in the novel, in the
various techniques by which writers from diverse backgrounds and cultures attempt to
represent consciousness, particularly through a first person narrator. Ir could be argued that
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the modern novel is, in a very large measure, a first-person novel.8 Where nineteenthcentury realist narrative attempted to paint a generalized, objective, portrait o f the world, as
seen from the exterior, by an omniscient narrator, the twentieth-century novel has
attempted to represent the “inner life” o f consciousness, to portray the world from the
Limited, fallible point of view of a particular individual. In this it shares the realist aspiration
to represent reality. The main difference which marks twentieth-century novels is that the
world is no longer approached as an object to be known, but as a creation of the mind. The
reliance on the unreliable first-person narrator emphasizes the subjective nature of reality.
The integrity of that subject is, however, problematized by the inconsistence and
unreliability of human thought. Ultimately, the very bases of human knowledge and
judgment are called into question. This explains the instability of the narrative voice, as the
modern novel ineluctably problematizes the status of its own narrative point of view.

8This is the thesis of jean Rousset a propos the French modern novel: ‘Notre roman moderne, conune celui
du XVIlie siede, est dans une trts large mesure un roman de la premiere personne.” ‘O ur modem novel,lilce
that of the eighteenth century is, in a very laige measure a first person novel.” The instability o f the pronoun
‘I’ in many novels, says Rousset, betrays the uncertainty of the speaking subject about his own integrity: ‘Le
jc se met en crise, en mtme temps que 1’unitd et la stability de la petsonne sont mises en question.” “The j
undergoes a crisis at the moment that the unity and the stability of the person are questioned.” N irriw
Romancier. « <ai «ir la nremfcre personne dans le roman. (Paris: J. Com, 1973) 9.36. My translation. It is
one of my premises that this can be said of many modem novelists.
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Chapter 1: An Exhausted Subject? The Postage Stamp and the Cup o f Tea

There has been so much written about these two authors that the topics might seem
to have already been so thoroughly “covered,” so exhausted, that there can be little
intelligent left to say. What purpose could be served by adding to the enormous critical
literature which each o f these authors has inspired? These are the inevitable questions which
plague anyone who proposes to study texts such as those I have chosen, or more generally,
any o f the literary works which belong to what is often referred to as the “canon” o f
Western Literature. This is all the more true for such white male authors as Proust and
Faulkner. The choice to study either of these authors would have seemed natural two or
three decades ago, but is hardly as innocent as it once may have seemed.
A consideration of the notion of the “exhaustibility” o f a given topic, or even of the
potential exhaustion of writing itselfwould not be entirely inappropriate., since Faulkner
stated that a major turning point in his writing career was the realization that he would
never be able to exhaust the possibilities for writing about the world he imagined in
Yoknapatawpha county: “Beginning with Sartoris I discovered that my own little postage
stamp of native soil was worth writing about and that I would never live long enough to
exhaust it.”’
The postage stamp as an image of an arbitrarily limited, almost insignificant space
is meant to render all the more miraculous the proliferation o f narrative devoted to it. The
self-containment of the stamp may, however, be a misleading metaphor for Faulkner’s
literary cosmos. Yoknapatawpha county, though perhaps small, is by no means as
insignificant as Faulkner’s pseudo-attempt at self-effacement may have meant to suggest.
With only the most tenuous o f links to the outside-two roads, one heading north-south
and the other heading east-west, a rail-line and a river, Jefferson is open to influences from
Memphis, New Orleans, New York, Haiti and even Paris. Indeed, as at least one critic has
’ Faulkner’s remark is taken from an interview with Jean Stein which was originally published in The Paris
Review in the Spring o f 19S6. republished in Lion in the Garden: Interviews with William Faulkner 19261962. Ed. James B. Meriwether and Michael Millgate. 1968. (Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press. 1980)
255. All further references to this volume will be noted parenthetically with the abbreviation LG.

8
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attempted to suggest, it seems as though, in order to make up for his novel’s lack of
narrative closure, Faulkner had to resort to time lines, encyclopedia-style character lists, and
cartography in order to constitute his fictional universe as a complete, self-contained
cosmos.10
Proust, too, limits the physical setting in which his characters evolve: a small village
in the French countryside, a Normandy beach resort, and the exdusive worlds of the
aristocracy and Parisian society. And as with the Yoknapatawpha saga, Proust’s novel is
recognized as being the work of a lifetime, an effort which only culminated in the fourteen
year period of intense writing which left him physically exhausted. A la recherche du temps
perdu is a work which began as a polemical essay, mutated into a three volume novel and
then ballooned into the eight volume, 3000 page opus we know today. Yet Proust also
claimed to have written the beginning and the end at the same time, so that the bulk o f the
novel, roughly from A 1’ombre des ieunes filles en fleurs to Albertine disparue. was “filled
in” afterwards. It is often understood that Proust did this because of his poor health, not
knowing whether he would live long enough to complete his work. It is equally probable
chat, unsure of whether he would be able to say all he wanted to (or perhaps realizing it was
impossible) he had to posit an end-point, in order to know not only where he was headed,
but that he would indeed arrive there at all.
If Proust felt an urgent need to bring his work to completion, Faulkner may have
felt an opposing sense of urgency, in his financial obligations, to sustain his literary
production. The very names Faulkner and Proust are associated by many with loquacity,
with interminable syntax or a long-winded oratorical style—in short with their very inability
to conclude." This very association can serve to close off the play o f signification at work in
lu In his Bakhtinian reading, Philip M. Weinstein suggests that the map and chronology Faulkner added to
later editions of Absalom.Ahsalnm! while seemingly seeking to contain the novel, reveal, in their conflicting
and contradictory claims, “the unmastered dialogic restlessness o f the text." Faulkner’s Subject: A Cosmos No
One Owns. Cambridge Studies in American Literature and Culture. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992) 97.
11 Stephen M. Ross links A b s a lo m . Absalom! to the tradition of southern oratory. According to Ross, “for the
colloquial orator there can be no closure [...], for there is no end to what he has to say." The various
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their novels. It is nevertheless an open question as to what extent the “subject” of these
novels is identifiable (and I am playing, for the moment, on the very ambiguity o f the term
subject:, the ambiguity which reigns whenever we speak of subjects, either the topic o f a
work or what we commonly tend to confuse with the terms individual or person). The
works of these two authors are excellent examples of the “inflation” of the signifier.
What links the works of Faulkner and Proust more than anything is their use of
narrative to illustrate, not so much defined characters, as the impossibility of arriving at any
definitive description of character. They mobilize the workings of language, memory and
perception to dramatize how consciousness continually (de)constructs itself in language.
Both works bear witness to a crisis of identity which manifests itself in narrative, in the
figure of narrating subjects, whether they be Proust’s “je,” the “psychic voices” of Benjy and
Quentin in The Sound and the Furv. or the various storytellers in Absalom. Absalom!. In
both novels, as they are usually understood, idiosyncratic narrative style is meant to
represent the workings of an individual human consciousness, but these novels
simultaneously challenge the very possibility of representation, and problematize identity as
the stable, self-similar presence of consciousness to itself. It might equally be argued that
the Proust’s work is a massively reiterated attempt to answer the question: “Who and where
am I?” or that the narrators in Absalom, in attempting to answer the question “Who was
Thomas Sutpen?” are driven inexorably back to the question “Who wants to know?” The
storyteller is identified by the story he is telling, by the way he tells it; consciousness is no
longer linked to an individual essence, but to the slipperiness of language.
Linguistics and the Subject
The field of modern linguistics, as a study of the production of meaning in
language was another product of this period of crisis which, if anything, has intensified at
the end of the twentieth century. These conflicts and crises are symptoms of an
narrators of the novel display “oratory’s essential discursive movement toward ever greater amplification."
“Oratory and the dialogical in Absalom. Absalom!” in I n r r r r « m i a l i r y in Faulkner, eds. Michel Gresset and
Noel Polk (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi. 1985) 73 -127. See also Fiction's Inexhaustible Voice.
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epistemological crisis, a crisis about the nature of human knowledge. Modern epistemology
is in many ways based on linguistics, and especially that form of structural linguistics which
begins with Saussure’s Cours de linguistique penerale. Saussure attempted to show how
meaning is not inherent in the word itself nor does it derive directly from a word’s
historical, etymological source, but is a function of that word’s position within a system
which is complete and self-sufficient at any given moment. That place is only defined by its
difference from all the other elements in the system: “In language there are only differences
without positive terms.”12
Jacques Lacan has pointed out that language as a system exists before the individual
speaking subject. The subject needs language in order to constitute him or her self as
subject, but language does not need any particular individual in order to be perpetuated as
a system: “language and its structure exist prior to the moment at which each subject at a
certain point in his mental development makes his entry into it.”13The subject is “born
into” a language, and his or her entry into the symbolic order of human society is equated
with the entry into language, which begins before birth with the imposition of a proper
name. The imposition of a name marks the entry of the child into the linguistic economy
and the symbolic order.
The writer’s paradox is then to construct an individual subjectivity using the
impersonal material of the linguistic system. More often than not this has meant altering
the language, using it in unaccustomed ways in order to suggest the monstrous,
inexpressible, inassimilable nature o f the self in society. This is the solution proposed by
Proust’s narrator in Le temps retrouve: The uniqueness of a truly great work of an
expresses the “world” seen only by the particular anist who created it: “Par Pan seulement
nous pouvons sonir de nous, savoir ce que voit un autre de cet univers qui n’est pas le
12 ..] dans la iangue il n’y a que des differences sans termes positifi." “[...] in language there are only
differences without positive terms.” Ferdinand de Saussure. Cours de linciiistique pfrferale. Paris: Payor, 1981
(166).
13Jacques Lacan. “The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason Since Freud.'' Ecrits: A Selection.
Trans. Alan Sheridon (New York: Norton, 1977) 146-177. p. 148.
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meme que le notre et done les paysages nous seraienr resces aussi inconnus que ceux qu’il
peut y avoir dans la lune” (TR 202) “Through are alone we are able to emerge from
ourselves, to know what another person seesof a universe which is not the same as our own
and of which, without art, the landscapes would remain as unknown to us as those that
may exist in the moon" (III: 932). Art, says Proust is our only “true” life. A great work of
art expresses that unique experience o f the world, that difference from others which is
usually hidden by the conventions and habits of everyday life. Proust’s affirmation of the
power of art is mitigated, though, by the premise o f a radical dichotomy between the life of
the artist himself and his work. This is exemplified by the figures o f Vinteuil and Bergotte
in the Recherche. The question o f art and originality is assimilable to the linguistic model
of speech and language-the former being a particular manifestation of the latter. The
unique work of art is a particular arrangement of elements which are common to a specific
medium: paint and canvas in the case of painting, rhythm and timbre in the case of music,
words on a page in the case of literature.
The problem with structuralist formulations of language may, however, be their
insistence on the “system” as something frozen and complete. It almost seems a positive
entity, a being in itself. It might be more useful in the context o f the works here considered
to think of this system not as a fixed entity, but as an ongoing process. Language as a
system does not preceed its particular manifestation in speech or writing. It is rather a set of
generalized rules and common elements abstracted from the particular.
To define a word requires more words, which in turn must themselves be defined.
Meaning cannot exist apart from a context. This process is effectively infinite. There can be
no absolute value upon which it can come to rest, whether it be considered as the origin,
the logos or the system. Derrida describes this infinite process in these terms:
«Signifiant du signifiant» ddcrit [. . .] le mouvement du langage: dans son
origine, certes, mais on pressent dijk qu’une origine dont la structure
s’lpelle ainsi-signifiant de signifiant-s’emporte et s’efface elle-meme dans sa
propre production. Le signify y fonctionne toujours d^ja comme un
signifiant. La secondaritl q u ’on croyait pouvoir reserver a 1’ecriture affecte
tout signify en glndral, l’affecte toujours d£j&, e’est &dire &'entrie de jeu.
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Signifier o f a signifier describes the movement o f language in its origins,
certainly, but one can already sense that an origin whose structure is thus
designated—the signifier of a signifier-is carried away and erases itself in its
very production. The signified always already functions as a signifier. The
secondarity that was thought to be reserved for writing affects all signifieds;
it always already affects them, as soon as the game begins.'4
This movement of language implies that there can be no final word to close off the process
of identification. The absence of an absolute basis or center, a sort of “gold standard” for
meaning to be guaranteed in language, what Derrida terms the logos, implies what he refers
to as a kind of absolute inflation: “Cette inflation du signe «langage» est 1’inflation du signe
lui-meme, I’inflation absolue, 1’inflation elle-meme,” “This inflation of the sign ‘language’
is the inflation of the sign itself, absolute inflation, inflation itself"(15).
This potentially infinite process of linguistic identification, of naming, can appear
to be fixed, (in dicitonaries, encyclopedia entries or legal records). Yet just as the “closed”
system of language is set in motion by the flux of time, personal identity, dependent on
contexts, necessarily changes when those contexts change. Thus in Proust, the profound
transformation of French society caused by the Dreyfus affair changes, along with social
“values,” the very identities o f the people involved. Proust refers to this phenomenon as a
“social kaleidoscope.” It is this kaleidoscope, as an image o f the perpetual reconfiguration of
elements in the social fabric, which also suggests the inexhaustible nature of reading, and
allows us to approach these novels from new perspectives, for as the values and assumptions
of culture change, the ways we understand and interpret works of art and literature change
as well.
The Subject of the Novel
Gerard Genette suggests that it is possible to summarize the plot of A la Recherche
du temps perdu in the simple sentence: “Marcel becomes a writer,” but this would be a
gross reduction, worthy of Monty-Python’s All-England Summarize Proust Contest.15It
14Jacques Derrida, De ia grammatologie (Paris: Minuit, 1967) 16 (my translation).
15 Genette suggests that it is possible to treat Proust’s novel, or any narrative, as “the development, monstrous
as you like, given to a verbal locution, in the grammatical sense o f the term: the expansion of a verb. I'm
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remains very difficult to provide a simple answer to the questions “What is the work
about?” What is its “point”? The attempt to answer these questions has occupied critics for
nearly a century. More often than not, the answers depend more on the particular political
or critical predispositions of the reader than on any kind of objective measure. Any such
attempt must interrogate the basis of its own reading. Indeed, Proust’s narrator suggests
that this is all one can do:
En realite, chaque lecteur est quand il lit le propre lecteur de soi-meme.
L’ouvrage de l’ecrivain n’est qu’une espfcce d’instrument optique qu’il offre
au lecteur afin de lui permettre de discerner ce que sans ce livre il n’eut
peut-etre pas vu en soi-meme. La reconnaissance en soi-meme, par le
lecteur, de ce que dit le livre, est la preuve de la verite de celui-ci, et vice
versa, au moins dans une certaine measure, la difference entre les deux textes
pouvant etre souvent impufee non a 1’auteur mais au lecteur. [. . .] le lecteur
a besoin de lire d’une certaine fa^on pour bien lire; 1’auteur n ’a pas a sen
offenser, mais au contraire a laisser la plus grande liberte au lecteur en lui
disant: «Regardez vous-meme si vous voyez mieux avec ce verre-ci, avec
celui-la, avec cet autre»16(TR 217-18)
In reality every reader is, while he is reading, the reader of his own self. The
writer’s work is merely a kind of optical instrument which he offers to the
reader to enable him to discern what, without this book, he would perhaps
never have perceived in himself. And the recognition by the reader in his
own self of what the book says is the proof of its veracity, the contrary also
being true, at least to a certain extent, for the difference between the two
texts may sometimes be imputed less to the author than to the reader. [. ..]
In order to read with understanding many readers require to read in their
own particular fashion, and the author must not be indignant at this; on the
contrary, he must leave the reader all possible liberty, saying to him: “Look
walking, Pierre has arrived, are [ ...] minimal forms o f narratives. On the other hand, the Odvssev or the
Remembrance merely amplify (in the rhetorical sense o f the term) enunciations such as Ulysses returns to
Ithaca, or Marcel becomes a w riter' [‘Puisque tout recit—fut-il aussi dtendu et aussi complexe que la
Recherche du temps perdu—est une production iinguistique assumant la relation d’un ou piusieurs
evenement(s), il est peut-etre legitime de le trailer com me le deyeioppement. aussi monstrueux qu’on voudra,
donne a une forme verbaie, au sens grammatical du termc: l'expansion d'un verbe. Je marche, Pierre est venu,
sonr pour moi des formes minimales de recit. et inversement I’Qdysak. ou la Recherche ne font d’unc certaine
maniere qu'ampiiher (au sens rhetorique) des enonces tels qu’ Ulysse rentre a Ithaqueou Marceldement
e'crivain.”j Girard Genette, Figures III (Paris: Seuil. 1972) 75- All further references to this text will be given
parenthetciaily.
6 Marcel Proust, A la Recherche du temps perdu 8 vols. (Paris: Folio [Gallimard], 1987 - 1990). For
convenience, all references to this novel will be to this edition, and will be noted parenthetically, with the
following abbreviations to indicate specific volumes: S, Du cotl de chez Swann: JF, A I’ombre des ieuncs fillcs
en flcurs: CGI. CGII, Le cote de Guermantes (I and II); SG. Sodome et Gomonhe: P, La prisonniere: AD.
Albertine disparue: and TR, Le temps retrouve. All Enlish translations of Proust’s novel are from
Remembrance of Things Past. Trans. C.K. Scon MoncriefF and Terence Kilmanin. 3 vols. New York:
Random House, 1981, and will be noted parenthetically with volume and page numbers.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

15
for yourself, and cry whether you see best with this lens or that one or this
other one” (III: 949)
Proust’s text here suggests a model of reading and interpretation in which the work ot art
does not mainatin an independent self-contained life. It is dependent upon the recognition
or mis-recognition of the reader, understood not simply as one who consumes the text,
accepting or rejecting it as a complete, self-contained package. Proust acknowledges chat
the reader is obliged to approach texts only with his experience and knowledge of language
and culture, history and science, that is to say with other texts. As Barthes suggests: “Ce
«moi» qui s’approche du texte est deja lui-meme une pluralite d’autres textes.” “This ‘self
which approaches the text is already itself a plurality of other texts.”17To approach an
understanding of the problem of narrative identity as represented in Proust and Faulkner,
it helps to begin with the linguistic bases of subjectivity itself.
The use in psychology of the term “subject” demonstrates that field’s intimate
dependence on linguistic considerations. For the term subject, stricdy speaking, must refer
to the grammatical subject, and only by extension to the speaking (or writing) subject. The
illusion of voice in narrative emerges from the use of the pronoun “I,” which, as Emile
Benveniste points out, presupposes a communicative linguistic model based upon a
relationship between “I” and “you.” These pronouns are referred to as “shifters,” since they
continually shift referents in the context of a conversation. The pronound “je” refers to
‘T’individu qui enonce la presente instance de discours contenant l’instance linguistique je,”
“the individual uttering the present instance of speech containing the linguistic element
“I.”1*The shifter’s critical dependence upon context is also a characteristic of human
personality and identity.

17“La subjectivity est une image pleine, dont on suppose que j'encombre le tatte, mais dont la plenitude,
truqude, n’cst que le sillage de to us les codes qui me font, en sorte que ma subjectivity a la gdnyrality meme
des sferotypes. L'objectivitd est un templissage du meme ordnc e’est un systeme imaginaire commc les autiesf
.. une image qui sen a me faire nommer avantageusement, a me faire connaitre, a me myconnaitre.” Roland
Barthes, S/Z (Paris: Scuil, 1970) 16-17. (my translation). All further references to this text will be noted
parenthetically.
Emile Benveniste, Probldmes de linguistique gyndrale 1 (Paris: Gallimard. 1966) 252.
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The term voice suggests a presence, the source of the utterance, but the illusion of
voice is a phenomenon which is produced, and is therefore reproducible in language. It is
possible to assume the voice of another. Utterances are always susceptible to repetition
through quotation. The use of quotation marks is a convention meant to affirm presence,
to guarantee the intention of the source o f the enunciation, the person, in their absence.
The materiality of language, its inherent anonymity, its complete otherness with reference
to the individual, must be compensated by a whole series of contextual considerations
which serve to make language cohere with its “producer,” while simultaneously holding
them apart. It is not merely that speakers are to be responsible for their enunciations: the
rules which govern the use and ownership of certain utterances (the system of authorship,
of signatures, o f ritual, as Pierce and Derrida have shown, serve to produce “successful”
speech acts), create the illusion that subjects produce language, but the opposite is equally
true. What writers have explored in twentieth-century literature is how language produces
subjects. From these two hypotheses it does not take long to conclude that language
produces language. The self-perpetuating mechanics of language seems indifferent to the
presence or absence of individual human beings.
The problematizing of human identity in these novels points to what Katherine
Hayles refers to, in her discussions of “postmodern” epistemology, as the “posthuman,”
evoking the mechanical production of cultural artifacts through “feedback loops”
When the essential components o f human experience are denatured, they
are not merely revealed as constructions. The human subject who stands as
the putative source of experience is also deconstructed and then
reconstructed in ways that fundamentally alter what it means to be human.
The postmodern anticipates and implies the posthuman.'9
In such a formulation the human subject becomes little more than a hypo these, a figure of
language, constituted only as a function o f text or discourse. The Cartesian subject as selfknowledge and plenitude has disappeared as the anchor or origin o f subjectivity, which can
be thought of as the locus of the intersection of various, sometimes conflicting, voices.
” N. Katherine Hayles, Chaos Bound (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990) 266.
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In narrative, the narrating subject might best be thought of in the same terms that
Roland Barthes uses to describe the person, as a construction, a figure, the intersection of
an impersonal network of signifiers or “a collection of traits” and their associated
connotations, with a proper name, or, in the case of a first person narrator, the personal
pronoun “ I .”20 The first-person narrators of many twentieth-century novels often do not
function as substantial entities. The)' cease to be readable as coherent subjects, rather
becoming anonymous, impossible empty signifiers, such as the narrator of Samuel Beckett’s
Mollov. Beckett has simply taken the implications of Proustian discourse and gone further
than anyone else (including perhaps Proust himself) in demonstrating the nothingness of
human expression. This tendancy can be traced in much of twentieth century fiction,
including the work of William Faulkner.
The Subject of Psychoanalysis
Freudian psychoanalysis is a narrative-based practice. It borrows many of its
exemplary figures and terms from literature with the aim is of reconstituting a certain
narrative of the patient’s life. Psychoanalysis can be thought of as the composition of an
appropriate narrative of the self, an explanation of personality identity according to what
Peter Brooks has called Freud’s “masterplot.” This masterplot, driven by desire toward the
release o f tension, demands the shortest possible route, one obeying a strict logico-temporal
development. Using Roland Barthes’s description of the “readerly” text in S/Z. Brooks
points out that meaning in the classical, or readerly text, “resides in full predication,
completion o f the codes in a ‘plenitude” of signification.”21 This point of culmination of
traditional narrative is embodied in the deathbed scene so frequent in nineteenth century
novels: “all such scenes offer the promise of a significant retrospect, a summing-up, the
coming to completion of a fully predicated, and readable, sentence.” In this interpretation,
:o Roland Barthes. S/Z (Paris: Seuil, 1970) 101. All further refemces to this text will be noted parenthetically.
*' “ Beyond the Pleasure Principle constitutes Freud’s own masterplot, the essay where he lays out most fully a
total scheme o f how life proceeds from beginning to end. [...] This inescapable middle is suggestive of the
demonic repetition and return are perverse and difficult, interrupting simple movement forward." Peter
Brooks. “Freud’s Masterplot." Reading for the Plot; Design and Intention in Narrative (New York: Knopf.
1984) 96. 100. All further references to this text will be noted parenthetically.
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everything that delays or otherwise complicates or prolongs this progression is “deviant.” If
this is the case, then it should come as no surprise that texts such as these provoke reactions
of impatience or frustration on the part of many readers.
Narrative as Actions
The concept of narrative implies the relation of a series of actions rather than
description. This conception o f narrative may have come to us through the sixteenth
century’s transposition of the classical unities of time, place and action from the theater to
the novel. Though in practice authors have always produced works which stray from this
ideal, such as Sterne’s Tristram Shandy or Diderot’s Jacques le fataliste. the works which
comprise the canon of seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth century literature have
invariably obeyed this injunction: Rabelais, Cervantes, and Diderot were scorned by
readers of “serious” literature, as were “minor” forms such as the epistolary novel. This
model of good narrative is based upon a conception of history as chronology, as a linear
progression in time.
The movement of time referred to as chronological is a linear movement in which
time has only one dimension and one direction. In this view, the world has a beginning, a
middle and an end. This has been the West’s conception o f time since Genesis. Alphabetic
writing is linear, since it cannot be taken in visually all at once the way a painting can. The
linearity of narrative reinforces this conception of time, which has long dominated forms o f
European narrative, culminating in the novel as most people think of it, which reached its
pinnacle of popularity in the nineteenth century, with realist writers such as Dickens and
Balzac, Tolstoi and Zola. Taken this way, narrative implies a communicative act in which
an action is communicated. In a novel there are often innumerable actions recounted.
Traditional realist fiction takes as its paradigm a narrative in which actions are
recounted from beginning to end, in chronological order; the time of the narrative follows,
as closely as is possible, the chronological evolution of the plot. What characterizes the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

19
modernity of Faulkner and Proust is the ways in which their novels undo this linearity in
an attempt to imitate the constant accumulation and reinvention of memory.
For the French reader, the A la Recherche du temps perdu would be an excellent
example of such a technique, as it undoes, on almost every page, the linearity which we
commonly associate with time. Proust did more than any other to dispel the long held
assumption that stories are to be told from beginning to end. So many different
combinations are used, that Genette has employed Proust’s novel to illustrate a kind of
encyclopedia of narrative techniques. His analyses o f these techniques can be useful for
reading Faulkner’s novel. Genette begins by distinguishing between “story” and “narrative”
(“histoire” and “recit”)-the latter being the instance, or act o f storytelling, and the former
che story that is told. The “story” here can also be thought of as “plot.” The story must be
abstracted from the narrative in order for inconsistencies between them to be perceived. A
story is essentially to be defined as a series of actions or events which are linked together in a
narrative, by causality (logic), or chronology. There are, then, at least two layers of
temporality which can be discussed in reference to a narrative: there is the story tim e-xht
chronology or the plot, and the narrative or textual time-which refers, not to time, but to
the amount of text it takes to tell the story, the space that the text occupies on the page.
The distinction between narrative and plot allows Genette to identify several
possible variations on this discrepancy. An exact correlation between these two temporal
orders is seldom achieved, though the best example o f what such correlation might look
like might be the scene which often consists of dialogue. Genette distinguishes several
variations on this basic paradigm, which he calls anaehronies, or discordances between these
two temporal orders. When the amount of text devoted to the story decreases, the actions
seem to accelerate. Years of events can be summarized in a single sentence. The ellipse he
defines as an “infinite speed” where no text is devoted to a period of time. The text
effectively “skips forward,” as if nothing significant had happened in the intervening time.
Conversely, when the amount of text devoted to specific events increases, the story seems to
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slow down. The descriptive pause is a portion o f text which does not relate any action
whatsoever. The criticisms that early readers had for Proust’s novel often had to do with
the number of pages he devoted to descriptions or what seemed to be insignificant actions,
such as the narrator’s difficulty going to sleep in “Ouverture.”
Such passages are frequent in A la recherche, yet, as Gilles Deleuze points out, the
story does indeed advance. This is what he insists upon when he states that the novel is “not
turned toward the past, but toward the future and the progress of the narrator’s
“apprenticeship.”” As Coindreau notes, “Proust [...] nourished more on classical
disciplines, accepts certain conventional restraints. Chronology, for example, inspires in
him a respect that is unknown to Faulkner.”23 Such a judgment, is often useful in giving a
first-time reader a sense of what the text is doing, but it is also an oversimplification, for the
text moves continually into the past and into the future.24
Proust’s novel obeys a somewhat chronological progression, insofar as the hero can
be seen to “grow up.”24 He is older in the latter volumes, but the steady progress of his
development is not clearly indicated. There are no details given, for example, about his
formal education. Instead, the narrator describes different placer. Combray, Paris and the
Champs Elysees, Balbec, Venice, and Meseglise and Guermantes (Swann’s or the
Guermantes’s way) at Combray. As the narrator revisits each locality, he gives an a~ In Proust ct Ics sipnes. Deleuze claims “L’oeuvre de Proust n’est pas tournee vers le passe et les decouvertes
de la memoirc. mais vers le futur et ics progres de l'apprentissagc [...] le monde vacillc dans le courant de
I’apprentissage [...] La Recherche est rythmde, non pas simplcment par les apporxs ou sddiments de la
memoirc, mais par des series de deceptions discontinues" "Proust's work is not turned toward the past and the
discoveries of memory, but toward the future and the progress of learning [...] the world vacillates in the
learning process [...] the rhythm o f the Rerherr-he is not simply due to the work or sedimentation of
memory, but also by discontinuous series o f deceptions.” (35 -36).
23 ibid.
This is what Genette terms analepse and pnlepse In the analcpse, or flashback, the narrative returns to an
event which is to have occurred previously in the story. The analcpse is a textual moment which is "out of
place,” in which the narrative moves backwards in time to retell or recall a past event. A prolepse is an
evocation o f a event which is to come at a later point in the story-a flash forward.
” Throughout my text, when I will refer to the “hero” of A la Recherche du temps perdu, it will be to
distinguish as the novel does, between the “young” protagonist and the "older” narrator who tells the story,
although the coherence of these narrative persona is unstable, each being potentially subject to further
subdivision and qualifications. The narrator who recounts the experience of the "petite maddeine” (for
example) is not necessarily the same who has experienced the revelations of Le temps retrouvtL For a more
systematic discussion of this problem see Marcel Muller, Les voix narratives dans La recherche du temps
perdu’. 1965 (Geneva: Droz, 1983).
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chronological account of various events which took place at different moments over a
period of years in each. Rather than following a plot, in the sense of a series of
interconnected actions, Proust’s novel is more like a series of tableaus.
This is not to imply that there is not a definite diachronic narrative, a series of
events which take place in the novel, in which we learn, for example, of the narrator’s
family having moved into a new home, or, in Le temps retrouv^. that after two stays in a
sanatorium, the hero revisits Paris after the First World War. Opposed to this linear
movement of narrative is the a-chronological, paradigmatic, or descriptive practice of
Marcel Proust, in which he develops the associations o f multiple events with people and
localities. The assocative axis o f narrative has been associated ever since Proust with the
workings of memory, but is not usually associated with realist narrative. In Proust’s novel
the synchronic, or paradigmatic chain dominates the diachronic chain of the plot.
The first few pages of the novel are only the first of many reflections upon reading,
and upon the boundaries between reality and imagination, sleep and waking. There are
several full-length discussions o f the relationship between the waking state and that of
sleeping and dreaming scattered throughout the novel. Many sections of the novel begin
with the hero awakening in a new room after having made a voyage to Combray, to Paris,
to Balbec, to Donci&res, to Tansonviile, or to Venice. The awakening sleeper is one of the
recurring motifs which gives unity to the disparate scenes and episodes of the work as a
whole. The temporal indeterminacy characteristic of such moments is accompanied by a
fluidity o f space.
Reflecting on the twilight world of semiconsciousness between sleep and waking,
the narrator relates his perplexity at his inability to situate the physical space in which he
lies, to place himself in the here and now: “quand je m ’^veillais au milieu de la nuit, comme
j’ignorais ou je me trouvais, je ne savais meme pas au premier instant qui j etais” (S 5),
“when I awoke in the middle o f the night, not knowing where I was, I could not even be
sure at first who I was” (I: 5) Literally lost to the world, unable to correlate his memories to
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his presenc sense perceptions, he is adrift in the unmastered flow of memory and sensation:
“but then the memory-not yet of the place in which I was, but of various other places
where I had lived and might now very possibly be-would come like a rope let down from
heaven to draw me up out of the abyss of not-being, from which I could never have escaped
by myself* (I: 5 -6 ). The image o f the rope let down from heaven qualifies the reemergence of memory is a miraculous occurrence, independent of the will or effort to
remember. It is a fortuitous occurrence, dependent not upon the self, but upon forces
which seem to elude the processes of rational thought.
The hero’s loss o f consciousness of himself as self is induced in exemplary fashion
by the acts of reading and dreaming. So deep is the narrator’s loss of self that, when he
evokes his illusory identification with the novel he is reading, it is not with a character, bur
with objects, works of art or history. What follows will further call into question the
location as well as the time of the actions being described, and will link this uncertainty to
the acts of dreaming and reading.
Thus this great novel originates, not in the epiphanic moment of involuntary
memory, of fullness of meaning brought about by the taste o f the famous petite madeleine,
but in an experience of loss of self, and in the narrator’s subsequent attempts to reconstruct
his sense of being, to localize his consciousness in space and time, by clearly distinguishing
between memory and perception, self and other. As Leo Bersani has put it, Proust’s novel
consists in a “massive-massively reiterated and illustrated—anxiety about an unidentifiable,
perhaps unfindable particularity.”* The tide of Proust’s work A la recherche du temps
perdu emphasizes the search not as a task to be completed, but as an ongoing process.
These texts are cases in the clinical sense of the term: texts which disobey or
frustrate Freud’s “master plot.” As such they are, in the language of a normative model of
narrative behavior, “pathological.” Their portrayal of a particular subjectivity is bound up
in the attempt to create the monstrous inner narrative of the self, replete with all the
“ Leo Bersani .“Death and Literary Authority.” A New Histniy of French Literature, ed. Denis Hollier
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989) 863.
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obsessions, manias and idiosyncratic behavior we commonly associate with eccentricity,
chat is to say, with personality. Branding this kind o f narrative as “pathological” is simply
the consequence o f the Freudian model’s self-assertion as the norm. This model o f narrative
expectation is arguably based upon a particularly masculine version of desire and reading,
thus excluding other forms, represented by texts just such as the ones I am discussing. Yet,
as I hope to show, there is simultaneously at work in these novels, a formidable machine for
producing narrative, one that seems to be inexhaustible and which absorbs all
manifestations of novelty, and which continually frustrates all desire for completion or fully
predicated actions.
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Chapter 2: Being and Nothingness in A la recherche du tem ps perdu
Proust's A la Recherche du temps perdu continues to fascinate us because it was
among the first o f the twentieth century to explore this fragility o f human identity and
sense o f self. T he fragility o f the narrator’s sense o f self is the principal theme o f the
novel. Although it could be read as realist novel, an intricate portrait o f bourgeois life in
French society during the Belle Epoqe, inthe period roughly from 1870 to 1921, it is also
a demonstration o f the precariousness, the nothingness of being. These two aspects o f the
narrative are not unrelated .Just as personality and being are fleeting, so too the concept of
the nation as a unified entity is shown to be illusory.’ It is in the problematic identity and
disunity o f the narrating subject that Proust’s novel ultimately calls into question the
status o f the nation.
In the opening lines o f the novel (which describe actions taking place much closer
to the end o f this quasi-circular narrative), the protagonist suffers from an unresolved and
unresolvable identity crisis, revealed in his bouts with insomnia. The very first word of
the novel is a reference to a period o f time which is never clearly indicated.
Longtemps je me suis couchd de bonne heure. Parfbis, a peine ma bougie
eteinte, mes yeux se fermaient si vice que je n ’avais pas le temps de me
dire: «Je m ’endors.» Et, une demi-heure apres, la pensee qu’il dtait temps
de chercher le sommeil m ’eveillair; je voulais poser le volume que je
croyais avoir encore dans les mains et souffler ma lumi&re; je n ’avais pas
cesse en dorm ant de faire des reflexions sur ce que je venais de lire, mais
ces reflexions avaient pris un tour un peu particulier; il me semblait que
j’etais moi-meme ce dont parlait l’ouvrage: une Iglise, un quatour, la
rivalite de Francois Ier et de Charles Q uint. (S 3)
For a long time I used to go to bed early. Sometimes, when I had put out
my candle, my eyes would close so quickly that I had not even time to
say ‘I’m going to sleep.’ And half an hour later the thought that it was
time to go to sleep would awaken me; I would try to put away the book
______ which, I imagined, was still in my hands, and to blow out the light; I had
' This is the argument o f Leo Bersani: “La fragility du sens du moi [c’est] le theme principal de la vie de
Marcel [...] tour entiere marquee par des episodes cruciaux qui mettenten reliefune etonnante perte d’etre [..
.] la non-reconnaissance d ’un lieu [...] est ressentie comme un dchec de toured«fsignarinn. et plus
do uloureusement encore, comme undchcc de la reconnaissance du moi.” “The fragility o f his sense o f self is
the main theme in the life o f Marcel [...] altogether marked by crucial episodes which put into perspective an
astonishinglossofbeing [...] the inability to recognizea place [...] is perceived as a failure o f all designation,
and more painfully yet, as a failure to recognize the self.” “Drfguisements du m oiet an fragmentaire,”
Recherche de Pro ust. Gerard Genette and Tzvetan Todorov. Eds. (Paris: Seuil, 1980) 16-17.
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been chinking all the time, while 1 was asleep, o f what I had just been
reading, but my choughts had run into a channel o f their own, until I
myself seemed actually to have become the subject o f my book: a church,
a quartet, the rivalry between Francois I and Charles V. (I: 3)
Proust’s hero must first make a difficult discovery o f himself in the present moment, and
is at pains to relate that moment to his past and his possible future. He does not know
where he is, and, as he indicates a few pages later, does not even know who he is. Neither
does the reader. The vague “longtemps” here must be related to the moment of the
revelation in the subsequent scene o f the “petite madeleine.” This event, at which point
the memories which will become the novel emerge, stands in an ambiguous relation to
the hero’s final revelation at the Princess de Guermantes’ matinee in Le temps retrouve.
In the first part of “Combray” (S3 - 47) he is already an old man, having experienced
most o f what will come in the novel, “II y avait d^ja bien des annees que, de Combray,
tout ce que n ’ecait pas le theatre et le drame de mon coucher n’existaic plus pour moi” (S
44), “Many years had elapsed during which nothing of Combray, save what was
comprised in the theatre and the drama o f my going to bed there, had any existence for
me” (I: 48). The hypothetical m oment o f the novel’s composition would thus fall
sometime after this moment at which everthing that is to come, most o f the novels
action, had already taken place, including the ultimate revelations at the Princess de
Guermantes’s party.
The language of the Recherche expresses not the plenitude o f being as presence,
but the absence or void with which the narrator is faced when he tries to call upon his
experience and knowledge o f the world. Narrative is a supplementary act which seeks to
fill the chasm, to supply something which is missing, the memories which constitute the
narrator’s identity.
The unreliability of human thought finallycalls into question the nature of
existence. This is suggested in the “Ouverture,” in the narrator’s efforts to remember
where he was upon waking. These opening pages demonstrate the fragility o f the
narrator’s sense of self and the tenuous nature of the line separating consciousness and
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unconsciousness, and establish a tone of flux which will persist throughout the novel.
Even such absolute concepts as time and matter are called into question:
Peut-etre l’immobilite des choses autour de nous leur est-elle imposee par
notre certitude que ce sont elles et non pas d ’autres, par I'immobilite de
notre pens6e en face d’elles. Toujours est-il que, quand je me reveillais
ainsi, mon esprit s’agitant pour chercher, sans y reussir, a savoir oil j etais,
tout tournait autour de moi dans l’obscurit^, les choses, les pays, les
annles. Mon corps, trop engourdi pour remuer, cherchait, d ’apres la
forme de sa fatigue, a reperer la position de ses membres pour en induire
la direction du mur, la place des meubles, pour reconstruire et pour
nommer la demeure oil il se trouvait. Sa memoire, la memoire de ses
cotes, de ses genoux, de ses epaules, lui presentait successivement
plusieurs des chambres oil il avait dormi, tandis qu’autour de lui les murs
invisibles, changeant de place selon la forme de la pi&ce imaginee,
tourbillonnaient dans les tenfebres. Et avant meme que ma pensee, qui
hesitait au seuil des temps et des formes, eut identifie le logis en
rapprochant les circonstances, lui, - mon corps, - se rappelait pour chacun
le genre du lit, la place des portes, la prise de jour des fenetres, l’exstence
d ’un couloir, avec la pensee que j’avais en m ’y endormant et que je
retrouvais au reveil. (S 6)
Perhaps the immobility o f the things that surround us is forced upon
them by our conviction that they are themselves and not anything else, by
the immobility o f our conception of them. For it always happened that
when I awoke like this, and my mind struggled in an unsuccessful
attempt to discover where I was, everything revolved around me through
the darkness: things, places, years. My body, still too heavy with sleep to
move, would endeavor to construe from the pattern of its tiredness, the
position o f its various limbs, in order to deduce therefrom the direction
of the wall, the location o f the furniture, to piece together and give a
name to the house in which it lay. Its memory, the composite memory o f
its ribs, its knees, its shoulder-blades, offered it a whole series o f rooms in
which it had at one time or another slept, while the unseen walls, shifting
and adapting themselves to the shape o f each successive room that it
remembered, whirled round it in the dark. And even before my brain,
lingering in cogitation over when things had happened and what they had
looked like, had reassembled the circumstances sufficiently to identify
the room, it, my body, would recall from each room in succession, the
style o f the bed, the position of the doors, the angle at which the daylight
came in at the windows, whether there was a passage outside, what I had
had in my mind when I went to sleep and found there when I awoke. (I:
6)

Here the narrator posits a split between conscious memory and a body memory, only
partially accessible to consciousness. The disconnection between body and mind results
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in the descab ilization o f space and time, as the rooms spin around and adjust themselves
to the posture o f the sleeper. The narrator’s memory o f himself is strongly linked to his
present sense perceptions. He describes himself dreaming of a girl, o f the room in which
he’s sleeping, as emanations o f the positions o f his thigh or arms.
W hat is poorly understood gives way to certainty, which is in turn revised, for the
narrator is not yet awake. The image o f the room in which he sleeps lades away to be
replaced by another, and then another: “Puis renaissait le souvenir d’une nouvelle
attitude; le m ur filait dans une autre direction: j’^tais dans ma chambre chez M m e de
Saint-Loup, a la campagne” (S 6 - 7). “Then the memory of a new position would spring
up, and the wall would slide away in another direction; I was in my room in M me de
Saint-Loup’s house in the country” (I: 7). T he narrator’s very body along with the
physical space itself, are shown to be a constructs o f memory and imagination. It is che
fragility o f this construct, the elusiveness o f memory, which gives his narrative its
impetus. The narrative act will be an atempt to reestablish the relationship between mind
and body, thought and reality.
The suggestion that the immobility o f matter is an illusion is one that would have
seemed quite acceptable to Albert Einstein, who was developing his theories about the
equivalence o f matter and energy at the same time that Proust was writing. If the
invariability o f the external world is dependent uponche immobility o f thought, Proust’s
novel will demonstrate chat the variability o f the latter implies the changeability o f the
former.
In che image o f the waking narrator-hero, seeing first one and then another room
from his past materialize around him, Proust offers a quick panorama o f the work to
come in the evocation o f the various bedrooms in which the narrator has slept: “j’^rais a la
campagne, chez m on grand-p&re, m on depuis bien des anndes [...] j’&ais chez Mme de
Saint-Loup,” W hen, he is finally “folly awake,” the narrator spends the rest o f the night
trying to remember each place, and in so doing, announces the essential settings for the
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whole novel: “je passais la plus grande partie de la nuit a me rappeler notre vie d’autrefois, a
Combray chez ma grande-tante, a Balbec, a Paris, a Doncieres, a Venise, ailleurs encore”
(9). The novel will eventually return to each these places, although through this
announcement they are little more than proper names. Thus Proust establishes an
imaginary topography which is litde more than a toponymy, but which will provide a
“map” for the reader.
As he describes himself regaining consciousness, he describes the simultaneous
presence o f different moments with a spatial analogy: “Un ho mme qui don tient en cercle
autour de lui le fil des heures, l’ordre des annles et des mondes. 11 les consulte d’instinct en
s’eveillant et y lit en une seconde le point de la terre qu’il occupe, le temps qui s’est ecoule
jusqua son reveil: mais leurs rangs peuvent se meler, se rompre.” “When a man is asleep, he
has in a circle round him the chain of the hours, the sequence of the years, the order of the
heavenly host. Instinctively, when he awakes, he looks to these and in an instant reads off
his own position on the eanh’s surface and the time that has elapsed during his slumbers;
but this ordered procession is apt to grow confused, and to break its ranks” (I: 5). Proust’s
whole novel is a demonstration of how the “ranks” of time can intertwine, or break off,
how time has a geometry which is non-linear. Proustian narration takes its cue from the
sleeper who “holds in a circle around himself the thread of the hours, the order o f years and
worlds.” In the images of the various rooms which the narrator has known and of which he
will eventuallly tell, Proust assembles the various settings of which the reader will learn,
into a tabelau, as the moments are superimposed, une upon the other. To say that narrative
moments can be juxtaposed, or superimposed, is to apply a visual metaphor to the apparently
linear. In L’espace proustien. Georges Poulet has pointed out the way in which Proust’s
novel spatializes temporality by juxtaposing different moments: “ L’ceuvre de Proust est
faite [...] d’une slrie de scenes detachees, d&oup&s dans le trame du foel. [.. .] ce qui
^tait temporel est main tenant &afe. Ainsi le temps cide la place k l’espace” “Proust’s work is
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made up [...] of a series of decached scenes, cut out o f the thread of the real. [...] chat
which was temporal is now spread out. Thus time gives way to space”2*
Just as the waiting hero is unable to situate his place and time, it is virtually
impossibile to determine the context, or to localize the spatio-temporal origin, of the
narrating voice in the novel. When and where should we situate the narrator who says
“Longtemps” or the one which tells of staying in a sanatorium in Le temps retrouvd? It is
assumed that since he begins as if he were telling the story of his life, the gap between the
narrating “je” and the young hero will eventually dose, but there remains, after che final
reception at the Princess de Guermantes’ an unbreachable distance between the present of
the narrator and the present of the narrated hero. The very structure of the narrative
suggests the illusory nature o f the present as the point of transition from what is not to
what is no longer. The Proustian “Je” is a pronoun without referent, speaking from
absence, not a presence but a language. As Muller points out, “here and now do not belong
to the vocabulary of the Recherche.”29When such words as “today” or “now” appear in the
text, they refer sometimes to the present of the narration, sometimes to the hero’s present
in the story, as if the narrator were reliving his past as another present. The “now” is
constantly changing in the flux o f memory and association. “Here” and “now” are, for all
practical purposes, equivalent to “there” and “then.” The effect is to flatten time to a virtual
present in the space of the text itsdf.
Proust’s project was ambitious. To unify it, he had to decide upon a form. He had
already made an unsuccessful attempt at a novel, and had begun an essay in the form of a
dialogue, but it wasn’t until he dedded to use a first person narrator that he found the
3 Georges P»nU 1 V«pane prp|.«pfn rParif Gallimard, 1963) 129-30 (my translation).
“entre ie jour de la reception chez la princesse, et celui oil le Narrateur raconte cette reception, route une ere
s'etend qui maintient entre le Hdros et le Narrateur un intervalle [infranchissable]. Si le Htiros rejoint le
Narrateur, c’est a la fa^on d ’une asymptote: la distance qui les s^pare rend vers zdro; die ne s’annulera jamais.
[...] Proust osdlie entre la-ias et fa n o u t, entre dm et toujours. Id et m aintenant n’appartiennent pas au
vocabulaire de La Recherche. ' (49-50, 86) ‘between the day of the princesses reception and the one on
which the Narrator tells us o f that reception, there stretches a whole era which maintains between the Hero
and the Narrator an unbreachable interval. [__ ] If the Hero rejoins the Narrator, it is asymptotically: the
distance which separates them tends toward zero, but will never disappear. [ ...] Proust oscillates between
there and everywhere. between then and always. Here and now do not bdong to the vocabulary of the
fic c h a d g ’’ Marcel Muller, lo s Vnhr Narrra rives dans La Recherche du temps perdu. 1965 (Geneva: Droz.
1983) 86 (my translation). All further references to this text will be noted parenthetically.
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means to bring all o f these things together. Proust had to forgo an omniscient narrator in
order to dramatize the alternation of forgetfulness and remembrance, of “time lost” and
“time regained,” which would also serve to structure his great novel. As elusive as the
former proves to be, the narrative is propelled forward by the promise of the latter.
The narrator o f A la Recherche du temps perdu is continually at pains to uncover
the depths of the human psyche, and, in doing so, he reveals as much through the structure
of his language as he does through his observations. Proust has it both ways, regaling his
passion for description and observation, while the narrator spends much time lamenting his
inability to observe and understand the people and things around him “always I was
incapable of seeing anything for which a desire had not already been roused in me by
something I had read, anything of which 1 had not myself traced in advance a sketch which
I wanted now to confront with reality” (III: 739). Each time he does this, however, his
sketch is revealed to be a fiction and the nature of reality remains forever hidden to him.
Nevertheless, Proust’s narrator goes to great effort to remember details of his observations.
The hero’s memories constitute the subtance of the novel, and thus the
preoccupation of the reader, but the style of the narration is also highly significant.
Proustian syntax has often been criticized for its incessant asides and parenthetical remarks,
but his sentences, while often quite long, seldom stray from the strict hierarchy of classical
syntax. Even with the “cascading” subordinate clauses referred to by Coindreau, Prousts’
phrases are usually grammatically and logically coherent.. Speaking o f the “strange syntactic
qualities” of Proust’s language, Julia Kristeva notes that they are “uncharacteristic of
French” and “are thought to be closer to Latin, since the various components of Proust’s
sentences are separated by unusual distances:”
The Proustian sentence, which is binary yet expansive, incorporates many
subordinate clauses that delay the closure o f the logical and syntactic
totality, either by returning to preceding themes and linguistic items or by
developing the themes and items contained in the sentence itself. What is
more, Proust’s sentence contains indefinite interlocking parts that make its
______ meaning difficult to discern.. .30
* Julia Kristeva Promt and the Sense o f Time, trans. Stephen Bann (New York: Columbia University Press,
1993)291.
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It is the delay of closure through the development o f the various subordinate clauses that
crystallize the aesthetic of “involuntary memory’ in the Proustian sentence, forcing the
reader to have to re-read, to return to the beginning of the sentence, to retrace the
meandering paths o f his thought.
Proust’s novel is often read as an exhaustive, even exasperating, portrayal o f the
sometimes incoherent patterns of human thought. The narrator attempts to systematize
and catalogue the intricate turns and twists of human thought—particularly in his analyses
of jeafousy-Chaiies Swann’s jealous)' for Odette de Crdcy, and the hero’s jealousy for
Albertine. What the text ultimately dramatizes is the fragility of consciousness. It
demonstrates the chaos barely hidden beneath the illusion of structure, the inability of
thought to be consistent, to cohere with itself over time.31 The difficulty of Proust’s style is
perhaps an inevitable consequence of the attempt to represent the precariousness o f thought
processes.
The Recherche stands in an ambiguous relationship to the genre of the
autobiographical novel. For a first person recounting of the narrator’s own life, it tells us
very little about him. What litde factual details we have can be briefly summarized. He
seems to hail from a respectable bourgeois family. We learn in A 1’ombre des jeunes ftlles en
fleurs that his father wishes him to study law and enter the diplomatic service, while the
hero himself expresses his desire to become a great writer. The narrator as protagonist,
however, seldom speaks, and even when he does, his words are seldom reported, it is rather
the reactions of others that we are given. Gaeton Picon calls Proust’s narrator an “un je
impenonnel“(“an impersonal I”), and “un miroir du monde,” (“a mirror of the world”).33
Marcel Muller, too, calls Proust's narrator a “collector of images o f the past” rather than an
actual individual: “jamais les gouts ou les repugnances qui pourraient ddfinir sa personne ne
nous sonr precises,” “The tastes or repugnances which could define his person are never
11 Margaret E. Gray has argued that the narrative voice in the Recherche is [ ...] “usually read as the rich,
interiorized almost obsessively analyzed experience [ ...] of a powerful subjectivity, that subjectivity is as
contested as it is developed’ Postmodern Proust (10).
v Gaeton Picon, L'Usage de la lecture 111; Lecture de Proust (Paris: Mercure de France. 1963).
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precisely presented” (Muller 86). The narrator could be described as a kind of voyeur, an
observer rather than as one who takes action, whose name is never given, and who rarely
lets his own voice be heard.
Although (or because) the Recherche is from the beginning centered around the
quest for personal identity by a narrator, he is the only character in the whole 3000 page
novel who is almost never named. This peculiarity is all the more significant given the
repeated long passages of the novel which discuss proper names: the chapters entitled
“Nom de pays: le nom” and “Nom de pays: le pays,” or the discussions of the etymologies
of place names by the Cure of Combray in Du cotd de chez Swann (103). and by professor
Brichot in Sodome et Gomorrhe, 280, 316, 321). The narrator also takes great interest in
the names of aristocratic families. The manifest importance of proper names in Proust’s
novel has led Roland Barthes to postulate, perhaps somewhat excessively, that the
establishment o f an onomasticon was the condition sine qua non which allowed the author
to begin writing.33
His possible name is only mentioned as spoken to him by Albertine, the ultimate
mysterious being in the novel. It is over a thousand pages into the novel, in an episode of
La Prisonnifere. that the name “Marcel” is only conditionally suggested as a possible name
for the narrator. Having installed Albertine in his parents’ apartment in Paris, he observes
her sleeping. When she wakes, she speaks his name: “Elle retrouvait la parole, elle disait:
«Mon» ou mon «cheri», suivi l’un ou l’autre de mon nom de bapt&me, ce qui, en donnant
au narrateur le m£me prdnom de l’auteur de ce livre, eut fait:«Mon Marcel**, «Mon chdri
’’ Barthes argues that the proper names of the Recherche work as infinitely explotable signifiers: '‘Comme
signe le Nom propre s’offrc i une exploration a un ddchifFrement.’' “As a sign the proper name offers itself to
exploration, to deciphering"] ‘si le Nom [ ...] est un signe, c'cst un signe volumincux, un signe toujours gros
d une epaisseur touffue de sens, qu’aucun usage ne vient reduire, apiadr [...] Le nom est en effet caudysable\
on peut le remplir, le dilater, combler les interstices de son armature sdmique d’une infinitd de tajouts [...]
C’est parce que le Nom propre s’oflTe a une catalyse d ’une richesse infinie, qu’ii est possible de dire que
podtiquement, route la Recherche est sorti de quelques noms." ‘ if the Name is a sign, it is a voluminous one,
always pregnant with a dense thickness of meaning, the use o f which does not reduce or flatten out [ ...] the
name can, in effect, be expanded, filled in, dilated; the chinks in its semiotic armature can be loaded with an
infinity of additios. It is because the proper name offers itself to an infintdy rich expansion that it is possible
to say that, poetically, all of the R w W li> came out o f a few names" (‘Proust et les noms’ 125-28, my
transladon).
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Marcel»” (P 67). The name is repeated for the second and last time a few pages further on,
in an example of the kinds of notes Albertine would send the narrator to reassure him of
her faithfulness (P 147). The general suspicion with which the narrator regards everything
she tells him reflects on the reader’s ability to trust her word, even when she seems to be
identifying the narrator/hero by name.
With no way of situating the narrating present, and no way to identify the narrator
by any name other than the pronoun “je,” the narrating voice remains peculiarly
anonymous, as if it were only by fully reconstructing the past that he could finally be
present to himself or identify his contemporary surroundings. The Recherche is, however,
among other things, a story of forgetfulness and a failure to understand people. It is no
wonder then, that, in spite of the “revelation” in the final volume, a revelation which
remains on the level of inarticulate perception, the prose of the book can only point toward
an as yet to be written work which would incorporate the lessons learned from the
involuntary memory. That A la recherche du temps perdu /rthat book Proust would not go
so far as to say (TR 350-51).
Memory and Oblivion
The Recherche is a novel that is as much about forgetfulness as about memory.
Before the awakening of the involuntary memory all the hero could recall about Combray
were fragments, bits and pieces of memories: the magic lantern and his mother’s good night
kiss, the little bell on the garden gate, Swann’s ritual visits, and being sent to bed. These
images he likens to “cette sorte de pan lumineux, ddcoupl au milieu d’indistinctes tenebres
[. ..] toujours vu it la meme heure, isoll de tout-ce qu’il pouvait y avoir autour, se
ddtachant seul sur l’obscurite” (S 43-44), “this son of luminous panel, sharply defined
against a vague and shadowy background [...], seen always at the same evening hour,
isolated from all that might have been around it, detached and solitary against the dark
background” (I: 46 - 47). The voluntary memory is a frozen memory, one which screens as
much as it reveals, thus distorting its object: “as though all Combray had consisted of but
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rwo floors joined by a slender staircase and as chough there had been no time there but
seven o ’clock at night” (I: 47). The Proustian hero demonstrates the frailty o f memory
through his inability toobserve and remeber. Conscious memory in the Recherche is
always faltering, always inadequate, demanding supplemental information. The moment
of involuntary memory is presented as a miracle, a moment o f plenitude in which “the
vicissitudes o f life had become indifferent to me” (I: 48).
What many commentators overlook is that even after the awakening o f the
involuntary memory, and as they are evoked in the narrative, the events and characters o f
the novel are fragmented, synthetic.34The moment o f epiphany in itself is an inarticulate
impression of recognition and unfamiliarity. Strange, yet intimately familiar, the joy felt
by the hero comes from himself. “II m avait aussitot rendu les vicissitudes de la vie
indifferences [ . . de la meme fa^on qu’opfcre 1’amour, en me remplissant d’une essence
precieuse: ou plutot cette essence n etait pas en moi, elle erair m oi” (S 44) And at once
the vicissitudes of life had become indifferent to me, its disasters innocuous [...] this
new sensation having had on me the effect which love has o f filling me with a precious
essence; or rather this essence was not in me it was me. (I: 48). This “precious essence”
emanating from within the self is nevertheless alien to the hero’s consciousness. It is
inexplicable, incompehensible.
Je pose la tasse et me tourne vers mon esprit. C ’est & lui de trouver la
verife. Mais comment? Grave incertitude, toutes les fbis que l’esprit se sent
d£pass^ par lui-meme; quand lui, le chercheur, est tout ensemble le pays
obscur oil il doit chercher et ou tout son bagage ne lui sera de rien.
Chercher? pas seulement: creer. II est en face de quelque chose qui nest
pas encore et que seul il peut fealiser, puis faire entrer dans sa lumi&re. (S
45)
I put down the cup and examine my own mind. It alone can discover the
truth. But how? W hat an abyss o f uncertainty, whenever the mind feels
overtaken by itself; when it, the seeker, is at the same time the dark region
* I am referring here to Genette’s definition o f “synthetic narrative” in his discussion o f the last scene in the
novel: the Princess ofGuermantes s reception, “qui est presque constammenr traitde sur le mode itdratih ce
n est pas led&oulement diachronique de la inception chez la princesse, dans la succession des tfvlnements qui
la remplissent, qui commande la composition du texte, maisplutdt Enum eration d ’un certain nombrc de
classes d occurrences, dont chacune symhetise plusieurs (fvenementsdispersesen fait tout au long de la
•matinfe* [...JJ’appelleraice second type iteration interne ou synth/tisante"[...] (150).
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through which it must go seeking and where all its equipment will avail it
nothing. Seek? More than that: create. It is face to face with something
which does not yet exist, to which it alone can give reality and substance,
which it alone can bring into the light of day. (I: 49)
The extreme effort the protagonist must make to understanding its origins and meaning
demonstrate the misrecognition, the misapprehension implicit in any conscious
understanding of oneself.35 It is only through great effort that he is able to plumb the
depths of its meaning and to give narrative form and consistency to what was only a
fleeting inarticulate sensation. The proustian moment always requires a supplementary act
of decipherment, which is equivalent to the act of writing. The search is in fact a creation.
Any pretense to truth must be qualified by the impossibility of objectivity when the subject
is indistinguishable from its object.
Proust’s equivalent of Faulkner’s postage stamp might well be the cup of tea in
which his protagonist dips the madeleine. It is from this tiny space that all of his novel is
said to emerge:
Et des que j’eus reconnu le gout du morceau de Madeleine trempe dans le
tilleul que me donnait ma tante (quoique je ne susse pas encore et dusse
remettre a bien plus tard de ddcouvrir pourquoi ce souvenir me rendait si
heureux), aussitdt la vieille maison grise sur la rue, ou dtait sa chambre, vine
comme un d^cor de theatre s’appliquer au petit pavillion, donnant sur le
jardin, qu’on avait construit pour mes parents sur ses derri&res (ce pan
tronque que seul j’avais revu jusque-la); et avec la maison, la ville, depuis le
matin jusqu’au soir et par tous les temps, la Place ou on m’envoyait avant
dejeuner, les rues ou j’allais faire des courses, les chemins qu’on prenait si le
temps dtait beau. Et comme dans ce jeu oil les Japonais s’amusent &
tremper dans un bol de porcelaine rempli d’eau, de petits morceaux de
papier jusque-l<i indistincts qui, & peine y sont-ils plongds s’etirent, se
contournent, se colorent, se difftrencient, deviennent des fleurs, des
maisons, des personnages consistants et reconnaissables, de meme
maintenant toutes les fleurs de notre jardin et celles du pare de M. Swann,
et les nymphdas de la Vivonne, et les bonnes gens du village et leurs petits
logis et l’eglise et tout Combray et ses environs, tout cela qui prend forme
et solidite, est sorti, ville et jardins, de ma tasse de thd. (S 47)
And as soon as I had recognized the taste o f the piece of madeleine soaked
in her decoction o f lime-blossom which my aunt used to give me
(although I did not yet know and must long postpone the discovery of why
35O r what a Lacanian might refer to as the absolute otherness o f the unconscious.
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this memory made me so happy), immediately the old grey house upon the
street, where her room was, rose up like a stage set to attach itself to the
little pavilion opening on to the garden which had been built out behind it
for my parents (the isolated segment which until that moment had been all
that I could see); and with the house the town, from morning to night and
in all weathers, the Square where I used to be sent before lunch, the streets
along which I used to run errands, the country roads we took when it was
fine. As in the game wherein the Japanese amuse themselves by filling a
porcelain bowl with water and steeping in it little pieces of paper which
until then are without character or form, but, the moment they become
wet, stretch and twist and take on colour and distinctive shape, become
flowers or houses or people, solid and recognisible, so in that moment, all
the flowers in our garden and in Mr. Swann’s park, and the water lilies on
the Vivonne and the good folk of the village and their little dwellings and
the parish church and the whole of Combray and its surroundings, taking
shape and solidity, sprang into being, town and gardens alike, from my cup
of tea. (I: 51)
It is not from the teacup itself, but from the hidden recesses, the black hole of memory that
the narrator’s story emerges, across the span of time, through the resemblance o f a sensor}'
perception in the present to a forgotten one in the past. The involuntary memory in proust
is not the narrative, but a moment which remains isolated, privileged, an “epiphany,” in
which the subject expresses a sense of self-presence: “J’avais cesse de me sentir mediocre
contingent mortel” (S 44). This sense o f exhaltation is concurrent with the resurrection of
the forgotten past in the guise of people and places. The narrator’s chance encounter with
such sensations triggers what Proust calls “involuntary memory.” Out of the formlessness
and insignificance of the “litde pieces of papier” or the empty teacup all of the beings and
things which existed in the past are made present. This event happens unexpectedly,
independently o f the hero’s will. This involuntary memory is opposed to the conscious act
of remembering, which pales in comparison, and could be thought of as a kind o f
forgetting.
As soon as the hero seeks to articulate the epiphanic moment and to intentionally
examine the sensations of memory which it resurrects, the moment has passed: “Je pose la
tasse et me tourne vers mon esprit. C’est a lui de trouver la verite, mais comment?” (S 45).
The work of remembering is not merely a task o f seeking out the truth from forgotten
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memories, he says, but a task of creation. The novel grows out of the desire to illuminate
the “vague and shadow)' background,” to restore the narrative of reality'. It is a difficult,
conscious effort, far removed from the involuntary memory’s moment of “epiphany.”
C’est ainsi que, pendant longtemps, quand, rdveille la nuit, je me
ressouvenais de Combray, je n ’en revis jamais que cette sorte de pan
lumineux, de'coupe au milieu d’indistinctes ten&bres, pareil a ceux que
I’embrasement d’un feu de Bengale ou quelque projection electrique
eclairent et sectionnent dans un edifice dont les autres parties restent
plongees dans la n u it: a la base assez large, le petit salon, la salle a manger,
l’amorce de l’allee obscure par oil arriverait M. Swann, 1’auteur inconscient
de mes tristesses, le vestibule ou je m ’acheminais vers la premiere marche de
1’escalier, si cruel a monter, qui constituait a lui seul le tronc fort etroit de
cette pyramide irrlguli&re ; et, au faite, ma chambre a coucher avec le petit
couloir a porte vitree pour l’entree de maman ; en un mot, toujours vu a la
meme heure, isole de tout ce qu’il pouvait y avoir autour, se detachanr seul
sur 1’obscurite, le decor strictement necessaire (comme celui qu’on voit
indique en tete des vieilles pieces pour les representations en province), au
drame de mon deshabillage; comme si Combray n’avait consiste qu’en deux
etages relies par un mince escalier, et comme s’il n’y avait jamais etl que
sept heures du soir. A vrai dire, j’aurais pu repondre a qui m’eut interroge
que Combray comprenait encore autre chose et existait a d’autres heures.
Mais comme ce que je m’en serais rappele m ’eut ete fourni seulement par la
memoire volontaire, la memoire de l’intelligence, et comme les
renseignements qu’elle donne sur le passe ne conservent rien de lui, je
n’aurais jamais eu envie de songer a ce reste de Combray. Tout cela etait en
realite m on pour moi.
Mort a jamais ? C’etait possible.
II y a beaucoup de hasard en tout ceci, et un second hasard, celui de
notre mon, souvent ne nous permet pas d’anendre longtemps les faveurs du
premier. (S 43)
And so it was that, for a long time afterwards, when I lay awake at night
and revived old memories of Combray, I saw no more of it than this son of
luminous panel, sharply defined against a vague and shadowy background,
like the panels which the glow of a Bengal light or a searchlight beam will
cut out and illuminate in a building the other parts of which remain
plunged in darkness: broad enough at its base, the little parlour, the dinig
room, the opening of the dark path from which M. Swann, the unwitting
author o f my sufferings, would emerge, the hall through which I would
journey to the first step of that staircase, so painful to climb, which
constituted, all by itself, the slender cone of this irregular pyramid; and, at
the summit, my bedroom, with the little passage through whose glazed
door Mamma would enter; in a word, seen always at the same evening
hour, isolated from all its possible surroundings, detached and solitary
against the dark background, the bare minimum of scenery necessary (like
the decor one sees prescribed on the title-page of an old play, for its
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performance in the provinces) to the drama of my undressing; as though all
Combray had consisted of but two floors joined by a slender staircase, and
as though there had been no time there but seven o’clock at night. I must
own that I could have assured any questioner that Combray did include
other scenes and did exist at other hours than these. But since the facts
which 1 should then have recalled would have been prompted only by
voluntary memory, the memory of the intellect, and since the pictures
which that kind of memory shows us preserve nothing o f the past itself, I
should never have had any wish to ponder over this residue o f Combray.
To me it was in reality all dead.
Permanently dead? Very possibly
There is a huge element of chance in these matters, and a second
chance occurrence, that of our own death, often prevents us from awaiting
for any length of time the favours of the first. (I: 4 6 -7 )
Here the memory of the intellect is equated with forgetting, with a kind of death. There is
a sense in which chance {le hasard) is equivalent to death, since it seems to negate the will
or efforts of the individual. So paramount a role does chance play in Proust’s novel that
often ic is capitalized. It is at once that which brings death, through the unexpected, and
that which brings life, awakening the hero from the slumber of the quoddien. The
involuntary memory, which the narrator claims to be more real than ordinary memory
(which is then more akin to fortgetting) is fundamentally dependent on forces beyond the
conscious control of the subject, on the chance encounter of an object which evokes it.
The narrator spends a great deal of textual time lamenting his inability to observe
and understand the people and things around him. He details his obsessive desire for
Gilberte Swann, Mme Swann, Madame de Guermantes and finally Alberune. He goes so
far as to surrepddously follow Madame de Guermantes in her walks around Paris. In
Proust the other is an enigma to be deciphered, but which continually frustrates all efforts
to know. Interposed between the observer and the world is the mirror of language. The
hero realizes this only in the final volume “j’dtais incapable de voir ce dont le dlsir n’avait
pas ^te dveilld en moi par quelque lecture, ce dont je n’avais pas d’avance dessinl moi-meme
le croquis que je de'sirais ensuite confronter avec la rfalitd” (TR 25), “Always I was
incapable of seeing anything for which a desire had not already been roused in me by
something I had read, anything of which I had not myself traced in advance a sketch which
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I wanted now to confront with reality” (III: 739). Each time he does this, however, his
“sketch” is revealed to be false. Reality remains forever elusive, hidden to him.
This inability to know, to fully define one’s context becomes an inability to know
oneself, and thus an inability to be. The narrator is the only character in the novel who is
never specifically and explicitly named.36Yet, the text spends much o f its time meditating
on the significance o f names: names of people and of places. This helps explain the hero’s
fascination with the aristocracy, whose names signify both places and people. In the
following chapters I will consider the role of the proper name in a discussion of Proust’s
social kaleidoscope and o f Faulkner’s “epic” of the South, but first I will examine the way in
which Faulkner’s novels attempt to represent thought throught the use of “stream of
consciousness” techniques.

36 Marcel Muller calls Proust’s narrator a “possessor of the other”: “Avoir un nom, c'est to e pour autrui cet
objet qu’autrui est pour nous [ ...] . Si je n’a pas de nom et qu’en revanche les villes et ics toes sont avant tout
leur nom, c’est que le rapport que ce je entteticnt avec autrui n’est pas tedproque [ ...] I’anonymat tcndrait [.
..] a consacrer la prominence du Hdros sur I’autre” (17). "To have a name is to be for others that object that
the other is for us [...]. If I has no name and on the contrary, cities and beings are before anything else their
names, it is because the relationship that this I holds with others is not reciprocal [ ...] anonymity tends to
consecrate the preeminence o f the hero over the other.” What I am arguing here would rather take the
opposing position. The hero’s lack of a name marks the preeminence o f the world over him, his inability to
distinguish self and other.
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Chapter 3: Identity and Consciousness in the Novels o f W illiam Faulkner

While Faulkner’s novels offer a portrait of a certain society, they are also studies in
human psychology, most notably in his use of stream-of consciousness technique to portray
the human psyche. Two of his major works, The Sound and the Furv. and Absalom.
Absalom! attempt to represent the sometimes incoherent thoughts of their protagonists.
The former employs what is often referred to as the “stream of consciousness” technique,
while the latter puts into play the voices of multiple storytellers in its attempt to retell the
story of Thomas Sutpen. Whether it be through one narrator or many storytellers,
Faulkner’s novels are studies in psychological processes, in the idiosyncratic ways that
human minds work. As such, they share fundamental precepts with the work o f Proust.
It would be implausible to argue that Proust had no influence upon Faulkner,
although there is little direct evidence of such in any of the Yoknapatawpha stories. The
Recherche is certainly never named in the course o f Faulkner’s novels, but Faulkner was
curious and attentive to developments in contintental literature. Michael Grimwood
among others has noted that Faulkner displayed a definite “francophiiia,” which led him to
take up residence in Paris in 1925.37
Andre Bleikasten suggests that most Faulkner criticism has ignored his connections
with European writers, arguing that “Like all American novelists,” Faulkner is “a novelist
of European descent. His many fathers include Cervantes, Scott, Balzac, Dickens, Flaubert,
Dostoevsky, Hardy, Conrad, Mann, Joyce, and Proust, to mention only the novelists.”
(75). Bleikasten laments that most Anglo-American critics tend to ignore the importance of
the international context of Faulkner’s work and reception, his relation to twentiethcentury novelists from non-English-speaking countries: “Faulkner’s novels possess an
enduring power beyond the culture out of which they arose and even beyond che language
in which they were written, since most of their non-American readers know them only

57 “He went to France, at [friend Phil] Stone’s urging, because both considered ic the homeland of any writer”
(31).
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through translations.” If this were not the case, argues Bleikasten, Faulkner’s novels would
never have gained so much recognition in France: “Did Faulkner’s novels not somehow
exceed the occasion of their birth, how could they have won recognition in France and be
admired by Malraux and Sartre (two writers on the left, neither of whom was an expert on
the South) long before they were taken seriously in Faulkner’s own country?” (76).*
In a his discussion of Faulkner’s European connections, Bleikasten notes that
“modern novelists all knew that there was no such thing as objective reality, only each
individual’s sense of it. Hence their abiding fascination with consciousness, with the
flickerings of subjective perception and the eddies of subjective experience—with what
philosophers at the turn of the century like James, Bergson, and Bradley identified as
‘stream of consciousness,’ ‘real duration,’ or ‘immediate experience.’”*
Finally, it is interesting to note what Faulkner himself said about his European
influences. It is an interview he gave in 1952 which is at the origin of the present study.
Speaking to Loic Bouvard, a French graduate student in political science at Princeton who
had asked him about his opinion of France, Faulkner professed a love for France and the
French people, although he qualified that admiration: “I greatly admire the French spirit,
even though you do tend to ‘polish’ people too much. The French think too much, and in
doing so, destroy something of man’s original flavor. Be careful of man in the abstract”
(LG 72). This criticism of the alleged French penchant for abstract thought draws on a
cliche in which the European intellectual is opposed to the “simplicity” or
unpretentiousness of American a r t. As many critics have noted, Faulkner often pretended
to be a simple farmer, but this stance was no more honest that his pretending to be a

* “Faulkner From a European Perspective" in The Cambridge Companion to Faulkner. 75 - 95.
39 Bleikasten names twelve European authors whom he identifies along with Faulkner as “the major figures of
Western fiction in the first half of our century.' These authors, he says “all bear witness to the increasing
acceleration and complexification of the ‘inward turn’ taken by the novel since the late nineteenth century.
Whether they adopted autobiographical modes or resorted to polytnodal or polyphonic arrangements, they all
created sharply inreriorized fictional spaces, in which the reader was made to feel individual psyches at work."
Andrf Bleikasten. “Faulkner from a European Perspective" in The Cambridge Companion to Faulkner, ed.
Philip M. Weinstein. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 75 - 95.
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wounded World War 1 aviator. It is interesting, then, that in the interview, Fauikner went
on to profess his admiration for an artist who is often accused of excessive analysis. Asked
specifically about French writers, Faulkner had this to say about Marcel Proust: “I was
influenced by Flaubert and by Balzac, whose way of writing everything bluntly with the
stub of his pen I admire very much. And by Bergson, obviously. And I feel very close to
Proust. After I had read A la Recherche du Temps Perdu I said ‘This is it!—and I wished I
had written it myself (LG 72); but in another interview, at Nogano in 1955, Faulkner
seems to deny the influence o f Proust on his writing: “Proust I have read. The names I
mentioned yesterday were the names of the men who I think influenced me. When I read
Joyce and Proust it is possible that my career as a writer was already fixed, so that there was
no chance for it to be influenced other than in the tricks of the trade, you might say” ( LG
112).

It is doubtful to what extent an author’s comments about his own work can be used
to judge that work, and Faulkner’s insistence that his career was already “fixed” when he
read Proust hardly seems likely, but it is interesting to see here that Faulkner seems to
attribute to these writers a possible “formal” influence in the “tricks o f the trade.” What
Faulkner is implying here by “the tricks o f the trade” can only be guessed at, but the
implication seems to be that these “tricks” would have more to do with the “mechanics” of
writing novels more than the themes or ideas contained in them. Faulkner seeks here to
deny any thematic connections, but such a denial remains suspect, and invites closer
scrutiny.
What other connections could Faulkner have felt to this French author known for
his obsessive descriptions and analyses? One answer to this question is, simply, their eflbrts
to portray the complexity of human beings and their relations. They owe as much to the
tradition of phenomenological realism, which seeks not to present an “objective” depiction
of the real, but demonstrates the mind’s production of the real. James Joyce was one of
Proust’s contemporaries who shared this concern with the representation o f the
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phenomena of perception and thought, and Faulkner’s work also demonstrates its
indebtedness to Joyce, not only in the “stream of consciousness” technique which it
employs, and which Joyce is famous for, but also in his use of names taken from Greek
mythology.
In what has often been called an “epic” of the American South, William Faulkner
portrays, a society confronted with its own failure and defeat. Edouard Glissant praises
Faulkner’s novels as examplary o f what he calls a poetics of relation, in which the perilous
encounter between cultures is played out in closed space of the plantation system. What is
at stake in this encounter is the integrity of an identity based upon exclusion of the other.
Western civilization has always tended to marginalize or exclude the other in its attempt to
affirm and legitimize a self-sufficient identity. The mechanism by which this society has
always perpetuated its structures of dominance is the patriarchal system, in which lineage is
meant to assure an unbroken orderly transferral of from one generation to another within
the structure of the family tree. This might be one explanation for the longevity of many o f
the principal actors in the Old Testament. The missing names in the long lists of lineage
are covered over by making one person live the equivalent of several generations.
The entire oeuvre of William Faulkner deals with the disintegration of the
patriarchal family, and therefore, in a larger sense, with the collapse of western (European)
social structure, brought about by the encounter betweeen different cultures in the
southern United States, and by the traumatic event which was the Civil War. We will
return to the cultural implications o f Faulkner’s tragedy in our consideration of the role of
the proper name and lineage, in a subsequent chapter.
Although William Faulkner purports to be telling about his region, his is also a
“comedie humaine,” something that he acknowledged himself when he admitted his debt
to Balzac (LG 72). These novels dramatize a crisis of identity which translates into a crisis
of the means of identification, of the process of identification in language through the
construction of narrative: the personal narrative of a speaking or writing subject, or the
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inner narrative of consciousness as manifested in language. The voice which emerges is
precariously fragmented, a continual negotiation with chaos in the form of language, that is
to say in the form o f pure formality.
French Readings of Faulkner through Proust
By the end o f the 1930s Faulkner had already gained recognition among European
writers, and continues today to be widely read, most especially by third-world writers. The
interest that Faulkner holds for international audiences is related to his use of narrative
techniques familiar to non-Western traditions as much as to the themes raised by his texts.
The most striking of these is the liberation of narrative from the exigencies of chronology,
from the a narrative form based on a conception o f time as linearity.
The French novelists and philosophers Jean-Paul Sartre and Andre Malraux were
among the first to recognize the importance of Faulkner’s work, even before he gained the
respect of many American readers. In introducing Faulkner to the French, Sartre found it
quite logical to compare the two authors. In his preface to the French translation of The
Sound and the Fury. Sartre saw obvious connections between Proust and Faulkner, in the
ways they thematized what he saw as the essential existential problems of being and time.
Like Faulkner, he criticized Proust for what he identified as his penchant for analysis, a trait
which he identifies as stereotypically French:
Faulkner est un homme perdu et c’est parce qu’il se sent perdu qu’il risque,
qu’il va jusqu’au bout de sa pensee. Proust est un classique et un Fran^ais: les
Fran^ais se perdent a la petite semaine et ils finissent toujours par se
retrouver. L’eloquence, le gout des idees claires, l’intellectualisme ont impose
a Proust de garder au moins les apparences de la chronologie.
Faulkner is a man who is lost, and it is because he feels himself lost that he
takes risks, following through to the consequences of his thought. Proust is a
classical and a Frenchman: the French lose themselves weekly, and always end
up finding themselves again. Eloquence, the taste for clear ideas,
intellectualism all forced Proust to keep at least the appearance of
chronology.*0

40 Situations I (77). My translation.
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Sartre’s sensitivity to the chronological organization of Proust’s narrative belies his
philosophical concerns with the concepts of being and time. The interdependence of these
concepts is reflected even in the physical sciences of the twentieth century, in Einstein’s
famous equation which equating mass with energy. Time and energy share one essential
characteristic which are the concepts of movement or change, whereas the traditional idea of
being implies permanence, stasis.
Sartre’s initial purpose was to alert French readers to the idiosyncrasies of
Faulkner’s style: “Quand on lit Le Bruit et la Fureur. on est frappe d’abord par les
bizarreries de la technique. Pourquoi Faulkner a-t-il casse le temps de son histoire et en a-til brouille les morceaux?” (70), “When one reads The Sound and the Furv. he is at first
struck by the peculiarities of his technique. Why did Faulkner break up the time of his
story and why did he mix up the pieces?” To present Faulkner’s difficulties to the French
reader, Sartre refers to Marcel Proust’s novel:
Tel est le temps de Faulkner. Ne le reconnait-on pas? Ce present indicible et
qui fait eau de toutes parts, ces brusques invasions du passd, cet ordre
affectif, oppose a 1’ordre intellectuel et volontaire qui est chronologique
mais qui manque la realite, ces souvenirs, hantises monstrueuses et
discontinues, ces intermittences du coeur [. . .], ne retrouve-t-on pas le
temps perdu et reconquis de Marcel Proust? (74)
Such is the time of Faulkner. Do we not recognize it? This unspeakable
liquified present, these brusque invasions of the past, this affective order,
opposed to the intellectual and voluntary order which is chronological but
which lacks reality, these memories, monstrous hauntings and
discontinuities, these intermittences o f the heart [. . .], do we not here
rediscover the time lost and reconquered o f Marcel Proust?4'
What interested Sartre was the narrative point o f view represented by each novelist, and
their protagonists’s attitudes with respect to time.
In Sartoris. says Sartre, Faulkner always shows events when they have already taken
place, and in The Sound and the Fury, nothing happens, all has already happened:
II semble qu’on puisse comparer la vision du monde de Faulkner a celle
d’un hommme assis dans une auto d&ouverte et qui regarde en arri&re. A
41 My translation.
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chaque instant des om bres surgissent k sa droite, a sa gauche,
papillottements, tremblements ramises.. . qui ne deviennent des arbres, des
hommes, des voitures qu’un peu plus tard, avec le recul. Le passe y gagne
une sorte de surrealite: ses contours sont durs et nets, immuables; le present,
innomable et fugitif, se defend mal contre lui; il est plein de trous, et, par
ces trous, les choses passes l’envahissent, fixes, immobiles, silencieuses
comme des juges ou comme des regards .. . Dans Sartoris, le passe s’appelait
«les histoires», parce qu’il s’agissait de souvenirs familiaux et construits,
parce que Faulkner n ’avait pas encore trouve sa technique. Dans Le Bruit et
laFureur, il est plus individuel et plus indecis” (73).
Faulkner’s vision of the world seems comparable to that o f a man seated in
an open car and looking backwards. At each instant, formless shadows,
flutterings, vague tremblings, and a kind of confetti of light appear to the
right and to the left, but only with distance do they become trees, men, and
automobiles. The past takes on a kind of superreality; its contours are firm
and clear, unchangeable. The present, undefined and fleeting, is weak by
comparison. It is full of holes, and the things of the past invade it through
these holes-things that are fixed, immovable, silent as judges or stares.
Faulkner’s monologues remind us of airplane flights replete with air
pockets: at each pocket the hero’s consciousness “falls into the past” and
then rises only to fall again. The present is not; it becomes; everything
was.42
Salvation for Proust’s narrator, says Sartre, lies in the integral reappearance o f the past. For
Faulkner, on the other hand, the past is never lost-unfortunately—it is always there, as an
obsession. While the narrator of La Recherche expresses nostalgia for, and a wish to
recapture, a past which comes to him through works of art, Faulkner’s protagonists are
haunted by an ever-present past which seems almost to negate the passage of time.
Faulkner, like Proust, was familiar with the teachings of Henri Bergson (if the
author’s comments can be trusted, which is an entirely different problem). He seems to
have embraced more wholeheartedly the theories of Bergson than Proust. In his 1952
interview with Loic Bouvard he affirmed that “there isn’t any time.”
In fact I agree pretty much with Bergson’s theory of the fluidity of time.
There is only the present moment, in which I include both the past & the
future, and that is eternity. In my opinion time can be shaped quite a bit by
the artist; after all, man is never time’s slave. (LG 70)

42 “A Propos de Le B ruit et ia Fureurr La temporality chez Faulkner," Situations I (Paris: Galiimard, 1947) 70
-81. English translation by George McMillan Reeves, from The time of William F a u lk n e rbv Maurice
Edgar Coindteau. (Colombia: University of South Carolina Press, 1971) 70.
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The artist may be capable of shaping time, but in Quentin Compson, Faulkner has
portrayed a character who is obsessed with time’s passing.
Sartre groups Faulkner and Proust with other early twentieth-century novelists like
James Joyce, Dos Passos, Andre Gide and Virginia Woolf. All of these authors, he says,
attempted to “mutilate” time. He points out similarities between Proust and Faulkner in
their attempts to present characters’ perceptions of the past, perceptions which do not
follow strict (chrono)logical order, but which are instead based upon what he terms
“affective constellations,” a few central themes around which “innumerable silent masses
gravitate.”
Sartre admired Faulkner for having “decapitated” time. Faulkner’s characters, he
said, have no future, because their consciousnesses are so fixed upon the past, which is
omnipresent. The best example of this might be Quentin Compson: his “thoughts” on
April 1910 are given to us in the past tense, as if he were remembering from a point in time
either at or beyond the moment of his suicide. All of Faulkner’s art, says Sartre, is aimed at
suggesting that Quentin’s interior monologues, and his last stroll, are already his suicide.
“Quentin pense sa dernifcre journ^e au pass^, comme quelqu’un qui se souvient. Mais qui
done se souvient, puisque les derni£res pensees du heros coincident a peu pres avec
l’eclatement de sa memoire et son an&ntissement?” (Situations I 78) “Quentin thinks his
last day in the past tense, as someone who remembers, but who could be remembering,
since the last thoughts of the hero coincide more or less with the disruption of his memory
and the cessation of his existence.” The future, says Sartre, no longer exists as a possibility
for Faulkner’s characters: “ce n’est pas une entrepreise, e’est une fatalite; en perdant son
caract&re de possible, il cesse d’exister au futur,” “it is not an undertaking; it is a fatality; in
losing its character of possibility, it ceases to exist in the future.”
Elyane Dezon-Jones, sees reason to believe that Faulkner was influenced by Proust.
F. Scott Fitzgerald, William Faulkner, Thomas Wolfe and Jack Kerouac, she says, all took
up Proust’s central theme, transforming the quest for lost time into a quest for a lost
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national continuity, a legitimizing historical consciousness. The heroes of the Lost and the
Beat generations are all men situated in time “faced with its unacceptable irreversibility”
(12). The Faulknerian character’s obsession with the past ias somtething at once
irretrievably lost and inescapable is worth reading in contrast to the Proustian hero’s search
for lost time.
Faulkner had a copy of Proust’s novel in his library, although this does not prove
that he read it. Nor do the statements he gave in interviews prove anything, since Faulkner
is notorious for telling tall tales about himself. It is rather through the discernable
similarities in their texts that such inferences can be made. Richard P. Adams sees “strong
internal evidence” indicating that Faulkner had indeed read at least part o f Remembrance
of things Past before he wrote The Sound and the Fury, since the latter novel displays “the
same obsessive preoccupation with time, with memory and with change” as in Proust’s.
There is no way of definitively answering the question of Proust’s influence on Faulkner,
but this should not stop us from reading the second through the lenses provided by the
former.
In each of these novels a protagonist is haunted by memories, or more precisely,
memories come back to haunt them. The involuntary nature of memory is apparent in
Faulkner as well as Proust. Although there have been numerous volumes written about
each, there are surprisingly few foll'length studies devoted to both of these writers whose
style, themes and approach bear some striking similarities. They deserve study together if
for no other reason than that they are each considered by many critics to be “the greatest”
twentiech-century novelists of their respective national cultures.
These authors present what might be styled a “poetics of consciousness” in which
consciousness and remembering proceed not through orderly progression but by quantum
shifts and sedimentation—the accumulation of connections and relationships between
elements which are themselves merely positions on a network-a web of inter and
intratextual shifters. The shifters are not confined to pronouns or adverbs such as “here,”
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“now,” “I,” “you” etc., but proper names themselves can shift referents. The change
represented in society by the fall or rise in stature of different figures, of different families,
is just one example of the ways in which time segments characters, in which time separates
the name from presence or meaning.
“Perfidious Arabesques”
What Faulkner and Proust’s novels put to the forefront is the paths of their
protagonists thoughts. Proust’s long periodic sentences are notorious for continually
qualifying the status of their affirmations, by multiplying the possible alternatives of
motivation and interpretation, until the status of the action or object itself is called into
question. The language of Faulkner’s novels can also demonstrate certain stylistic excesses.
Maurice Edgar Coindreau remarked o f the imbricated Faulknerian sentence that “His texts
necessitate a sustained effort; the tangled sentences, interrupted by digressions and
parentheses, [envelop] thought in perfidious arabesques”43
Coindreau’s remarks could apply equally well to Proustian syntax, the “perfidious
arabesques” of Faulkner’s language, referred to by Coindreau, demonstrate the complex
movement of thought. It is finally the status o f perception and the possibility of arriving at
a meaning which is problematized by this language of digression and continual deferral.
The reader is forced to go back, and reread so as to follow each and every diverging path.
Proust makes every effort to provide the reader with a way out, no matter how circuitous a
path he must take. For all their length and complexity, Proust’s sentences are almost always
grammatically correct, though it is true that occasionally a sentence fails to reach its logical
conclusion. In spite of the author’s occasional mistakes (such as the reappearance of
characters who are supposed to have already died), Proust’s narrator is forever attempting to
sort out the multiple threads of possibilities, the many layers of motivation and chance
which he believes explain the actions o f others.
43 From Coindteau's “Note” to his French translation of Faulkner's short story ‘Afternoon of a Cow,”
attributed to the pseudonymous ‘Ernest V. Trueblood” (‘L’Aprts-Midi d’une Vache, par Ernest V.
Trueblood"). Translated by Grimwood (5).
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Perhaps the most striking examples of the way in cwhich Faulkner “mutilates” time
in his narratives occur in The Sound and the Furv in which he makes ample use of the
prolepse and analepse. The novel attempts to portray distinct personalities through the
wavs in which they use language to segment and splice together perception. The “stream of
consciousness” narrative style is characterized by abrupt unsignalled changes in the time
and setting of the images and events it depicts. It is in the failure of such texts to clearly
signal such movement that they are seen as representative o f conscious processes. Unlke in a
storytelling situation, explanations and contexts do not need to be furnished, since such a
technique is not aimed uniquely at telling a story, but at representing thought.
The novel is divided into four chapters, which are usually identified with the
characters whose “points of view” they seem to represent, although Faulkner gave them,
not tides, but dates: “April Seventh, 1928,” “June Second 1910,” “April Sixth 1928,” and
“April Eighth 1928.” Each section would thus constitute a discrete span of time from the
others. They are usually read as being four different “points of view,” four different versions
of a story, as seen or experienced by four separate individuals.44 The first three chapters are
distinct from the fourth, as they employ first person narrators to portray the intimate
thoughts, the consciousness, of three different characters: the 33 year old “idiot,” Benjy,
and his brothers, Quentin, and Jason. The fourth chapter is presented in an omniscient
mode, although it is focused on their African American servant Dilsey, following her
activities on the date in question. While the other three attempt to represent the thoughts,
and thought patterns, of the three Compson brothers: Benjy, Quentin, and Jason, chapter
four tells us Dilsey’s thoughts, rather than attempting to represent them. It is only the third
and fourth chapters, Jason’s interior monologue and the omniscient last section, which
remain squarely focused on the time frame set by their tides. Benjy’s attention frequendy
44 Point o f view is another slippery concept, which, like the concepts o f voice, or style, posits a controlling
subject, the eyc/I which sees and relates the story. The reliance on a first person narrator, represented by the
pronoun “I” means that the concept o f point o f view is bound up with the concept o f time, since the
pronoun, as a “shifter” can only be defined through its context, its location in space and time. Faulkner's
narrators are all strictly linked to specific places and times, but the past invades the present to such an extent
thar ir is omnipresent, inescapable and quite often difficult to distinguish from the present.
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shifts from his consciousness of the present moment to his memories of ocher, similar
moments. Quentin’s thoughts are likewise prone to such fluxes of perception and memory.
Very few of Faulkner’s characters live entirely in the present, and very few plan for
the future (except perhaps Jason Compson), as they are continually immersed in images of
the past. Benjy’s narrative is an example of an unchecked involuntary memory. He does
not clearly distinguish between the present and the past, his memory and his existence in
the present. The reader must make more of an effort to distinguish the temporal strata
represented in Benjy’s narrative. Luster’s mention of Benjy’s age (“aint you something,
thirty-three years old, going on that way” and the mention of his birthday cake, that allows
the reader to isolate the “present,” identified by the tide of his section (“April Seventh,
1928), from the memories.
Benjy Compson’s Involuntary Memory
The most striking thing about Benjy and Quentin Compson’s sections of The
Sound and the Fury is the discontinuity of their narratives. Benjy’s thoughts on April
seventh, 1928 do not follow a logical order, from beginning to end, but jump from one
moment to the other, from one image to another. The story of is not a chronology, but a
juxtaposition of images, images which are sometimes motivated by an obvious similarity or
association of perceptions, as when Benjy is crawling through the “broken place” at the
limit of the Compson property, and snags himself. This past event is perhaps called to
Benjy’s consciousness by the similarity of his sensation in the present to the memory of that
sensation in the past. This is the definition of Proust’s involuntary memory. Benjy’s section
of The Sound and the Furv is a good example of this kind of memory.45
Benjy’s point of view is characterized by chronological incoherence. His thoughts
jump without warning from present percepdons to memories, and it is often difficult to
distinguish between them. The tide of the section, “April Seventh 1928” indicates a

45 Dezon-Jones has called Benjy ‘une
purest form" (103).

mo ire involontaire a (Ytac pur,” “an involuntary memory in its
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temporal reference which is not the starting point o f any particular story, but a day in the
life of Benjy Compson. Its only immediate significance seems to be that it is the day of his
thirty-third birthday. The chapter gives us his thoughts and perceptions during part of that
day, and these thoughts include observations of things he sees and does as well as things he
has seen and done. Frequendy, and without any warning or clear indication, his view turns
from the present to the past, so that it is not always clear to the casual reader when these
transitions take place.
Through the fence, between the curling flower spaces, I could see them
hitting. They were coming toward where the flag was and I went along the
fence. Luster was hunting in the grass by the flower tree.
The first sentence presents the reader with incomplete information. An “I” is describing an
event to which he or she was witness, presumably on the date specified by the tide o f the
chapter, although it could very well be that it is instead another date on which the I” is
telling this story, or both. A number of quesuons arise almost instantly; “Who is this T?”
Who are “they?” What are they hitting, where and why? In the traditional, or “Balzacian”
novel, the reader would expect an explanation, but these questions remained unanswered.
The reader of this first secdon is thus immediately disconcerted by their inability to make
sense of what is happening, and must immediately begin actively searching for clues as to
what is gong on. It is only after the next two sentences that the reader can divine that a
game of golf is being described. It is baffling in that the speaker’s interest is not, as might be
expected, the game or the golfers themselves, but their movements, for the acuons o f the
golfers are described as events in and of themselves, rather than elements of a logical
process:
They took the flag out, and they were hitting. Then they put the flag back
and they went to the table, and he hit and the other hit. Then they went
on, and I went along the fence. Luster came away from the flower tree and
we went along the fence and they stopped and we stopped and I looked
through the fence while Luster was hunting in the grass.
“Here, caddie.” He hit. They went across the pasture. I held to the
fence and watched them going away.
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“Listen at you, now.” Luster said. “Aim you something, thirty-three years
old, going on that way. After I done went all the way to town to buy you
that cake. Hush up that moaning. Aint you going to help me find that
quarter so I can go to the show tonight.”
They were hitting little, across the pasture. I went back along the fence to
where the flag was. It flapped on the bright grass and the trees.
“Come on.” Luster said. “We done looked there. They aint no more
coming right now. Lets go down to the branch and find that quarter before
them niggers finds it.”
It was red, flapping on the pasture. Then there was a bird slanting and
tilting on it. Luster threw. The flag flapped on the bright grass and the trees.
I held to the fence.
“Shut up that moaning,” Luster said. “I cant make them come if they aint
coming, can I. If you dont hush up, mammy aint going to have no birthday
for you. If you dont hush, you know what I going to do. I going to eat that
cake all up. Eat them candles, too. Eat all them thirty-three candles. Come
on, let’s go down to the branch. I got to find my quarter. Maybe we can
find one of they balls. Here. Here they is. Way over yonder. See.” He came
to the fence and pointed his arm. “see them. They aint coming back here no
more. Come on.”
We went along the fence and came to the garden fence, where our shadows
were. My shadow was higher than Luster’s on the fence. We came to the
broken place and went through it.
“Wait a minute.” Luster said. “You snagged on that nail again. Cant you
never crawl through here without snagging on that nail.”
Caddy caught me and we crawled through. Uncle M aury said to not let
anybody see us, se we better stoop over, Caddy said. Stoop over, Benjy. Like this,
see. We stooped over and crossed the garden, where the flowers rasped and rattled
against us. The ground was hard, we climbed the fence, where the pigs were
g u n tin g and snuffing. I expect they’re sorry because one ofthem got killed today,
Caddy said. The ground was hard, churned and knotted.
Keep your hands in your pockets, Caddy said. Or they’l l get froze. You don’t
want your handsfroze on Christmas, do you.
“It’s too cold out there.” Versh said. “You dont want to go out doors.” (2 -3)
The speaker displays a unique and limited vocabulary, since “Flower spaces” or “flower
tree” are not conventional English terms. Their meaning is nevertheless comprehensible.
The phrasing is simple and laconic “they stopped and we stopped.” The first proper name
introduced is that of “Luster,” but the reader has no idea who this is or what his
relationship is to the narrator. Benjy’s section lacks any explanatory passages. The reader is
forced to make inferences and to supply the missing explanations. The first two sections of
The Sound and the Furv thus fell into the category of what Roland Barthes calls “writerly”
texts.
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In spite of Benjy’s inability to dearly express himself, he is able to report verbatim
the speech of others, which is dearly ddimited by quotation marks, and attributed to the
speaker. He has no conception o f golf as a game. All he sees is the activity at its most
primitive level. His vocabulary does demonstrate an attempt at classifying and
characterizing his perceptions according to a vocabulary which is particular to him :
“hitting little” is his understanding o f putting. Here again, the limited vocabulary'compels
the reader to interpret or to dedpher a kind of code.
This may explain why the first two sections of the novel are often dted as being
difficult to understand. Benjy is a thirty-three year old with the mind of a three year old.
His narrative is characterized by a limited vocabulary, or an invented one, and an inability
to distinguish between present and past sensations. The structure of his section mimics the
overall structure of the novel. His thoughts switch unexpectedly between perception and
memory, between present and past, to such an extent that it becomes very difficult for a
reader to distinguish the “present” of the narration:
We went along the fence and came to the garden fence, where our shadows
were My shadow was higher than Luster’s on the fence. We came to the
broken place and went through it.
“Wait a minute.” Luster said. “You snagged on that nail again. Cant you
never crawl through here without snagging on that nail.”
Caddy uncaught me and we crawled through. Uncle M aury said to not let
anybody see us, so we better stoop over, Caddy said Stoop over, Benjy. Like this,
see. We stooped over and crossed the garden where the flowers rasped and rattled
against us. The ground was hard We climbed the fence, where the pigs were
grunting and snuffing. (2 - 3)
This initial analepse is marked by italics, but such is not always the case in this novel.
Faulkner’s use o f italics in this respect is far from systematic. The purpose of italics (as he
later explained it in response to a question asked by one of his students at the University of
Virginia), was only to alert the reader that such shifts are characteristic of Benjy’s thought:
“I had to use some method to indicate to the reader that this idiot had no sense of time.
That what happened to him ten years ago was just yesterday. The way I wanted to do it
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was to use different colored inks, but that would have cost so much, the publisher couldn’t
undertake it.”*’
The temporal shift, when it is not marked by italics, is indicated only by the
unexplained change in setting and characters. Rather than Benjy following Luster along the
edge of the pasture in the summer, it is his sister Caddie who accompanies him across
frozen ground. Then the italics end, and in the next paragraph the setting has again
abruptly switched to the inside of a house, and someone named Versh speaks. While
Faulkner initially uses italics to alert the reader to such shifts, the change in setting,
mentions of colder weather and Christmas, or a sudden change in the names of his
guardians are sometimes the only signals of such a shift. The presence or absence o f italics
remains inexplicable. They are ultimately the inexpressible remainder of Benjy’s difference,
his position outside of expression, of the linguistic economy.
The sight o f the candles on his birthday cake evokes another memory of fire:
“You cant blow out no candles” Luster said. “Watch me blow them out.”
He leaned down and puffed his face. The candles went away. I began to
cry. “Hush.” Luster said. “Here. Look at the fire while I cuts this cake.”
I could hear the clock, and I could hear Caddy standing behind me, and I could
hear the roof. It's still raining Caddy said. I hate rain. I hate everything. A nd
then her head came into my lap and she was crying, holding me, and / began to
cry. Then I looked at the fire again and the bright, smooth shapes went again. I
could hear the clock and the roofand Caddy.
I ate some cake. Luster’s hand came and took another piece. 1 could
hear him eating. I looked at the fire.
Benjy’s thoughts lack any expressions of intentionality or emotions. His is a voice
which simply observes and reports what it sees, as if it were disconnected from its own
body, an impartial witness to its own actions. He is content merely to sit and watch the fire
in the stove, until Luster closes the oven door:
A long piece of wire came across my shoulder. It went to the door, and then
the fire went away. I began to cry.
“What you howling for now.” Luster said. “Look there.” The fire
was there. I hushed. (69)
46 Faulkner in the University: Class Conferences at the Univeristv o f Virginia 1957 - 1958. eds. Joseph
Blocncr and Frederick L. Gwynn (Charlottesville: University ofViiginia Press, 1959) 4. All Further references
to chis text will be noted parenthetically with the abbreviation FIU.
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From Benjy’s point of view, things happen with no apparent warning or explanation:
“Luster’s hand came and took another piece;” Things “go away” and “come back”
inexplicably: “A long piece of wire came;” “the fire went away;” “I began to cry;” “I
hushed” The speech and actions of the self are presented in the same tone of impartial
observation. The “I” is not a willing, intentional participant in his environment, but an
impartial observer. When he burns himself, Benjy repons without affect even the sound of
his own wailing as if it were a detached object.
I put my hand to where the fire had been.
“Catch him.” Dilsey said. “Catch him back.”
My hand jerked back and I put it into my mouth and Dilsey caught
me. I could still hear the clock between my voice. Dilsey reached back and
hit Luster on the head. My voice was going loud every time.”
“Get that soda.” Dilsey said. She took my hand out of my mouth.
My voice went louder then and my hand tried to go back to my mouth, but
Dilsey held it. Mv voice went loud. She sprinkled soda on my hand. (71 72)
Affect can be inferred only from the images and memories which recur. Benjy begins to cry
when he hears the golfer calling for his caddie. In the opening pages, his crying after
hearing the word “caddie” can only be understood when we discover that the name o f his
sister is Candace, or “Caddy.” His feelings toward his sister are in no way distinguished
from his feelings toward fire, which he likes to watch, and the disappearance o f which
causes his emotional outburst. In Benjy’s case, rather than emotion it would almost be
suitable to speak of psyiological reaction.
Benjy’s response is the same when he recalls the sight of his mutilated genitalia in a
mirror (after Jason has had him castrated): ^I got undressed and I looked at myself, and I
began to cry. Hush, Luster said. Lookingfo r them aint going to do no good. They’re gone. You
keep on like this, and we aint going haveyou no more birthday. He put my gown on. I hushed”
[. . .] (90). Benjy “remembers” his actions and the actions and words of others only in their
most obvious outward appearance, but he is incapable of understanding the reasons for any
of them, even those that are related to his affection for his sister, Caddy. Motivations are
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never mentioned, even in speculation, moreover, there is nothing to indicate that he is able
to distinguish what is a memory from what is the present, ongoing, moment, and this is,
then, the difficulty which the reader, too, will have. There is effectively no privileged frame
of reference for making such distinctions
One of the motifs which distinguishes Benjy’s patterns of thought are the images
which recur. It is his fixation upon certain details-shapes, colors and odors-which mark his
difference, his particularity. He is particularly sensitive to odors. In the opening pages, he is
not concerned with the game the men are plating, but by the movement. His attention is
attracted by the flag flapping on the green, and the bird flying across his field o f vision, and
he watches the actions the men accomplish: hit ball, sit at table, walk further. He is equally
sensitive to the words of those closest to him, and notes them each in turn, demonstrating
that our own deepest memories involve the language, the visions, of others.
The movement of Benjy around the remains of the Compson property, and the
wandering o f his thoughts from present to past, are mirrored in Quentin’s section o f the
same novel, where we follow him as he wanders around the Harvard campus and the
surrounding countryside. His thoughts are also marked, although to a somewhat lesser
extent, by this uncontrolled movement between various past moments and the present.
Quentin Compson: Temporal Consciousness
The Sound and the Fury. As I lavdvinp. are Absalom. Ahsalnm? are considered by
many to be the finest examples of Faulkner’s use of the stream of consciousness technique.
These are the novels which problematize, more than any of his others, the stability of
consciousness in their main narrating voices. Quentin Compson’s voice, in his section of
The Sound and the Fury, might well be characterized as schizophrenic: It is full of the
voices of others: his father, but also his mother, Caddy, Dalton Ames, Bland, and Shreve.
Likewise, in Absalom, Absalom!, he is repeating tales that he has internalized, that he has
heard from his father and Miss Rosa, who were also repeating second-hand information.
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The second section of The Sound and the Forv begins with an unidentified
narrative voice which immediately establishes a precise temporal setting: “When the
shadow of the sash appeared on the curtains it was between seven and eight oclock and
then I was in time again.” The mimetic voice establishes its focus upon the present
moment, the now, by its concern with establishing a precise point of departure. The “now”
here is established simultaneously as an already has been, since the verb is in the past tense:
“it was [already] between seven and eight oclock.” It is the morning, yet symbolically it is
not on sunlight but on the shadow that he focuses. Here, unlike in Proust, where much of
the text is spent slowly suggesting the fuzzy continuum which connects sleep and waking,
Quentin Compson snaps into time from the absolute other of consciousness, from the
silence of “nodanguage” (a term Quentin uses in Absalom. A h sa ln m h , Sleep is a death for
Quentin, and one which he spends much o f his waking time dreaming about.
From the start he is fixated on the passing of time, and the beginning of his section
of The Sound and the Furv is explicidy formulated in terms of an entry into time, as if
time were a container, or a space from which one could escape. Quentin’s entry into time is
also an entry into language, as it is the moment when his narrative begins.
When the shadow of the sash appeared on the curtains it was between seven
and eight oclock and then I was in time again, hearing the watch. It was
Grandfather’s and when Father gave it to me he said, Quentin, I give you
the mausoleum of all hope and desire; it’s rather excruciating-ly apt that you
will use it to gain the reducto absurdum of all human experience which can
fit your individual needs no better than it fitted his or his father’s. I give it
to you not that you may remember time, but that you might forget it now
and then for a moment and not spend all your breath trying to conquer it.
Because no battle is ever won he said. They are not even fought. The field
only reveals to man his own folly and despair, and victory is an illusion of
philosophers and fools. (93)
His father’s voice is one of the most significant echoes in Quentin Compson’s thoughts on
June Second 1910. The gift of the grandfather’s timepiece is equivalent to a condemnation.
Mr. Compson’s advice to Quentin is, as John T. Irwin puts it, “hardly the kind of
exhortation to dare and accomplish great things that one would expect a father to give his
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son on graduation day.”47 Instead, his father’s words are a constant reminder that “no batde
is ever won.”
If Faulkner believes that the artist can shape time, Mr. Compson’s words to
Quentin are quite the opposite, and might explain why Quentin has no thoughts of being
an artist. Quentin frequently recalls the cynical, defeatist attitude of his father: “bad health
is the primary reason for all life. Created by disease, within putrefaction, into decay” (SF 52
- 3) It is the repetition of these memories, of the father’s pronouncements, which betray
their profound effect on Quentin, and explain his morbid obsession with the passing of
time: “It’s always the idle habits you acquire which you will regret, Father said that: That
Christ was not crucified: he was worn away by a minute clicking of little wheels” (94).
Mr. Jason Richmond Compson III, Quentin’s father, is described in the appendix
to The Sound and the Furv as “bred for a lawyer,” [. . .] “a sort of privileged pseudo-Daniel
Boone-Robinson Crusoe, who had not returned to juvenility because actually he had never
left it,” who “sat all day long with a decanter of whiskey and a litter of dogeared Horaces
and Livys and Catulluses, composing (it was said) caustic and satiric eulogies on both his
dead and his living fellowtownsmen” (409 - 10). Mr. Compson is a figure of the artist as
cynic, producing insignificant verse that no one will read. Miss Rosa Coldfield is another
figure for the artist, producing an antiquated form that no one will read, as she is said to
have written “over a thousand odes” to the defeated confederate soldier.
Quentin demonstrates his desire to escape time, to stop its flow, in his highly
symbolic gesture of tearing the hands off of the watch his father gave him. His thoughts
will reveal the reason for this wish: He is acutely aware of a sense of loss, and with the
impossibile desire to restore or preserve something that is already gone. He is obsessed with
4 Irwin views Quentin’s relationship with his father in The Sound and the Furv as a form of role reversal . Ft
is Mr Compson’s failure as a hither, according to Irwin, embodied in his philosophy that “nothing is even
worth the changing of it," which obliges Quentin to assume the role o f the father in relation to his own
father, exhorting him to avenge his daughter’s honor: "As Mr. Compson’s hither was a failed general, so M r
Compson is a failed lawyer-an alcoholic nihilist who revenges himself on his hither for that psychological
castration that has left him with the feeling that nothing can be done, by passing on to his son that same sense
of inescapable failure, defeat and impotence.’’ Doubling and Incest/Repetition and Revenge: A Speculative
Reading of Faulkner. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975) 67-68.
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the idea of avenging his sister’s honor, and is haunted by the loss of the Compson estate for
which he feels responsible, since his parents have sold the pasture so that he could spend a
year at Harvard. For Quentin, as for Benjy and Marcel, the experience of time is above all
the experience of loss.
In spite of his father’s words, or perhaps because of them, Quentin is obsessed with
timepieces. As much as he seeks to forget about the passing of time, he remains keenly
aware of it. He constandy notes the length of his shadow, the slanting light, and the
chiming of the campus clocks. He passes a clock shop and stops in to inquire if any of the
models on display has the correct time, and he is alert to the chiming of the campanile on
the Harvard campus. He is even attentive to the attention that other people pay to their
timepieces:
Shreve stood in the door, putting his collar on, his glasses glinting rosily, as
though he had washed them with his face. “You taking a cut this
morning?”
“Is it that late?”
He looked at his watch. “Bell in two minutes.” (95)
Quentin’s section of the novel is, as a whole, more coherent than Benjy’s, in that
the “present” of the action is clearly established. This is due pardy to the fact that the
action that takes place occurs in and around Cambridge, Massachusetts. Scenes consisung
principally of dialogue, involving the members of the Harvard community, his roommate
Shreve or the Kentuckian Gerald Bland, are more easily distinguished from the analepses
involving Benjy, Caddy and Mr. Compson. When memories occur, though, they are less
easily distinguished from one another, it is in these passages that Quentin’s section most
closely resembles that of Benjy. A particularly illustrative moment of this occurs in his fight
with fellow student Gerald Bland in Cambridge (183 - 203).
In an episode which transposes the trianguaiar relationship between Quendn,
Caddy and her lover, he befriends a litde girl whom he addresses as “sister.” The girl’s
brother accuses Quentin o f kidnapping her. He is picked up from the sheriffs station by
Mrs. Bland, with Gerald, Spoade and Shreve. As they ride in Mrs. Bland’s car, she begins
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talking about Gerald’s grandfather, and Quentin’s thoughts switch from the present
moment to memories of the past
The narrative switches abrupdy from a mode in which dialogue is clearly marked,
to a stream of consciousness technique, signaled by italics
“Did you ever drink perfume?” Spoade said, with one hand he could
lifi her to his shoulder and run with her running Running.
“No Shreve said, running the beast with two backs and she blurred in
the winking oars running the Swine ofEuboeleus running coupled w ithin how
many Caddy.
“Neither did I,” Spoade said. I dont know too many (184)
As in the first section of the novel, the italics here are one signal that a flashback is
occurring. The memory of earlier conversations are intermixed with images o f Caddy and
her lover, associated with the smell of honeysuckle. It is ultimately impossible to determine
whether these are images that Quentin saw, or whether they are creations o f his overactive
imagination, provoked by his conversation with Caddy about her lovers.
Caddy did you love them When they touched me I died
one minute she was standing there the next he was yelling and pulling at
her dress they went into the hall and up the stairs (186)
Different moments are juxtaposed within the same line of text. Sentences are begun and
then interrupted by others, only to be resumed later in mid-phrase. This technique is
suggestive of a simultaneity of thought. Quentin seems to be remembering several events
and conversations simultaneously. Another significant characteristic of the stream of
consciousness technique, is the difficulty of determining the proper referent for pronouns.
In the above passage, it requires an effort on the part of the reader to determine to whom
the pronoun “he” refers. It is only through the reader’s familiarity with the behaviour of
Benjy Compson that this can be determined.
The encounter with Caddy’s lover is presented in a text marked by a lack of
punctuation and capitalization that might distinguish phrases and sentences from one
another. The reader is forced to rely entirely on the logical coherence o f subject and verb:
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we reached the fence she crawled through I crawled through when I
rose from stooping he was coming out of the trees into the grey toward us
coming toward us tall and flat and still even moving like he was still she
went to him
this is Quentin Im wet 1m wet all over you dont have to if you dont
want to
their shadows one shadow her head rose it was above his on the sky
higher their two heads
you dont have to if you dont want to
then not two heads the darkness smelled of rain of damp grass and
leaves the grey light drizzling like rain the honeysuckle coming up in damp
waves I could see her face a blur against his shoulder he held her in one arm
like she was no bigger than a child he extended his hand
glad to know you (SF 192)
In this passage, dialog is not clearly attributed to specific speakers. While it is apparently
Caddie who introduces Quentin to Dalton Ames, it is unclear who says “Im wet Im wet all
over.” This passage closely resembles the language of Benjy in its laconic syntax and in the
imagery of the two children moving about the Compson land, (“we reached the fence she
crawled through I crawled through”).
It is unclear what “you” dont have to do “if you dont want to.” The lack of
punctuation or attribution of quotations are further characteristics of the stream of
consciousness technique which make it difficult to attribute enunciations to characters. The
inferiority of thought eliminates the need for such indications, and distinguishes it from
narrative based on the communicative model o f oral or written storytelling. This lack of
punctuation continues for ten pages in which Quentin’s thoughts echo bits and pieces of
conversations with Caddy about her pregnancy, and her lover, as well as Quentin’s meeting
with, and his threats and his clumsy attempt to punch Dalton Ames. The text then returns
to the “present” time frame, resuming on the afternoon of June 2, 1910. Quentin’s nose is
bleeding, and Shreve asks him why he tried to hit Bland. This fight with Bland is a scene
which is is presented only through Quentin’s subsequent re-living of it. Spoade has to tells
Quentin what he has apparendy just lived though but of which he apparendy has no
memory.
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“The first I knew was when you jumped up all of a sudden and said, ‘Did
you ever have a sister? did you? and when he said No, you hit him. I
noticed you kept on looking at him, but you didn’t seem to be paying
any attention to what anybody was saying until you jumped up and asked
him if he had any sisters.” (206)
That the flashbacks to conversations and images of Caddy are what as he attacked Bland,
Quentin seems to have been re-living an earlier encounters with Dalton Ames in Jefferson.
The question echoes the one he remembered asking Caddy’s lover after confronting him
and insisting that he leave town.
did you ever have a sister did you
no but theyre all bitches
I hit him my open hand beat the impulse to shut it to his face his
hand moved as fast as mine the cigarette went over the rail I swung with
the other hand he caught it too before the cigarette reached the water he
held both my wrists in the same hand his ocher hand flicked to his armpit
under his coat behind him the sun slanted and a bird singing somewhere
beyond the sun we looked at one another while the bird singing he turned
my hands loose
look here (199)
The two identical questions also lead the reader to assume that Quentin was thinking about
his confrontation with Caddy’s lover during his assault of Gerald Bland.
Though more clearly framed in the present thatn Beny’s narrative, the above
example illustrates how Quentin does not live entirely in the present. In his fight with
Gerald Bland, he re-lives a fight with Dalton Ames. Even in his fight with Ames, he is
strangely attuned, not to what he is doing, but to the singing bird and the slanting sun.
Involuntary Memory and the Olfactory
While there seems to be no overt involuntary memory mechanisms at work the way
the sensation of a piece of cake dipped in tea, or the narrators’ stumbling on uneven paving
stones brings to consciousness Marcel’s forgotten memories, Faulkner’s novels do seem to
evoke an “involuntary” memory akin to Proust’s. In The Sound and the Furv. for example,
Quentin and Benjy’s perceptions and memories of their sister Caddy are infused with the
sensation of certain odors. Just as he is attentive to color and movement, Benjy is
particularly sensitive to odors. He can “smell” Caddy’s sickness (75). Caddy and Quentin
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smell “like rain.” (80), and Caddy smells “like trees” (88). Benjy is upset when Caddy’s
usual odor is altered by the perfume she was given by Dalton Ames.
Quentin’s memories of Caddy are likewise associated with the odor of
honeysuckle,*® and in Absalom. Absalom! he is attentive to the smell of Mr. Compson’s
cigar along with that of honeysuckle and the summer wisteria, which comes to be
associated with the events narrated by his father and Miss Rosa. Miss Rosa expounds a
theory of memory which bears a striking resemblance to Proust’s involuntary memory in its
valuation of sense perception, particularly the olfactory as she too recalls her own “summer
of wisteria.”
Once there was—Do you mark how the wistaria, sun-impacted on this wall here,
distills and penetrates this room as though (light-unimpeded) by secret and
attritive progress from mote to mote o f obscurity’s myriad componentsI That is
the substance o f remembering-sense, sight, sm elt the muscles with which we see
and hear and feel—not mind, not thought: there is no such thing as memory: the
brain recalls ju st what the muscles grope for: no more, no less: and its resultant
sum is usually incorrect and false and worthy only o fth e name ofdream [. . .]
(AA 178)
Here as in Proust, sense perception is the catalyst of memory and has a very powerful
influence on the nature o f the memory evoked. The purely contingent presence of the odor
during the initial experience, comes to stand for the memory in an essenital way, as
metaphor.
Quentin’s thoughts are also heavily affected by his father’s words, and by odors, or
by the memories of certain odors; but in contrast to Benjy, he is emotionally affected by
those odors and those memories. Unlike Benjy, Quentin is able to reflect on his own non
existence in the moment o f involuntary recall, “where all tstable things become shadowy
paradoxical:”
Benjy’s memories are completely involuntary, thus mechanical. He is not able to
relate one moment to the other or to reflect on the existential status of the past. He has no

**(SF 160, 185, 186. 190, 191. 192, 193. 195. 210. 211)
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use for the past tense. His memories do not belong to him, when the past becomes present
it copmpietely obliterates ail sense he might have of the present.
When it bloomed in the spring and it rained the smell was everywhere you
didnt notice it so much at other times but when it rained the smell began
to come into the house at twilight either it would rain more at twilight or
there was something in the light itself but it always smelled strongest then
until I would lie in bed thinking when will it stop when will it stop [. . .]
Sometimes I could not put myself to sleep saying that over and over until
after the honeysuckle got all mixed up in it the whole thing came to
symbolize night and unrest I seemed to be lying neither asleep nor awake
looking down a long corridor of grey halflight where all stable things had
become shadowy paradoxical all I had done shadows all I had felt suffered
taking visible form antic and perverse mocking without relevance inherent
themselves with the denial of the significance they should have affirmed
thinking I was I was not who was not who was not was not who. (SF 2 1 0 211)

Quentin postulates his existence here as a chiasmus of negation, in what might be called a
“Proustian” moment, he expresses this lack of being in the nether-world of consciousness
“neither asleep nor awake.” Since he is unable to fulfill the role he thinks he should have
assumed as male heir to the Compson domain his actions are “without relevance,” and
come back to “mock” him.
Just as he blames himself for his inability to defend the honor of his family by
protecting the virginity of his sister, Quentin cannot come to terms with the violation of
the land represented by the loss of the pasture. The Compson domain has been altered by
the country club which has erected a fence and made the pasture into a golf course (where,
in Benjy’s words, men “hit”). The “virgin” swampland which Thomas Sutpen is said to
have “outraged” in Absalom. Absalom! is another figure for the loss of the values o f the Old
South in the impurity and senselessness of modern life.
Quentin’s narrative is cerebral and comtemplative, the episodes which he
remembers all somehow involve his indecision and inability to act, to assume the role he
envisions for himself of his sister’s protector, the role of the father. The character o f
Quentin Compson is Faulkner’s version o f T.S. Eliot’s Prufrock, confronted with a state of
affairs in which the code of honor which he wants to follow is no longer respected. At the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

66
end of Absalom. Absalom? he tells Shreve “I am older at twenty than a lot of people who
have died” (AA469).
Existentialist Faulkner
Lewis P. Simpson has argued that Faulkner’s work, like much of Southern literature
from about 1920 to 1950, tends to suggest that “the process of the destruction of memory
and history [.. .] cannot be halted” and that the “inauguration of any attempt to establish a
new literary covenant with the past is futile and that the only meaningful covenant for the
latter-day writer is one with the self on terms generally defined as existential.” The stream
of consciousness technique, while seemingly revealing the “inner” thoughts of a character,
explains nothing. The significance of images and words reflected in Quentin’s thoughts
appears only in their repetition and juxtaposition, in the relationships which become
decipherable in the phenomenon of consciousness.
Quentin’s section is marked by the repetitive or obsessive memories of the odor of
honeysuckle, or the name of Caddy’s boyfriend, Dalton Ames, as he obsessively recalls his
failure to defend her honor in his fight with the man he suspects to be the father of her
child. The alternation of stream of consciousness techniques with more straightforward
narrative and dialogue is similar to the technique used in Absalom. Ahsaloml As in
Quentin’s section of The Sound and the Furv. there is a frame narrative in which consists
of the events of the summer of 1909, in which Quentin listens to Miss Rosa and then Mr.
Compson telling what they know of the Sutpen legend, and as in the former novel,
passages in which speakers are clearly indicated by quotation marks and enunciations are
specifically attributed to particular characters, alternate with long portions of text in which
it is not entirely clear who is speaking.
Time and Memory in Absalom. Absalom!
It is a the desire for coherence and consistency which rivets Yoknapatawpha’s (and
the reader’s) attention on the story of Thomas Sutpen and his children. As in Proust, the
way the book is set up, nothing (or relatively litde) in fact “happens.” What happens is the
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act o f narration itself, as it is taken up by first one, and then another character. The events
are related have already happened. It is a question of constructing a stable, coherent, logical
narrative out of disparate fragments which do not all make sense to the storytellers. There
are a certain number of events which are well-known to them, and in later volumes
Faulkner even provided a chronology to help the reader, but no one narrator is capable of
telling it all. The text is continually coming and going between different moments in the
Sutpen story as each of the narrators tries to make sense of them.
Absalom. Absalom? does not present itself as an autobiographical novel in the same
way the Proust’s does. It does not make extensive use of first person narration, but the
characters themselves engage in acts of narration. While the novel is chiefly concerned with
Thomas Sutpen and his activities in Yoknapatawpha county, it is in many ways the story of
a story, the story of its telling; In some brief passages, Faulkner shows us the thoughts of
Quentin, as in the second chapter of The Sound and the Furv. but for the characters of
Miss Rosa Coldfield, Mr. Compson, or Shreve, it is not so much their immediate
perceptions which are portrayed, but the way the narrators speak the stories they tell, their
emphasis or vocabulary, thus their use of language, which give clues as to the nature of
their thought processes. What is portrayed are their different uses of language and signs.
Jean-Paul Sartre claims that “a novelistic technique always reveals the novelists’s
metaphysics. The critic’s task is to grasp the latter before he can appreciate the latter.rvWThe
style o f Faulkner novels suggest personal identity through the idiosyncratic ways that
thought perceives and organizes the world. The only way to gain access to this perception
and organization is through language. This is the lesson that Faulkner seems to have
gleaned from his own readings of Continental authors, including Proust.
The narrator of the Recherche is extremely attentive to the ways in which others
use language. He takes pleasure in mocking Francoise s mispronunciations when, indignant

49 “one technique romanesque rcnvoie toujours a la mdtsphysique du romander. La tiche du critique est de
d^gagercelle-ci avant d ’apprtdercelle-ia" (Situations 1.71).
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over the narrator’s feigned mocking attitude toward the death of his aunt: «Je ne sais pas
m’esprimer», je triomphais de cet aveu avec un bon sens ironique et brutal digne du
docteur Percepied, e si elle ajoutait: «Elle dtait tout de meme de la parent&se, il reste
toujours le respect qu’on doit a la parent£se», je haussais les ^paules et je me disais: «Je suis
bien bon de discuter avec une illetree qui fait des cuirs pareils” (S 152). “I dont know how
to express myself,” I would gloat over her admission with an ironical and brutal comon sense
worthy of Dr. Percepied; and if she went on: “all the same she was kith and kindle; there’s
always the respect due to kindle,” I would shug my shoulders and say to myself “It’s really
very good of me to discuss the matter with an illiterate old woman who makes such
howlers”(I: 168).
Genette, in considering the use of language by various characters in Proust’s novel,
notes that “just about all of them present at least sometimes erratic linguistic traits, faulty,
dialectical or socially marked expressions, acquisitions or characteristic borrowings, misuses,
mispronounciations or revealing ellipses. [.. .] none o f them escapes, save perhaps for the
hero himself, who speaks very little as such, and whose role is rather one o f observation,
apprenticeship and decipherment.”* Genette concludes that this stylistic autonomy does
not finally constitute substantial, determined characters in the way previous realist authors
did. Far from compensating the transitory psychology of their character, their language
often accuetnuates and aggravates it.51 All of Proust’s characters are, like Aibertine, «etres
de fuite» (202-03).Dezon-Jones concurs with Genette in her assessment that “with Proust
the very notion o f the creation of novelistic characters with stable, fixed identities has
disappeared in favor of the description of variable, impressionable consciences,” “avec
50

“i peu prts tous pi&entent au mo ins a quelque moment quelque trait a n tiq u e de langage, tournuie
fautive ou dialectale. ou sodalement maiqude, acquisition ou emprunt canctdriscque. gaffe, bourde ou lapsus
revdateur, etc [ ...] aucun d eux n'echappe, si ce n’est peut-ctre le hdros lui-m£me, qui d’ailleurs parie fort
^>eu comme tel et dont le rdle est plut6t d’observation, d’apprentissage et de d&hiftiement.” (201).
“1’autonomie stylistique [n'aboutit] pas chez Proust a la constitution de penotnuga substantids et
determines au sens tdaliste du terme. On sait combien les «personnages» proustiens restent, ou piut6t
deviennent au fil des pages de plus en plus inddfinissables. insaisissables, «4tres de fuitc», et [’incoherence de
leur ccnduite en est dvidemment la raison essentiellc [ ...] mais la coherence hyperbolique de leur langage.
loin de compenser cette evanescence psychologique, ne (ait bien souvent que I’accentuer et I’aggraver.”
(Genette 202 - 03).
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Proust, la notion meme de creation de personnages de romans fixes, stables, s’effa^a au
profit de la description de consciences variables et impressionables,” (25). This identity
crisis is not limited to the narrator. It plagues all of the inhabitants o f the Proustian
universe. In the case of Faulkner’s novels, she likewise affirms that “even more than
characters, it is a series of temporal consciences” which are presented (100). Quentin
Compson a good example of such a temporal consciousness.
In the Compson novels, Faulkner strictly delimits the time o f the narrative. We
have already seen the precision with which Faulkner situates the narrative time in the four
sections o f The Sound and the Fury. In Absalom. Absalom? the time between Quentin’s
first meeting with Miss Rosa Coldfield (the sister of Ellen Coldfield who was Sutpen’s wife
in Yoknapatawpha county), and his final retelling of the story to Shreve McCannon is
confined to a precise 9 month period in the Summer and Winter o f 1909, but the novel
begins in medias rex, Quentin is rehearing a story that he already knew. As he is preparing
to attend Harvard in the late summer of 1909, he is summoned by Miss Rosa Coldfield to
listen to her tell her version of Sutpen’s story. In the early pages o f the novel, Quentin is at
pains to discover why she has chosen him to listen to what seems to be her confession of
complicity with this man.
Much of the first few chapters consist o f Quentin listening to the tale told first by
Miss Rosa and then Mr. Compson, in Jefferson, while, in the latter half of the novel,
Quentin reconstructs the story with Shreve in his Harvard dorm room. Mr Compson, Miss
Rosa, Quentin and Shreve take their places in a lign of storytellers that begins with Sutpen
himself, on the occasion of his discussion with Quentin’s grandfather, General Compson).
If the same story is told more than once, and by different storytellers, it is never twice told
in quite the same way.
At the same time that Quentin, Miss Rosa and Mr. Compson are attempting to
piece together the portrait of Thomas Sutpen, the language they use and the stories they tell
oblige the reader to make inferences about their own identities. The way material is
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organized, the types of associations which structure the narrator's discourse are perceived to
bear the traces of an individual consciousness, but any attempt to represent the workings of
consciousness in narrative gives rise to all sorts of problems involving not only language,
memory and sense perceptions, but also history, science and epistemology. It presupposes
that language is capable of “representing” something other than itself, or that the term
“consciousness” refers to some state of being or pattern of thought preexisting language,
and that it could somehow be represented in language.
Voice, Voices
Michael Millgate argues that the narrative style o f the various narrators in Absalom.
Absalom! is “more distinct than has usually been allowed,” and that “It is fair to speak of
the story as having three main narrators. Miss Rosa Coldfield and Mr. Compson are
narrators in their own right, projecting distinct interpretations” o f the Sutpen story which
are “deeply colored by the relationship in which they stand to him and by their own
particular qualities of character and personality.” Millgate distinguishes in Miss Rosa’s
account “with its ‘demonizing’ and linguistic extravagance [. ..] the violence and verbal
frenzy-action larger than life-size, language pushed beyond its proper limits-of decadent
Jacobean drama” (153), whereas Mr. Compson, “much less involved, much cooler and
more skeptical in his assessment of Sutpen and of the world at large, concentrates his
attention on different aspects of the story and treats them in quite a different manner. He
identifies Mr. Compson’s rhetoric with an “effete disenchantment: suggestive of the literary
decadence of the fin de siicle” with the “self-conscious estheticism of an Oscar Wilde or
Beardsley (154). In accordance with his portrayal of the tale as a tragedy, Mr Compson
insists that it was Sutpen’s pride which was his downfall, while Quentin will paradoxically
attribute it to “innocence.” The way the story is told emphasizes the workings of memory
and perception on the part of the Quentin as he is alternatively telling, listening to, or
imagining, the story.
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While it is sometimes possible to associate certain rhetorical stances with Miss Rosa
or Mr. Compson, at other times the various voices which narrate become indistinguishable
one from another. N. Blake argues that the narrating voices tend to merge into one
“overvoice:” “The voice, in Faulkner’s text, exists an an irrefutable overwhelming
presence.” While admitting the possibility of distinguishing among the book’s various
speakers, Blake cakes as his working hypothesis that all the narrators are “simply
mouthpieces for a voice that is unique, singular and indivisible [...]. The voice is really
anonymous” (Intertexrualitv 130). To speak of an omniscient narrator is misleading, for
although there are passages of the text written in the third person which tell us, for
example, what Quentin thinks and feels, “Whatever her reason for choosing him [...] the
getting to it, Quentin thought, was taking a long time” (AA 11), such passages are
relatively few.
In the first paragraphs, we get a summary of the story in Quentin’s thoughts in
which we see him internalizing the words of Rosa Coldfield:
he would seem to listen to two separate Quentins now—the Quentin
Compson preparing for Harvard in the South, the deep South dead since
1865 [. . .] and the Quentin Compson who was still too young to deserve
yet to be a ghost [. . .] the two separate Quentins now talking to one
another in the long silence of not people, in nodanguage, like this: It seems
that this demon—his name was Sutpen-(Colonel Sutpen)—Colonel Sutpen, Who
came out o f nowhere and without warning upon the land with a band o f
strange niggers and built a plantation—(Tore violently a plantation. Miss Rosa
Coldfield says)-tore violently. A nd married her sister Ellen and begot a son and
a daughter which—(W ithout gentleness begot, M iss Rosa Coldfield says)-without
gentleness. Which should have been the jewels o f his pride and the shield and
comfort o f his old age, only-(O nly they destroyed him or something or he
destroyed them or something. A nd died)-and died. W ithout regret, Miss Rosa
Coldfield says—(Save by her) Yes, save by her. (And by Quentin Compson) Yes.
And by Quentin Compson. (AA 5 -6 )
The multiple repetitions and corrections indicate the provisional nature of oral knowledge,
and give an indication of what is to follow: the different, sometimes conflicting, and
uldmately unverifiable stories about Thomas Supten’s family and plantation. The
condensed version o f the events of the Sutpen narrative is only the first of the many re-
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tellings in the novel. If Proustian narrative is characterized by the iterative mode, in which
repeated events are summarized in one instance o f narration, the narration o f Absalom.
Absalom? is characterized by repetition. The same events will be the subject o f multiple
tellings in the course of the novel.
In the logic of the Yoknapatawpha saga, this moment of splitting presages the
fractured inner discourse of Quentin’s final day in The Sound and the Furv. Since the
latter novel appeared first, the reader is in the position of Quentin himself, “listening [. . .]
to one of the ghosts which had refused to lie still even longer than most had, telling him
about old ghost-times” (AA 5). The splitting and doubling of the narrator, the listener and
the characters in the story they are telling and being told sets up a play of mutually
reflecting mirrors which cannot help but implicate the reader, much as the evocation of the
insomniac hero reading in bed does in Proust’s initial paragraph.
Quentin has evidendy internalized the story being told by Miss Rosa, even before
the reader has heard it. This passage displays a nearly schizophrenic splitting of Quentin’s
thoughts, and the introduction of another, seemingly omniscient voice (“two separate
Quentins now talking to one another”).
The second chapter of the novel begins in seemingly omniscient mode, telling of
the “legend” o f Sutpen’s arrival in the county in the 1830’s. “He had apparendy come into
town from the south—a man of about twenty-five as the town learned later, because at the
time his age could not have been guessed” (35). The information being conveyed in this
passage is communal. It is the limited, sometimes speculative knowledge pased along in the
gossip among the inhabitants of Yoknapatawpha. Mid-way through this chapter, the text
switches to direct quotation of Mr. Compson, who mil narrate the rest of the chapter to
Quentin. The third-person narrator is deprived o f any status as “omniscient,” not only
because it is mosdy absent, but also by what might be termed the relendessly “dialogical” or
polyphonic nature of the text. There is a proliferation of voices in the novel, not just those
of Miss Rosa Coldfield, Mr. Compson, or Shreve, but also the absent voices o f Quentin’s
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grandfather, and of other witnesses and townspeople who have over the years supplied
various elements of the ongoing narrative. The “overvoice” in Absalom, Ahsalnm! is
anonymous, displaying the communal nature of oral knowledge, and could be thought of
as schizophrenic. In the latter half of the book, as Quentin and Shreve tell each other the
story, Faulkner dramatizes the splicing together of different points of view in the ongoing
process of narration. Rather than tending toward clarity of voice, the momentum of the
narration drowns individual voices in a sea of dtiationality.
The coon-hunter Akers, who is said to have stumbled upon one of Sutpen’s “wild
negroes” is a representative of one of many people of Jefferson who may have gotten some
information about the man: “the men who would ride out to watch what was going on,
wbo began to tell how Sutpen would take stand beside a game trail with the pistols and
send the negroes in to drive the swamp like a pack of hounds [...]. There were many more
than Akers, though the others were responsible citizens and landowners and so did not
have to lurk about the camp at night” (AA 41) Thus nearly everything that is told about
Sutpen is rooted in this communal story.
The community which perpetuates the Sutpen “legend” or the Sutpen “mystery” is
the one which collectively produces the discourse. The principal speakers in the narration
which occurs in the years 1909-1910 include the sole remaining “eyewitness” to some of
the events, in the person of Rosa, as well as the descendants of Sutpen’s first (and seemingly
unique) Yoknapatawpha county friend: General Compson. But information also comes
from others, especially in the one section o f the book where an unidentified third person
narrator relates Thomas Sutpen’s arrival and first few years in Yoknapatawpha. There are
several scattered witnesses to sightings of Sutpen, and a few rare occasions on which the
entire town is witness to his actions. He makes brief taciturn appearances to court and
marry Ellen Coldfield, but otherwise turns his back on the community. Living twelve miles
away on Sutpen’s Hundred, all the town can know of him is innuendo. While the latter
pan of this chapter, in quotes, is attributed to Mr. Compson, we may or may not attribute
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che first pan to him; the nature of the information remains more or less “communal,”
therefore, as Faulkner might say, “apocryphal.”
The act of (re) telling the story to Shreve in the latter pan of the novel becomes a
catalyst for Quentin’s involuntary loss of self, finally provoking a profound psychological
identification with his father, and with Sutpen. The telling o f the story thus serves to efface
all difference between its object and the various agents of its perpetuation. So strong is his
identification with the figures in the Sutpen legend that, in the course of his storytelling
sessions with Shreve in their Harvard dormitory, the acts o f reminiscence and narration
trigger a vertiginous loss of identity, apparent in Quentin’s thoughts. He seems to lose his
sense of being an individual in the process of storytelling, identifying with Henry Sutpen,
or his father:
Yes, we are both Father. Or maybe Father and I are both Shreve, maybe it took
Father and me both to make Shreve or Shreve and me both to make Father or
maybe Thomas Sutpen to make all o f us. (AA 326 - 27)
This doubling of the narrating subject is As Weinstein has noted (referring to John Irwin’s
study Doubling and Incest), “the process of vicarious identification is rampant. Rosa and
her identification with Judith and Charles’s courtship, Henry and his shifting triangular
identifications with Judith and with Bon (mergers in which the clarity of sexual difference
itself seems to dissolve), Sutpen’s identification with the planter in the big house, Wash
Jones’s identification with Sutpen, Quentin and Shreve’s identifications with Henry and
Charles; in each of these crossings an involuntary psychic merger takes place” [.. .].52
Why did Faulkner choose return to the character o f Quentin Compson, first
introduced in his earlier novel, on the day of his suicide, in order to tell the story of
Thomas Sutpen, the uneducated man from Appalachia whose establishment of a plantation
and family in Yoknapatawpha County are the concern of the narrators? In interviews,

^Weinstein continues with an observation that is central to my argument: “Individual identity here remains
poignantly incomplete [ ...] Revising each finished version o f its characters’ identity with another version, the
novel melts down whatever it has consolidated” [...] (93). This statement holds true as well for the continual
revision at work in “Marcel’s ' story.
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Faulkner implied that he was merely looking for a mouthpiece to tell the story, and that the
main character in Absalom. Absalom! was Sutpen, but it is also a novel about Quentin
Compson, whose grandfather was Sutpen’s first Yoknapatawpha county friend. And in its
intertextual relationship to The Sound and the Furv. the Sutpen story seems intimately
related to the tragic end of the Compson Clan.
In a conference he gave in May, 1958 at the University of Virginia, Faulkner
attributed an autobiographical function to storytelling when he was asked whether the
Quentin Compson of Absalom. Absalom.1was supposed to be the same character who
appeared in The Sound and the Fury, “a man thinking about his own Compson family
[and] his sister.” Faulkner responded that Quentin approached the Sutpen family “with the
same opthalmia that he approached his own troubles” (FIU 274).
Faulkner said that Absalom. Absalom! was Sutpen’s story, despite the fact that
Quentin is a central character in it,
it’s Sutpen’s story. But then, every time any character gets into a book, no
matter how minor, he’s actually telling his biography-that’s all anyone ever
does, he tells his own biography, talking about himself, in a thousand
different terms, but himself. (FIU 275)
While Faulkner is ostensibly referring to the character of Quentin as a storyteller, his choice
of language invites an interpretation whereby every character in a narrative is to be read as a
figure for the author himself. Instead of saying “every time a character tells a story,”
Faulkner attributes the very constitution of characters as the establishment of so many
mirrors for the author.
If Absalom. Absalom! is, as Faulkner claimed, Surpen’s story, it is also the story of
Quentin Compson and William Faulkner. The exemplary nature of the Sutpen story is
suggested by Quentin, who postulates “it took Thomas Sutpen to make all of us.”
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Readers o f The Sound and the Fury know that Quentin has no future, but
continually re-lives the past. Sartre noted this in his comparison o f Proust and Faulkner:
“It would seem that we can compare Faulkner’s vision o f the world to that o f a man
seated in a convertible facing backwards. At each moment shadows appear to his right
and to his left [...] which only a little while after become trees, men, cars, with
distance.”53 The novel begins with Q uentin “listening” to Miss Rosa Coldfield, but he is
not listening. He has heard versions o f the Sutpen story numerous times, he is more
concerned with discovering why he m ust be subjected to ityet still again-.
It's because she wants it told he. thought so that people whom she w ill never
see and whose names she w ill never hear and who have never heard her name
nor seen her face w ill read it and know at last why God let us lose the war
(AA 8).
Q uentin’s conventions with his father subsequent to Rosa’s narrative are dramatized in
the second and third chapters. He is concerned to know why she should have summoned
him to accompany her to Sutpen’s hundred. Mr Compson suggests that perhaps she
holds Quentin guilty by association, since his grandfather was Sutpen’s first friend in
Yoknapatawpha county.
W e learn that he has heard the story innumerable times. Later on, as he retells the
story to Shreve his thoughts reveal his weariness at the incessant rehashing o f the same
incidents in the story:
A m I going to have to hear it a ll again he thought I am going to have to hear
it a ll over again I am already hearing it a ll over again I am listening to it all
over again I shallhave to never listen to anything else but this again forever so
apparently not only a man never outlives his father but not even his fie n d s
and acquaintances do (AA 345 - 46)

53“I1 semblequ'on puisse comparer la vision du m ondede Faulkner a celle d’un ho mm me assis dans une auto
d&ouvetre et qui regarde en amere. A chaq ue instant des ombres surgissenc a sa droite, a sa gauche,
papillortements, rremblcmencstamisls [...} qui nedevienntdesaibres, deshommes,desvoituresqu’un peu
plus tard, avec le recul. Le passdy gagne une sortede surtdalitd: ses contours sont duiset nets, immuablev, le
present, innomable et fiigirif. re ddcnd mal contre tui; ilest plein de trous, et, par ces trous, les choses passes
I'envahissent, fixes, immobiles, siicncieuses comme des juges ou comme des regards" (73 - 4)
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The very repetitiveness o f Q uentins thoughts suggests a static, unchanging story in
which the same thing is continually repeated. His expression o f weariness with an act o f
narration which is repeated over and over again in the book is simultaneously a
commentary on the form of the novel itself. The repetition with difference of narrative
suggests the infinity of possible interpretations and arrangements o f the scant pieces of
the Sutpen puzzle, but also implies the futility of any attempt to artificially limit or
master the flux of time and reality:
M aybe nothing ever happens once and is finished. M aybe happen is never
once but like ripples maybe on water after the pebble sinks, the ripples
moving on, spreading, the pool attached by a narrow um bilical water-cord to
the next pool which the first poolfeeds, hasfed, did feed, let this second pool
contain a different temperature o f water, a different molecularity o f having
seen, fe lt, remembered, reflect in a different tone the infinite unchanging sky,
it doesn't matter: that pebble's watery echo whose fa ll it did not even see
moves across its surface too a t the original ripple-space, to the old ineradicable
rhythm (AA 326)
Quentin employs images here which evoke an infinitude o f potential or actual
complexity, an infinite connectedness. It is significant that the images he chooses are
precisely those inspiring the recent models o f complex interactions hinted at by studies
of fluid dynamics. The unlimited potential for dilation and revision inherent in narrative
is a manifestation of what “fractal geometry” knows as infinite recursiveness. Likewise,
the self-reflexivity and self-similarity of the mise en abyme is akin to the selfrecursiveness and similarity among the many patterns found in natural systems and
mimicked by models o f fluid dynamics.
As a result of his excursion to Sutpen’s Hundred with Miss Rosa, Quentin seems
to be the beneficiary of supplemental information about Charles Bon s African-American
blood. This supplemental knowledge allows Quentin to assume mastery of the narrative,
thus taking the place o f his father when he comes back to tell Mr. Compson what he
found at the Sutpen place. Mr. Compson’s efforts are to resurrect the past through the
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voluntary act o f storytelling. He is frustrated by the difficulty o f making a complete,
coherent story out o f the fragments o f memories and narratives about Thomas Sutpen.
In Absalom it is remarkable that, although he provides the focus for the novel’s
point of view, Quentin is the only one o f the narrators who is unable to sustain the act o f
narration. In the chapters in which he is the principle narrator, he is progressively
interrupted by his Canadian roommate Shreve, who finally appropriates the story and
tells it himself. Q uentin’s inability to tell the story am ounts to an inability to tell any
story, his or anyone else’s, to the bankruptcy o f narrative discussed by Walter Benjamin
in his essay “The Storyteller,” where he asserts that “today the communicability o f
experience is decreasing” (86-87). Quentin’s ultimate inability to express himself is
evident at the very end o f the novel where, in response to Shreve’s question “W hy do you
hate the South?” all Quentin can do is rather obsessively deny this hatred: “/ dont. I dont!
I dont hate it! I dont hate itT (AA 471). He remains powerless to assert his identity in
anything other than a negative mode. It is the end o f this novel which helps explain his
disjointed narration in The Sound and the Furv.
Quentin’s efforts to establish a definitive version o f the story are doomed to
failure because o f the multiple and conflicting voices which feed his own discourse. The
fracturing and dispersal o f the narrative voice also serves to suggest the different
discourses which come together to structure consciousness. Q uentin’s voice is situated at
a nodal point between those o f his grandfather, his father, Rosa Coldfield, Thomas
Sutpen, and the whole com m unity o f Jefferson, all ofw hom contribute, in one form or
another, to the Sutpen legend, which is described as “part o f his twenty years’ heritage.”
We are told that “his very body was an empty hall echoing with sonorous defeated
names; he was not a being, an entity, he was a commonwealth” (AA 9). The “omniscient”
narrator here makes explicit a symbolic level on which Quentin will serve as a
representative o f the whole South, o f the Confederacy, and eventually o f all mankind.
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If at times the various narrating voices are virtually indistinguishable from one
another, at others the “individual” voices become fractured, as when, at the very
beginning o f Absalom. Absalom! Quentin’s consciousness splits itself into two voices
which, carrying on a dialogue with himself, as he listens to Miss Rosa tell the Sutpen
story, as if he had heard it already a thousand times. It is suggested that he has heard it
for years, that it is part o f his “birthright,” his heritage. Yet the scene is supposed to be
taking place on the afternoon that Quentin is summoned to hear the story for the first
time. How are we to take this exchange between two nearly identical voices? Is it a flashforward to a m om ent in time when Quentin will have heard the story in its entirety? The
hesitant character o f the exchange, with its repetitions and corrections suggests the
uncertainty o f the facts. Sutpen is not a man but a “grim ghost” haunting Rosa’s language
“where a more fortunate one would have had a house” (AA 4).
Why does Sutpen not have a house? W hy is he exiled into the world o f endless
discourse, o f narration? For that is perhaps the ultimate question and the final irony for
this man who so obstinately refused to speak. Sutpen’s appearances in the town o f
Jefferson are marked by his silent passage.
So they would catch him, run him to earth, in the lounge between the
supper table and his locked door to give him the opportunity to tell them
who he was and where he came from and what he was up to, whereupon
he would move gradually and steadily until his back came in contact with
something-a post or a wall-and then stand there and tell them nothing
whatever as pleasantly and courteously as a hotel clerk. (AA 38)
Sutpen refuses textuality at all turns, insisting only on his own “design,” (though we
cannot be sure if this is the way he puts it, since all we know o f him comes through the
townsfolk, the Compsons, or Miss Rosa). He refuses to supply a narrative o f himself to
the townfolk who lie in wait for him so as to corner him and force him to talk, to tell
them who he is, where he comes from and what he’s up to.
If Sutpen avoids committing himself in conversation, it is because his singular
goal is to have the final word, the only word that matters. He intends to leave his “mark”
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through the perpetuation o f his name by his children. Thus the imposition o f a name is a
significant aspect o f his attempt at writing his own story. The other main way in which
Sutpen attempts to control his story is through the tombstones which he has engraved,
save for the dates and which he carries around with him during the war:
“He bought them himself,” M r Compson said “He bought the two o f
them while the regiment was in Virginia, after Judith got word to him
that her mother was dead. He ordered them from Italy, the best, the
finest to be had-his wife’s complete and his with the date left blank: and
this while on active service with an army which had [. . .] the highest
mortality rate o f any before or since [. ..].” (AA 236 - 37).
Quentin imagines the scene o f the wagon accompanying Sutpen’s regiment with the twothousand pound stones:
that much bombastic and inert carven rock which for the next year was to
be part o f the regiment, to follow it into Pennsylvania and be present at
Gettysburg, moving behind the regiment in a wagon driven by the
dem on’s body servant through swamp and plain and mountain pass, the
regiment moving no faster than the wagon could. (AA 237)
The stones come to represent Sutpen himself for the starving men o f the regiment, who
refer to them as Colonel and Mrs Colonel. This absurd process is literally an attempt by
Sutpen to control the final word, to possess closure and carry it around with him. He
would like to create his own monument, his own identity, independendy from the voices
of others. Ironically his taciturn nature and the seemingly inexplicable event o f the son’s
renunciation o f his birthright leaves him open to the speculation of innumerable others.
Throughout Faulkner’s novel, Mr. Compson, Miss Rosa, and Shreve, but
especially Quentin, as well as the reader himself, are preoccupied with putting all the
pieces o f the story together in order to make it whole, ordered and understandable. Each
storyteller has a different approach to the characters and events, a different relationship
to the story being told, and each version has its own blind spots. Mr. C om pson’s story is
influenced by his father s friendship with and knowledge about Sutpen; it is equally
enriched by Mr. Compson’s education as a classicist, while Miss Rosa’s is filtered
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through her sister, Sutpen’s second wife, and through her own education as a woman in
the rural South in the late nineteenth century. She characterizes Sutpen as a “demon,”
while Mr. Compson prefers to see his as a victim o f Fate.
Faulkner’s novels incorporate multiple voices in order to suggest the ways in
which consciousness is dependent on the interplay o f many different discourses, and that
this interplay is an unstable, contingent, ever-changing process o f negotiation, involving
repetition and revision. The narrators o f these novels, like Sutpen talking to Quentin s
grandfather, are not talking about themselves, they’re just telling stories, but it is the
ways in which they tell their stories which end up telling us about themselves.
In the Recherche the hero learns the cultural significance o f appearances and
gestures, o f signs, and the role they play in constituting social and personal identites. As
Proust demonstrated the power o f art to create the real for the young Marcel, in
Faulkner’s novels, the internalization o f culturally determined systems o f representation
is shown through the importance accorded to memories o f others’speech, o f storytelling.
In Proust’s novel the number o f discoursrve positions and their ideological over
determinedness is more overtly presented, from the reactionary and anti-semitic
positions o f the Parisian nobility, represented by the Guermantes, to the “Dreyfusism” o f
Bloch, from the medieval legends o f the narrator’s youth, to Brichot’s etymologies. The
assumption of such discursive stances serves to define individuals and nations, that is why
the anti-semitic furor o f the Dreyfus affair became an issue o f national security, yet the
arbitrariness o f such attitudes is demonstrated by the ease with which they are discarded
and replaced.
T hat Basin de Guermantes is an anti-Dreyfusard seems to conform to the
narrator’s image o f him as a representative o f one of the great aristocratic families o f
Paris, but in Sodome et Gomorrhe we learn that his colleagues are shocked by his sudden
reversal o f position. By changing his position on this crucial issue, his figure undergoes a
transformation in their eyes. This transformation is mediated by a theatrical, artistic
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milieu in which three “charming little women” convince him that there was never any
evidence against him. Rather than by logic and reason, they sway him by charm and
finally by decree “Les trois charmanres dames trouvaient qu’il n’allait pas assez vite et le
rudoyaient un peu: «Mais au fond personne d’intelligent n ’a pu croire qu’il yeflt rien».
[...] Le due etait rentrd k Paris dreyfusard enrag£.” Marcel concludes that many
countries behave like such men o f sincerity, “beacoup de pays qu’on a laissls remplis de
haine pour un peuple et qui, six mois apr&s, ont changd de sentiment et renverse leurs
alliances” (SG 138). In the Recherche, the behavior o f individuals mirrors and prefigures
the behavior o f governments and nations. The importance o f the impersonal symbolic
field o f language is shown through the coercive power o f artistic and linguistic
representation.
The frustration o f the various speakers in Absalom. Ahsalom!. at their inability to
fully understand the mystery o f the son’s renunciation o f his birthright, flight, and
eventual murder o f his sister’s fiance, or the murder o f the father by his own farm hand,
is expressed by Mr. Compson, who laments: “It is just incredible. It just does not explain
[...] We have a few old m outh-to-m outh tales; we exhume from old trunks and boxes
and drawers letters without salutation or signature, in which men and women who once
lived and breathed are now merely initials or nicknames out o f some now
incomprehensible affection which sound to us like Sanskrit or Choctaw” (124). T he
impassioned attempts o f the narrators to understand the mystery o f the man named
Sutpen is here likened to the attempt to decipher a difficult language. The choice o f
Sanskrit and Choctaw is interesting for a number o f reasons. Sanskrit is a written
language while Choctaw is from an oral tradition, but both are also languages associated
with non-Western traditions. These spiritual languages are opposed to the mysterious
and sinister language o f Sutpen’s Haitian slaves, which Mr. Compson equates in their
incomprehensibility.
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In Absalom. Absalom! as in The Sound and the Fury, the chronology, the link o f
causality has been broken, so the story cannot be told from beginning to end. It is not
completely understood by the people o f Yoknapatawpha. All they have is the murky inbetween o f unknown, known and inexplicable. The chronology o f the plot is scattered,
dispersed throughout the narrative. As in Proust, the story is revealed episodically, and as
each episode is evoked, the storyteller explores its relations to other episodes at other
moments o f the protagonists’ lives. Michael Millgate has suggested that "one way o f
looking at the book’s structure is to think o f it as organized about a number o f crucial
moments o f recognition, truth, disillusion: Henry and his father in the library, Henry
shooting Bon, Sutpen proposing to Rosa, Wash Jones murdering Sutpen-each moment
presented in a kind o f tableau arrested at a particular point o f time and held in
suspension while it is looked at, approached from all sides, inspected as if it were itself an
artifact, like that Grecian urn which Faulkner so often invoked elsewhere” (164).
While Proust’s novel presents itself as a kind o f autobiography, a first person
recounting o f the narrator’s own life, in A b s a lo m . Absalom! the narrators are concerned
with someone else’s story: but the story o f Thom as Sutpen also carries personal
significance for Quentin Compson, just as Swann’s does for Marcel. This is especially
evident in his retelling o f it, in the context o f his Harvard Dorm room, to his Canadian
roommate. We are told that Shreve’s request was not the first time that Q uentin had
been asked to describe or explain the South’s difference to other inhabitants o f the
Harvard community: “not Shreve’s first time, nobody’s first time in Cambridge since
September: Tell about the South. What's it like there. What do they do there. Why do they
live there? Why do they live at all?”(AA 218). T he insistence o f this line o f questioning
indicates the exemplary status Quentin holds in Massachusetts as a representative o f the
South.
Shreve continually refers to Rosa as Q uentin’s “Aunt Rosa” and is repeatedly
corrected. T he vehemence with which Q uentin denies her kinship belies the very real ties
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chat bind him to her, if only because they are neighbors in such a small Mississippi town.
To Shreve, the Northerner, for whom Jefferson Mississippi is as imaginary as Paris or
Haiti, they may as well be family. Quentin is thus called upon not only to explain life in
the South, but to justify its very existence. The story ofThom as Sutpen thus becomes
emblematic o f something fundamental, specific to Southern culture, which remains
irreducible, some difference or remainder which eludes the comprehension o f even the
native Southerner. As Shreve struggles to understand the South he mimics the desire o f
the residents o f Yoknapatawpha County themselves-Quentin, his father and Miss Rosa—
in their struggle to understand the Sutpen story, and all o f these characters thus become
stand-ins for the reader of the novel itself.
Wait. Listen. I’m not trying to be funny, smart. I just want to understand
it if I can and I dont know how to say it better. Because it’s something
my people haven’t got. O r if we have got it, it all happened long ago
across the water and so now there aint anything to look at every day to
remind us o f it. We dont live among defeated grandfathers and freed
slaves (or have I got it backward and was it your folks that are free and
the niggers that lost?) and bullets in the dining room table and such, to be
always reminding us to never forget. What is it? Something you live and
breathe in like air? a kind o f vacuum filled with wraithlike and
indomitable anger and pride and glory at and in happenings that
occurred and ceased fifty years ago? A kind o f entailed birthright father
and son and father and son o f never forgiving General Sherman, so that
forevermore as long as your childrens’ children produce children you
wont be anything but a descendant o f a long line o f colonels killed in
Pickett’s charge at Manassas?
“Gettysburg,” Quentin said. “You cant understand it. You would
have to be bom there.”(AA 450 - 451)
Quentin subsequently admits to Shreve that perhaps he doesn’t understand it himself
after all. It is only Shreve, the outsider, who must explain the significance o f his story to
Quentin.
In the context o f the novel, this “remainder,” or this difference specific o f
Southern culture, is the difference o f Southern culture to itself-its irreducible remainder,
the one which it would like to suppress and eliminate, namely, its intimate relationship to
Afro-American culture.
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The story they are telling involves several well-defined temporal strata, going
back as far as Sutpen’s boyhood encounter with a slave at the door o f a plantation house
in Virginia, His appearance in Jefferson in 1833, and, in-between, the story of his
renunciation of his first wife and the loss o f her father’s plantation to a slave revolt in
Haiti. These and other episodes constitute the Sutpen narrative, but there are large gaps
in this story. These gaps contribute in no small measure to the Sutpen mystery and
constitute a large part o f the novel’s preoccupations.
There are resemblances between the descriptions o f the settings, o f the contexts
in which the story is told. Despite the obvious differences in climate and temperature,
they are all described in terms o f stillness and death:
From a little after two oclock until almost sundown o f the long still hot
weary dead September afternoon they sat in what Miss Coldfield still
called the office because her father had called it that-a dim hot airless
room with the blinds all closed and fastened for forty-three summers
because when she was a girl someone had believed that light and moving
air carried heat and that dark was always cooler, and which (as the sun
shone fuller and fuller on that side of the house) became latticed with
yellow slashes full o f dust motes which Quentin thought o f as being
flecks of the dead old dried paint itself blown inward from the scaling
blinds as wind might have blown them. (AA 3)
The Harvard dormitory room in which Quentin and Shreve rehash the Sutpen story is
similarly portrayed:
the two o f them not moving except to breathe, Both young, bom both
within the same year: the one in Alberta, the other in Mississippi, born half
a continent apart yet joined, connected after a fashion in a son o f
geographical transubstantiation by that Continental Trough, that River
that runs not only through the physical land [. ..] (AA 322)
It is a letter from his father which also brings the memories o f the sensations of that
summer into the Massachusetts winter:
Then on the table before Quentin, lying on the open text book beneath
the lamp, the white oblongs o f envelope, the familiar blurred mechanical
Jefferson Jan 10 1910 Miss and then, opened, the M y dear son in his
father’s sloped fine hand out o f that dead dusty summer where he had
prepared for Harvard so that his father’s hand could lie on a strange
lamp-lit table in Cambridge; that dead summer twilight-the wisteria, the
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cigar-smell, the fireflies-attenuated up from Mississippi and into this
strange room, across this strange iron New England snow. (AA 217)
In Absalom, Absalom! the narrators are all concerned with restoring memory, and thus o f
overcoming time. The novel is, from the beginning, cast in the fading light o f
remembrance (“From a little after two oclock until almost sundown o f the long still hot
weary dead September afternoon"). The stillness o f the scene in Rosa Coldfield’s father s
office, and the slow fade o f the summer afternoon comm ents ironically on the
immobility o f Faulkner’s prose, in which the action, the verb itself, seems never to come.
“From a little after two oclock until almost sundown o f the long still hot weary dead
September afternoon” action is never fully predicated, instead being continually impeded
by the interminable description and accumulation o f adjectives (“long still hot weary”).
W hen the reader finally reaches the verb, it is not action, but stasis, as “they sat.” Such
language is characteristic o f “decadent” literature, in which the hero spends long periods
in contemplation unable or unwilling to act. Such novels, then devote large passages o f
text to descriptions. Description is, to be sure, a necessary technique of realist fiction, in
which a detailed setting conveys the necessary foundation, setting the scene for the
novel’s action. But there is little action in Absalom. Absalom!, at least at the first diegetic
level o f Miss Rosa, Q uentin and Mr. Compson’s narrative acts. T he stasis o f the narrative
illustrates the inability o f the characters to overcome time, to “get past” the facts o f
Sutpen’s story, and to overcome the weight o f Southern history.
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Chapter 4: The Social Kaleidoscope

This question posed by Proust’s narrator about the possibility o f immortality
(“mort a jamais?”), is the ultimate question about identity, whether or not there is some
immutable core, a soul or an essence which might survive the ultimate demise o f the
individual. In patriarchal society the perpetuation o f the father’s name is meant to
guarantee a kind o f immortality, but Proust’s novel takes as one o f its themes the
mobility o f the proper name, from one family to another, from one person to another.
The narrator is intrigued by names, and especially by old aristocratic names, especially if
they are mentioned in works of art or literature.
T he decline o f the French nobility is one o f the major sociological themes o f the
novel. The narrator is initiated into the life o f Parisian aristocracy through a series of
receptions, at the salons o f the Duchess o f Guermantes, Mme Verdurin and finally the
Princess o f Guermantes in Le temps retrouvd. The rise to eminence o f Mme de Verdurin,
a simple bourgeoise is accomplished through a fortuitous alliance which makes her the
new Princess o f G uermantes. This movement is seen as part of a continual change which
the narrator refers to as the “social kaleidoscope.”
Although the narrative seems to set out to tell the story of an individual, the
“individual” is continuously shown to be inhabited by a multitude o f selves. The
Recherche seeks at times to catalog this multitude, to depict the different “worlds”
which the hero frequents, but it also shows that what is usually thought o f as the
individual incorporates thoughts, experiences and lessons learned from diverse sources.
The portrait o f French society o f the Belle £poque in the Recherche is inextricably
related to the portrayal o f being, a particular being in a particular place and time. To tell
the story of the self, then, an entire universe must be established, incorporating the
multiple worlds which make up the self. T he novel begins with the narrator’s naive view
of a society segmented and held apart in rigid hierarchies, and ends with the ultimate
discovery o f the fluidity o f ranks and values.
87
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T he overestimation o f the proper name is characteristic o f Proust’s naive hero.
The narrator’s first reflections on the power o f words involves a proper name: that of the
local aristocratic family, the Guermantes.54 As with many o f the characters and places in
the novel, the first thing that the hero knows is a name or an image, a representation,
which then becomes the object o f speculation and imagination. The affective power that
this name will have for the hero can be traced back to the troubling projections o f the
magic lantern placed in his childhood bedroom. The superimposition o f its images on
the walls o f his room, like the illusions o f the dream states described in the opening
pages, substitutes, “a 1’opacite des murs d’impalpables irisations, de sumaturelles
apparitions multicolores, oil des ldgendes Itaient dlpeintes comme dans un vitrail
vacillant et m om entanl” (S 9), "it substituted for the opaquenss o f my walls an
impalpable iridescence, supernatural phenomena o f many colors, in which legends were
depicted as on a shifting and transitory window” (I: 9).
The projections of his magic lantern represent Genevi&ve de Brabant, ancestor of
the present day Duchesse de Guermantes, standing on a moor in front o f her castle, "lost
in contemplation,” unaware o f the approach o f Golo "filled with an infamous design.”
The suggestive power that names hold for the hero is due in part to their sound. The
name Brabant suggests the golden color of the castle and landscape to the young hero
even before he saw them. "Le chateau et la lande Itaient jaunes et je n avals pas attendu de
les voir pour connaitre leur couleur car, avant les verres du chassis, la sonorird mordorde
du nom de Brabant me 1’avait montrd avec evidence” (S 9) “The castle and the moor
54 Roland Barthes has pointed out a major symbolic structure of the Recherche in the opposition o f the long
vowel endings o f prestigious names like Guermantes, Laumes and Agrigente, to the short, abrupt endings of
names such as Verdurin, Cottard and Lcgiandin (132). Serge Dubrouvsky claims that this is an example of
Proust’s ‘reactionary” side: “C ’est toute l’«histoire de France* qu on saisit dans le vocable Guermantes,
comme toute la vuigaritd juive dans Blachou le porte-i-faux dans Swann. snob et dreyfiisard. dont le nom se
prononce de 2 inanities. La surestimation du Nom est un choix iddologique, oil se Ihne le c6tt
«reactionnaiie» de Proust.” We shouldn’t forget, however that the hero is depicted as naive, not yet having
benefirted from the lessons oftime and not yet having experienced the nevelation ofLe temps retro uvt. This is
the essential difference to be diawn between the ”heto” and the ‘nam tor.”
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were yellow, bur I could cell their colour without waiting to see them, for before the
slides made their appearance the old-gold sonorous name o f Brabant had given me an
unmistakable clue” (I: 10). T he aristocratic families o f the Recherche are fascinating to
the narrator above all because o f their names, they are the counts o f Combray, possessing
Co mb ray in the middle o f their names “First among the citizens o f Combray” they are
the only ones who do not live there (S 170). Altghough they don’t have a house there,
they are everywhere.
In his initai encounter with representation, it is the unsettling intrusion o f mystery
and otherness, of death, which interrupts the anesthetizing influence o f habit, o f
familiarity and brings the hero painfully to life, returning thought and sensation.
Certes je leur trouvais du charme k. ces brillantes projections qui
sem blaient Imaner d ’un passl m&ovingien et promenaient autour de moi
des reflets d ’histoire si anciens. Mais je ne peux dire quel malaise me
causaic pourtant cette intrusion du myst&re et de la beautl dans une
chambre que j’avais fini par remplir de mon moi au point de ne pas faire
plus attention a elle q u ’i lui-meme. L’influence anesth&iante de 1’habitude
ayant cess£, je me mettais a penser, a sentir, chosessi crisces. (S 10)
And, indeed, I found plenty o f charm in these bright projections, which
seemed co emanate horn a Merovingian past and shed around me the
reflections o f such ancient history. But I cannot express the discomfort I
felt at this intrusion o f mystery and beauty into a room which I had
succeeded in filling with my own personality until I thought no more o f it
than o f myself. The anesthetic effect o f habit being destroyed, I would
begin to think-and to feel-such melancholy things. (I: 10-11)
The importance o f historical Actions in the formations o f the young hero’s sense o f social
values and identities can be seen in this legend which the hero internalizes and learns to
associate with the Due and Duchesse de Guermantes. The room here is the equivalent o f
the hero’s self-an empty space onto which history is projected. Unlike the older narrator,
awakening from slumber in a room he cannot identify, the young hero does not have to
isolate his surroundings from memories, but from superimposed images and
“Merovingian tales.” They become part o f his own memories, thus part o f his childhood.
The tale of Genevi&ve de Brabant is a legend of persecuted innocence in the hagiographic
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vein. The image o f the persecuted female is clearly associated with his mother: “que les
malheurs de Genevieve de Brabant me rendaient plus ch£re, tandis que les crimes de
Golo me faisaient examiner ma propre conscience avec plus de scrupules” (S 10), “whom
the misfortues o f Genevieve de Brabant had made all the dearer to me, just as the crimes
of Golo had driven me to a more than ordinarily scrupulous examination o f my own
conscience” (I: 11). He learns to associate the figures in the magic lantern with the
“intrusion o f mystery and beauty” into his room/self. It comes as no surprise then that
the hero should project these same images onto the “real” Duke and Duchess o f
Guermantes once he has learned that they are also dukes of Brabant. Most significantly,
his infatuation with the Duchesse is the first movement in the continual metonymic
displacement o f his desire for his mother onto other female figures, including Mme
Swann, Mile de Stermaria, and Albertine.
The hero’s fascination with nobility and with the Merovingian past, a
romanticized image o f the French ancien regime, idealizes the aristocracy as embodying
something essentially French. His desire is to possess the key to the mystery o f what he
wants to think o f as the innate charm and desirability o f the Guermantes. This mystery is
embodied, or so he thinks, in the quasi-magical power o f the name. In some essence
which it embodies or distills, and will play a role in his desire for the Duchesse.
Their castle becomes for him the unattainable goal o f his childhood walks:
jamais non plus nous ne pflmes pousser jusqu’au terme que j’eusse rant
souhaife d'atteindre, jusqu'ik Guermantes. Je savais que la residaient des
chatelains, le due et la duchesse de Guermantes, je savais qu’ils Itaient des
personnages feels et actuellement existants, mais chaquefois que je pensais
a eux, je me les repfesentais tan tot en tapisserie [. . .] tantot de nuances
changeantes [. . .] tantot tout a fait impalpables comme 1’image de
Genevieve de Brabant [. . .] que la lanterne magique promenait sur les
rideaux de ma chambre [. . .] enfin toujours enveloppes du mysfere des
temps nferovingienset baignant comme dans un coucherde soliel dans la
lumi&re orangle qui emane de cette syllabe «antes». (S 169)
Nor could we ever get as far as that other goal which I so longed to reach,
Guermantes itself. I knew that it was the residence o f the Due and
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Duchesse de Guermantes, I knew that they were real personages who did
actually exist, but whenever I thought about them I pictured them either
in tapestry, like the Comptesse de Guermantes in the “Coronation o f
Esther, which hung in our church, or else in iridescent colors [. ..] or again
altogether impalpable, like the image o f Genevieve de Brabant, ancestress
o f the Guermantes family, which the magic lantern sent wandering over
the curtains o f my room or flung aloft upon the ceiling-in short,
invariably wrapped in the mystery o f the Merovingien age and bathed, as
in a sunset, in the amber light which glowed from the resounding syllable
“antes.” 0: 187)
The existence o f these idealized beings so close to Combray surprises him, and is one of
the hero’s first lessons in the fallability o f his own perceptions when the sight o f the real
duchess conflicts with the image the hero had previously associated with the name
Guermantes. He is at first unable to reconcile his imagined representation o f the Duchess
with the flesh and blood woman before him:
Ma deception etait grande. Elle provenait de ce que je n’avais jamais pris
garde quand je pensais a Mme de Guermantes, que je me la repr&entais
avec les couleurs d ’une tapisserie ou d’un vitrail, dans un autre si&de,
d’une autre mati&re quele reste des personnesvivantes. (S 172)
My disappointment was immense. It arose from my not having borne in
mind, when I thought of Mme de Guermantes, that I was picturing her to
myself in the colours o f a tapestry or a staimed glasswindow, as living in
another century, as being o f another substance than the rest o f the human
race. (I: 190 - 91)
In order to get over this deception he recalls to himself the stories he has absorbed, which
tell of the Guermantes’ illustrious ancestors:
«Glorieux d&s avant Charlemagne, les Guermantes avaient le droit de vie
et de mort sur leurs vassaux; la duchesse de Guermantes descend de
Genevi&ve de Brabant. Elle ne connait, ni ne consentirait a connaitre
aucunedes personnesqui sont ici.<> (S 173).
“Great and glorious before the days o f Charlemegne, the Guermantes had
the right o f life and death over their vassals; the Duchesse de Guermantes
descends from Genevieve de Brabant. She does not know, nor would she
consent to know, any of the people who are here today.” (I: 192)
The young Marcel tries desperately to reconcile his illusory image o f what the Duchess
ought to look like with the reality o f the person present before him. In a characteristic
move, he projects his image o f the Duchess onto the face he sees before him, thus
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shrinking from the flesh and blood truths o f lived reality, or rather, appropriating them
to his narrative version o f it. This move prefigures the one at the end o f the novel when
Marcel will finally leave the world, go into his room and begin writing.” The same terms,
“une grande deception,” are used to describe the hero’s first experience o f a theatrical
performance by the great actress “La Berma” in A 1’ombre des ieunes filles en fleurs (17).
Much later on in the novel, he will learn one o f the scandalous secrets o f the
Guermantes: that they are just as much German no bilit)' as they are French. This
discovery, along with the decline in fashionableness o f the Duchesse de Guermantes,
contribute significantly to the loss o f prestige of the maison de Guermantes in the hero’s
eyes. His disillusion with regard to the passing of what had seemed to be immutable
values contributes as much as anything to his eventual stay in a sanatorium in Le temps
rerrouve. The narrator’s discovery o f a path at Combray which connects what he had
thought to be separate realms, the “c o d de Mesdglise” and the “cote de Guermantes,”
equally destroys the reassuring symmetry o f the two opposing sides which corresponds to
the young hero’s naive belief in the clear-cut separation between good and evil, and
between the aristocracy and the rest o f society.
T he Pastoral Tradition
Another link which can be seen between the lost time o f Marcel Proust and the
obsession with the past o f Faulkner’s narrators is the sense o f loss expressed in both
authors as a longing for an idealized past embodied as a rural or agrarian ideal. Lewis
Simpson and Michael Grimwood have both discussed Faulkner’s links with the pastoral
tradition: “insofar as he typically chose to write about people who worked with their
hands rather than with their minds,” says Grimwood, “he was a pastoralist. For
pastoralism has always thrived on the infatuation of intellectuals and artists with the
imagined joys of physical labor.” While the Sutpen and the Compson families could
55 This is also a figure for the flesh and blood novelist, who spent the last decade ofhis life enclosed in a corklined room.
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hardly be called representatives o f pastoral values, the loss o f the Compson pasture and
the violence which is said to have been inflicted upon the land by Sutpen are examples o f
how Faulkner’s novels dramatize a sense o f loss or transgression which plagues the
intellectual Quentin.
Sutpen’s fate, or punishment, was perhaps sealed by the way he “violently tore”
his plantation from the “virginal” swampland. The building o f the Sutpen plantation is
thus described as a rape o f the land. His acquisition o f the property is likewise said to
have been the fruit o f some secretive, underhanded deals.
Sutpen’s appearance in Yoknapatawpha is all the more sinister to the inhabitants
o f Jefferson because o f the presence o f Haitian slaves with whom Sutpen works side by
side, caked in mud to ward off mosquitoes: “[...] the negroes could speak no English
yet and doubtless there were more than Akers who did not know that the language in
which they and Sutpen communicated was a sort o f French and not some dark and fatal
tongue of their own” (36). T he slaves themselves seem to have been focus of much
speculation among Yoknapatawpha citizens. This is due in no small measure to Sutpen’s
promiscuity with them. He joins them in the physical labor, plastering himself with mud
to avoid mosquitos just as they do, and boxing with them.
In The Sound and the Furv. Quentin’s thoughts reveal a sense of guilt about the
loss o f the land in exchange for his one year at the university (95,116, 127, 154). The
literal loss of the pasture is symbolic o f the loss of values associated with the Old South.
The sale o f the Compson pasture enables Quentin to leave the agrarian south for
intellectual pursuits at Harvard.
Pastoral Proust
Proust’s novel could also be read in its relationship to the pastoral tradition. One
o f the fundamental oppositions in Proust’s novel is between the values associated with the
country, with life in the provinces, and those displayed in the more cosmopolitan circles
o f the Parisian salon socity. In “Combray,” his grandmother extolls the virtues o f nature,
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and encourages the young child to engage in physical activities which his feeble health
precludes. The hero remembers being read “Francois le champi,” a novel whose
characters and themes deal with rustic life.
As Paul De Man has pointed out in his analysis o f the reading scene in Du cote
de chez Swann, the tension between these two realms forms the central conflict in the
young Marcel’s life. This can be seen in his desire to claim for his intellectual activities,
reading and writing, the values ascribed by his grandmother to exercise, and country air.
DeMan discusses this in depth in his Allegories o f Reading: “the confinement to the
obscure, private existence of inward retreat turns out to be a highly effective strategy for
the retrieval o f all that seemed to have been sacrificed. T he text asserts the possibility o f
recuperating, by an act o f reading, all that the inner contemplation had discarded, the
opposites o f all the virtues necessary to its well-being: the warmth o f the sun, its light and
even the activity that the restful immobility seemed to have definitively eliminated” (5960). The pastoral virtues associated with the warmth and light of the sun are associated
with the bourgeois ideal o f activity, that is to say industry.
The narrator describes himself as forever fantasizing about young peasant women,
whether they be milkmaids spied from a train window, or the chambermaid o f the
Baroness Putbus. T he desire for pastoral virtues, like search for lost time, is a quest for a
lost paradise. One o f the major concerns o f Proust’s narrator is loss: the loss o f his
grandmother, o f Albertine, o f his own memories, and finally, the loss o f his sense o f loss
in the slow progression o f forgetfulness which he traces in Albertine disparue. In Le
temps retrouve. the narrator is forced to conclude that “les vrais paradis sont les paradis
qu’on a perdus” “the true paradises are those which have been lost” (177).
In Faulkner’s novels, the character’s obsession with the past, their inability to let it
die projects an image o f the antebellum South as a pre-lapsarian paradisee. The Sound
and the Furv reveals that one o f the thoughts which is at the root o f Quentin’s inner
conflicts is that o f the pasture which his idiot brother loved and which was sold so he
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could spend one year at Harvard. Q uentin’s going o ff to Harvard represents a turning
away from the Southern heritage. This is driven home in Absalom by his relationship to
his Canadian roommate at Harvard. T he South here is literally recontextualized, as
Quentin’s new context changes the nature o f his relationship to the Northern other and
to the other in general.
T he reader has seen in The Sound and the Furv. that Quentin is hounded by the
thought that he has a duty which he cannot fulfill. His thoughts return incessantly to his
sister Caddy, and thus his family’s honor, and his failed attempt to fight Dalton Ames,
whom he perceived as having befouled that honor. Quentin is obsessed by the need to
follow a code o f honor, but is unable to act. Some critics have speculated that this loss of
power to act is attributable to the castrating effect o f the Compson women, first Mrs
Compson, then Caddy. This code of honor is a vestige of a value sytem which is no
longer in effect.
Unlike the Proustian narrator, Quentin never shows any sign o f a desire for some
kind o f philosophical truth or conclusion. Instead, he seems merely to seek an end, relief
from his obsessions, from his sense o f obligation to defend the honor o f his sister, and
from the oppressive past of Southern history. In A h s a lo m . Absalom! he is from the start,
tired, weary o f hearing the same story over and over again.
During Proust’s lifetime the prestige and privileges o f the aristocracy were being
eroded, by educational and governmental systems based on merit or by social status
based on wealth rather than birthright. The social status accorded to the former Mme
Verdurin when she becomes the new Princesse de Guermantes, negates all the
significance that the hero has invested in the aristocratic name. Gilles Deleuze has
pointed out the emptiness of the gestures and signs emitted in the Verdurin’s salon,
which is portrayed almost as a cult, obeying a strict, if unspoken, code, with its rituals
and its displays. Mme Verdurin is described as an accomplished actress and stage
director as she emits signs which serve as signals for her “faithful” “rien de drole nest dit
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chez Mme Verdurin, et Mme Verdurin ne rir pas; mais Cotrard fait signe qu’il dit
quelquechose de dr6le, Mme Verdurin fait signe quelle rit, et son signe est dmis si
parfaitement que Monsieur Verdurin, pour ne pas etre inferieur, cherche a son tour une
mimique appropriee” “Nothing funny is said in Mme Verdurin’s salon, and she doesn’t
laugh; but Cottard indicates that he has said something funny, and Mme Verdurin
displays signs o f laughter. Her sign is so perfectly promulgated that Monsieur Verdurin
in turn seeks an appropriate mimicry so as to avoid seeming inferior.” In the bourgeois
salon of the Verdurins, the sign “anticipe Faction comme la pensee, annule la pensle
comme Faction, et se declare suffisant,” “anticipates action as it does thought, annuls
them both, and declares itself sufficient.”56 The world o f the bourgeois salon is a world
devoid o f substance, an endless play o f empty signifiers.
As Roland Barthes explains in his analysis of Balzac “Sarrasine:” “La difference qui
oppose la socfefe feodale k la socfefe bourgeoise, Findice au signe est celle-ci: Findice a
une origine, le signe n’en a pas; passer de Findice au signe, c ’est abolir la derniere (ou la
premi&re) limite, Forigine, le fondement, la bufee, c’est entrer dans le proems illimife des
equivalences, des representations que rien ne vient plus arreter, orienter, fixer consacrer”
(S/Z 47). “T he difference which opposes feudal society to bourgeois society, the index to
the sign, is this: the index has an origin; the sign does not. To move from the index to
the sign is to abolish the last (or the first) limit, the origin, the foundation, the goal; it is
to enter into the unlimited process o f equivalencies, of representations that nothing can
any longer stop, orient or consacrate.” In the post-aristocratic world o f French society,
individual status could no longer be guaranteed by the family name. The naive hero’s
belief in the magical power o f names, and in the Recherche demonstrates that this was
always already the case, even with the Guermantes, who owe as much allegiance to
Germany as to France. The narrator ascribes Charius with “German” behavior (“une
56 Gilles Dcicuze, Proust et les sipnes. (Paris: PUF, 1986) 11 (my translation).
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maniere allemande,” SG 304). Madame de Cambremer ceils che hero that the
Guermantes are half German, which she says explains why Saint Loup is a “dreyfiisard”
(SG 480). This explains in part the Baron de Charlus’ sympathy for Germany in the first
World Wan “il allait plus loin que ne pas souhaiter passionement la vicroire de la France,
il souhairait plutot, sans se I’avouer, que I’Allemagne sinon triomphat, du mo ins ne fik
pas ecrasee comme tout le monde le souhairait” (TR 80), “he went beyond not
passionately desiring the victory o f France: he desired rather without admitting it to
himself, that Germany should, if not triumph, at least not be crushed as everybody
hoped she would be” (III: 797). We learn in the final volume that Charlus considers
himelf German: “si longtemps apr&s la guerre, il g&nissait de la d^faite des Allemands,
parmi lesquels il se comptait” (TR 171) “The war had long since ended, and still he
groaned over the defeat o f the Germans, among whose number he counted himself” (III:
896).
The climax o f the novel coincides with the devaluation o f the name Guermantes,
as the narrator discovers not only the change in individuals that time has wrought, but
also that the salon of the Princesse o f Guermantes, once the beacon o f elegance in the
Faubourg Saint Germain, is inhabited by “foreign bodies” which, in the past would have
been excluded:
ce milieu en la nature specifique duquel, definie par certaines affinites qui
lui attiraienc tous les grands noms princiers de l’Europe et la repulsion qui
eloignait d ’elle tout dllment non aristocratique, j’avais trouve comme un
refuge materiel pour ce nom de Guermantes auquel il pr&cait sa derni&re
realitd, ce milieu avait lui-meme subi dans sa constitution intime et que
j’avais crue stable, une alteration prolbnde (TR 262)
this coterie, within che specific nature o f which, delimited as it was by
certain affinities that attracted to it all the great princely names o f Europe
and by forces o f an opposite kind which repelled from it anything that
was not aristocratic, I had found, I thought, a sort o f corporeal refuge for
the name Guermantes, this coterie which had seemed to confer upon that
name its ultimate reality, had itself, in its innermost and as I had thought
stable constitution, undergone a profound transformation” (III: 1000)
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The change in the constitution o f the Princesses salon is characteristic o f a tendency o f
society as a whole: “Car ce que caractdrisait le plus cette socilte, c ’ltait sa prodigieuse
aptitude au declassement” (TR 262).57 This “d&lassement” corresponds to the elevation
o f those who were previously excluded, and seems to split them into different people.
This social change, says the narrator, is a phenomenon o f memory:
J’enrendais des gens qui auraient pourtant du savoir, dire en parlant de
Bloch: «Le Bloch-Guermantes ? Le familier des Guermantes ?» Ces
erreurs quiscindent une vie et, en en isolant le present, font de l’homme
dont on parle un autre homme, un homme different, une creation de la
veille, un hom m e qui n ’est que la condensation de ses habitudes actuelles
(alors que lui porte en lui-meme la continuite de sa vie qui le relie au
passe), ces erreurs dependent bien aussi du Temps, mais elles sont non un
phdnom&nesocial, mais un phenomine de mdmoire. (TR 262)
And now, with reference to Bloch, even those who ought to have known
better might be heard to inquire: T h e Guermantes Bloch? The Bloch
who is such a friend o f the Guermantes? these errors which split a life in
two and, by isolating his present from his past, turn some man whom one
is talking about into another, a different man, a creation o f yesterday, a
man who is no more than a condensation o f his present habits (whereas
the real man bears within himself an awareness, linking him to the past, o f
the continuity o f his life), these errors, though they too, as I have said, are
a result o f the passage o f Time, are not a social phenomenon, but one o f
memory. (Ill: 1011)
The shifting o f the proper name is equated by Proust himself as a usurpation o f property:
T h e succession o f a new individual to a name is melancholy, as is all succession, all
usurpation o f property; and yet for ever and ever, without interruption, there would
come, sweeping on, a flood o f new Princesses de Guermantes-or rather, centuries old,
replaced from age to age by a series o f different women, o f different actresses playing
the same part” (III: 999).
In Le temps retrouv^ alliance, that is to say association, has displaced lineage as
the organizing principle. Synchrony has displaced history (thus the difficulty many
people have in reading Proust “for the plot”) and an identity based on relation to the
57 T h e most characteristic aspect ofthis society was its prodigious aptitude for loss of class status" (My
translation. This passage missing from the standard English translation).
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ocher must also displace an identity based on essence. When identity is based on a
relationship to an other, it becomes necessary to define that other; hence the narrator’s
efforts to exhaustively know others as the context for his own affirmation as self. As
Bersani puts it: “The narrator insistently asks: how can /be? The question is generated by
Marcel’s shattering discovery-or at least suspicion—that others are” (863). The failure o f
this project o f knowing can be seen in che inconsistencies and lacuna o f the narrative
itself
Fractured Narrative
Both on the level o f the signifier and on the level of the signified, in the style o f
the narration and the story which it tells: the text is much more fractured than it may
appear. Many crucial events seem to be missing from the narrative. The advent o f the war
in the final volume corresponds to one of the more noticeable gaps in the narration: an
undefined period o f “several years” which the narrator spends “far from Paris in a
sanatorium,” having completely renounced his desire to be a writer (TR 29; III: 743). In
chis time, the hero has grown old, a fact which is as imperceptible to the reader as it is to
him. It is only when he recognizes the aged faces o f the other invited guests at the
matinee o f the Princess o f Guermantes that he realizes that he to has grown old:
Alors moi qui depuis mon enfance, vivant au jour le jour et ayant re^u
d ’ailieurs de moi-meme et des autres une impression definitive, je
m ’aper^us pour la premiere fois, d ’apr&s les metamorphoses qui setaient
produites dans tous ces gens, du temps qui avait passe pour eux, ce qui
me bouleversa par la revelation qu’il avait passe aussi pour moi” (TR 233)
So that at last I, who from childhood had lived from day to day and had
received, o f myself and o f others, impressions which I regarded as
definitive, became aware as I had never been before-by an inevitable
inference from the metamorphoses which had taken place in all the
people around m e-of the time which had passed for them, a notion
which brought with it the overwhelming revelation that it had passed also
for me. (Ill: 967)
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Once again, che narrator can only recognize himself in his image as reflected through
others. This realization comes as a surprise for the reader, too, for there is very little in the
novel to suggest the progress o f the narrator’s life.
Far from presenting a “whole picture” o f the narrator’s “lost time,” the novel
leaves large gaps in che chronology o f the life. We know nothing o f his formal education
or employment. These gaps are especially evident in the final volume, where the “leaps
ahead” in the story o f the hero’s life become increasingly larger, while the amount o f text
devoted to relatively small amounts o f “story time” increases dramatically.58The process
of filling in those gaps is the very process o f remembering (or we might also say “o f
writing”).
Gerard Genette points out three possible relationships between plot and narrative,
wherein events that happened once can be recounted once. This “singular” mode o f
discourse is che standard mode o f traditional narrative. Alternatively the same event can
be recounted more than once, in a repetitive narrative mode. Finally, events which
recurred more than once can be summarized in a single narrative instance. This is what
Genette calls “iterative” discourse. In the traditional narrative, the iterative discursive
elements are always subordinated to the singular. In Proust, this is reversed. Even the
singular events, things which, according to verisimilitude, can only have happened once,
are often presented in the imperfect. Genette calls this the “pseudo-iterative" and
qualifies this as a particularly Proustian mode o f discourse.
The artificiality of a large part o f the memories recounted in the novel is manifest
in the way that characters are always caught in habitual postures or actions. The
dominance o f the imperfect tense demonstrates this. People are described as they “used
to” behave. T he soirees of the Verdurins or the Duchesse de Guermantes are “synthetic”
narratives: amalgams o f many soirees spliced together by the flow o f the text itself. Most
58 For the distinctions between “story rime," “textual time,” “plot,” and “narrative," see my discussion of
Gerard Genette Figures HI (Paris: Seuil, 1972.) in the next chapter.
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o f the actions are things that habitually happened. Even the intermittent anecdotes that
the narrator recounts, introduced by “Une fois” and “une autre” which would seem to be
unique events, accumulate and transform into exemplars o f many similar repeated
events, with a formulation such as: “ainsi chaque fois q u e .. . ”
The whole episode o f “Un amour de Swann,” for example, begins with the basic
temporal patterns o f habitual actions: It first establishes the rituals of behavior in the
“petit noyau” o f the Verdurin clan, and opposes to it the irruption o f inhabitual behavior
when Odette introduces Swann: “cette annee-li, la demi-mondaine raconta a M.
Verdurin qu’elle avait fait la connaissance d u n homme charmant, M. Swann” (S 18788), but soon the novelty is assimilated by the repetitive nature o f salon activities.
The opposition o f voluntary and involuntary memory is built around this
alternation of habit and novelty. The things we can easily recall form only a “sort o f
luminous panel, ” a tiny fragment o f an unknown whole. Gradually all novelty is
converted into Habit. So crucial a role does the force o f habit play in his novel, that
Proust often capitalizes the term. Order is preserved only by suppressing accidents and
difference. Yet anomaly and difference continue to disrupt habit up to the very end o f
the novel.
The narrator himself is engaged in an ongoing quest for unity: he describes
himself as a young man in search o f some “great philosophical truth,” on which to base a
novel, but this ideal forever eludes him. He must continually come to terms with things
that are not as they (once) may have appeared to be. This is due in part to the
inadequacies of his powers o f observation, to the fallibility o f human judgment and
perception, as, for example, when he mistakes the signature on a letter from Gilberte to
be that of Albertine, or in the little train leading to the Verdurin’s summer salon at la
Raspeli^re, where he observes an old prostitute, whom he later discovers to have been not
a prostitute, but the Princesse de Sherbatoff (SG 251, 285). But as Roland Barthes points
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out, the narrator’s dilemma can not simply be attributed to the “banal play o f appearance
and truth.”59
In the Recherche, human identity displays a chameleon-like quality which is
demonstrated incessantly in the novel. At the beginning o f the second volume, we learn
that Swann has acquired yet still another personality for the narrator: as the husband o f
Odette. It is surprising and highly ironic that Swann has married Odette, because, at the
end of the “Swann in love,” we learn that they have separated. Swann seemed to have
realized his mistake falling for a girl who “wasn’t even his type.” (“il s’ecria en lui meme:
«Dire que j’ai gachd des annees de ma vie, que j’ai voulu mourir, que j’ai eu mon plus
grand amour, pour une femme qui ne me plaisait pas, qui n ’dtait pas mon genreN,” S
375) This unexpected and unexplained reversal by which Swann is suddenly O dette’s
husband is only one example o f a process o f revision which is effectively never ending in
Proust’s novel.
Swann is a double for the narrator in many ways, not only through the
resemblance o f his jealousy for and suspicions about Odette, which foretells the narrator’s
relationship to Albertine, but also because, like Swann, the narrator wants to be a writer.
The narrator’s sense o f himself is only established as a reflection o f those around him. As
he says in the first volume: “notre personnalite social est une creation de la pensee des
autres” (S 19), “our social personality is a creation o f other people’s thoughts.”
Proustian characters are full o f surprises. The hero is continually forced to adjust
his beliefs both to new circumstances and because o f his faulty observation. In the course
of the novel transformations are apparent in almost all o f the major characters. They are
not seen as gradually changing or evolving. They are abruptly and inexplicably
discovered to be other than themselves. They are not one, but many.

59 Roland Barthes “Une id^ede recherche’’ in Recherche de Proust, eds. Gerard Genette and Ttvetan
T odorov (Paris: Seuil. 1980) 35 - 36.
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The most exemplary figure in this respect is that of Albertine. T he hero’s
relationship to her is built around his need to unravel the mystery o f her desires.60 It is his
desire for an exhaustive knowledge o f her past and present activities that leads him to
cloister her in his parents’ apartment. The only moment when the hero is able to enjoy
the illusion o f truly possessing Albertine is when he observes her sleeping in his parents’
apartment. The death-like image o f her immobile body, gives the illisuion that she can be
completely grasped, completely possessed.
His suspicions about her life (her lives) away from him are never fully calmed. At
every turn, he discovers a bewildering multiplicity o f Albertines: “Hdlas! Albertine dtair
plusieurs personnes,” (P 324) “Alas! Albertine was several persons in one” (III: 343). Even
after she is gone, the narrator discovers that she is no less an «etre de fuite:»
Mais ce fut surtoutce fractionnement d’Albertine en de nombreuses parts,
en de nombreusesAlbenines, quidtait son seul mode d ’existence en moi.
Des moments revinrent oil elle n’avait dtd que bonne, ou intelligente, ou
serieuse, ou meme aimant plus que tout les sports. Et ce fractionnement,
n’etait-il pas au fond juste qu’il me calmat? Car s’il n ’etait pas en Iuimeme quelque chose de reel, s’il tenait k la forme successive des heures oil
elle m ’etait apparue, forme qui restait celle de ma memoire, comme la
courburedes projections de ma lanterne magique tenait k la courbure des
verres colons, ne representait-il pas a sa maniere une verite bien objective
celle-la, k savoir que chacun de nous n’est pas un, mais contient de
nombreuses personnes qui n’ont pas toutes la meme valeur morale et que
si 1’Albertine vicieuse avait existe, cela n’empechait pas qu’il y en eut eu
dautres [. ..] (AD 110).
But it was above all that fragmentation o f Albertine into many pans, into
many Albertines, that was her sole mode o f existence in me. Moments
recurred in which she had simply been kind, or intelligent, or serious, or
even primarily addicted to spon. And was it not right, after all, that this
fragmentation should soothe me? For if it was not in itself something real,
if it arose from the continuously changing shape of the hours in which she
had appeared to me, a shape which remained that of my memory as the
curve o f the projections o f my magic lantern depended on the curve o f
the coloured slides, did it not in its own way represent a truth, a
thoroughly objective truth too, to wit, that none o f us is single, that each
60 To Proust, “the ‘possession’of someone loved is inseparable from an exhaustive knowledge o f their past and
present.”). Humphries. The Otherness Within: Gnostic Readings in Marcel Proust. FlanneivO'Connor. 8c
Francois Villon. (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1983) 11-
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o f us contains many persons who do not all have the same moral value,
and that if a vicious Albertine had existed, it did not mean that there had
not been others [. . .] (Ill: 540)
His suspicions about her are provoked by his projection onto her o f his own desires. The
multiplicity he perceives in Albertine mirrors his many selves: “ce qui me torturait a
imaginer chez Albertine, c etait m on propre ddsir perpetuel de plaire a de nouvelles
femmes [. ..] Comme il n’est de connaissance, on peut presque dire qu’il n’est de jalousie
que de soi meme” (P 371). “what it tortured me to imagine in Albertine was my own
perpetual desire to find favor with new women [...]. As there is no knowledge, one
might almost say that there is no jealousy, save o f oneself’ (III: 392 - 93). The fleeting
nature o f Albertine implies the multiplicity and elusiveness o f the narrators own selfknowledge.
Love and jealousy in Proust is synonymous with the desire to obtain an
exhaustive knowledge o f all the points in time and space which the loved one has
occupied. Thus jealousy is the ultimate figure for the undefinable nature o f the real:
C ’est un des pouvoirs de la jalousie de nous dlcouvrir combien la foalite
des faits exterieurs et les sentiments de 1’ame sont quelque chose
d’inconnu qui prete a mille suppositions. Nous croyons savoir exactement
les choses, et ce que pensent les gens, pour la simple raison que nous ne
nousen soucionspas. Mas dfes que nousavonsle desir de savoir, comme a
le jaloux, alors c’est un vertigineux kaleidoscope oil nous ne distinguons
plusrien. (AD 100)
It is one o f the faculties o f jealousy to reveal to us the extent to which the
reality o f external facts and the sentiments o f the heart are an unknown
element which lends itself to endless suppositions. W e imagine that we
know exactly what things are and what people think, for the simple reason
that we do not care about them. But as soon as we have a desire to know,
as the jealous man has, then it becomes a dizzy kaleidoscope in which we
can no longer distinguish anything. (Ill: 529)
T he numerous contradictory images he has o f Albertine, and the loss o f the ability to
trust his impressions ofwhat is real, reveal to him the indeterminacy o f his own desires
and the multiplicity o f his own behavior:
Ce n’&ait pas Albertine seule qui n ’&ait qu’une succession de moments,
c ’iftait aussi moi-meme. M on amour pour elle n’avait pas
simple: k la
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curiosity de 1’inconnu s etait ajoutl un desir sensuel, et a un sentiment
dune douceurpresquefamiiiaJe, tantot l’indifference, tantot une furieuse
jalousie. Je n’lrais pas un seul homme, mais ie difill d’une armle
composite oil il y avait selon le moment des passionls, des indifferents,
des jaloux-des jaloux dont pas u n n ’ltait jaloux de la mime femme. (AD
71).
It was not Albertine alone who was a succession o f moments, it was also
myself. My love for her was not simple: to a curiousity about the
unknown had been added a sensual desire, and to a feeling o f almost
conjugal sweetness, at one moment indifference, at another a furious
jealousy. I was not one man only, but as it were the march-past o f a
composite army in which there were passionate men, indifferent men,
jealous men—jealous men not one o f whom was jealous o f the same
woman (III: 499)
Ironically, the calm he feels watching her sleep is not reproduced when he learns o f her
actual death. Jealousy, he learns, is not dependent on its object, on the external world, for
ail of the jealous lover’s suspicions and suppositions emanate from himself.
Quand notre maitresse est vivante, une grande partie des pensles qui
forment ce que nous appelons notre amour nous viennent pendant les
heures ou elle n’est pas a cotl de nous. Ainsi Ton prend l’habitude d ’avoir
pour objet de sa reverie un etre absent, et qui, m im e s’il ne le reste que
quelques heures, pendant ces heures-la n ’est qu’un souvenir. Aussi la mort
ne change-t-elle pas grand-chose (AD 104).
When one’s mistress is alive, a large proportion o f the thoughts which
form what one calls one’s love comes to one during the hours when she is
not by one’s side. Thus one acquires the habit o f having as the object o f
one’s musings an absent person, and one who, even if she remains absent
for a few hours only, during those hours is no more than a memory.
Hence death does not make any great difference. (Ill: 534)
There is nothing unusual about this, he concludes, since the images of Albertine that he
had, came not from her, but from himself. He continues to act and think as if she were
still alive even after he learns o f her death in a horse-riding accident.
Accordingly, in the progress o f his forgetfulness after she has died the narrator
discovers that this oblivion implies a loss o f the self.
Et comme dans les nouveaux espaces, encore non parcourus qui
s’ltendaient devant moi, il n ’y aurait pas plus de traces de mon amour
pour Albertine qu’il n ’y en avait eu dans les temps perdus que je venais de
traverser, de mon am our pour ma grand’mlre, offrant une succession de
plriodes sous lesquelles, aprls un certain intervalle, rien de ce qui soutenait
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la precedante ne subsistait plus dans celle qui la suiviait, ma vie m’apparut
comme quelque chose de si depourvu du support d ’un moi individuel
identiqueet permanent” [...] (AD 173)
And as in the new spaces, as yet unexplored, which extended before me,
there would be no more trace of my love for Albertine than there had
been, in the time lost which I had just traversed, o f my love for my
grandmother, my life appeared to me-offering a succession o f periods in
which, after a certain interval, nothing of what had sustained the previous
period survived in that which fbllowed-as something utterly devoid o f
the support o f an idndividual, identical and permanent self. (Ill: 607)
If the ability to forget implies a loss of self, it is because memory is the essence o f the self.
Without memory, there can be no narrative, and without narrative, there is no identity.
The question o f Albertines homosexuality, which so plagues Prousts hero,
further illustrates the undeflnable nature o f identity, for even sexual “identity” is
ephemeral. Commenting on Albertines “polymorphousseductiveness,”Julia Kristeva
notes that Proust “intends it to be universal. Each sex and each person (Albertine no less
than anyone else) would be a network o f partitioned differences and adjacent
incompatibilites (a ‘Vinteuil’ side, a ‘hideous’ side). T he whole person is unaware o f these
divisions, for in the final analysis this ‘whole’ person does not exist. He is nothing but
features and characteristics” (72).
The models of language and consciousness which emerge from Marcel Proust
and William Faulkner’s novels reveal an almost infinite potential for associations and
anecdotes; time is exploded into disparate fragments linked no longer by chronology
and logic, but by the fabric o f association. Subjectivity is the building o f a complex web
of intertextual references. But contexts can never be fixed. The narrator’s inability to
correctly observe and understand those around him can also be attributed to the everchanging nature o f his social context. But, as we have seen, the narrator ultimately
ascribes the flux of social values to the fluctuations o f memory.
O ur memories, and thus our knowledge o f who we are, o f where we’ve been and
who we’ve known, is critically dependent on arbitrarily established initial conditions, one
of which is on the present o f our remembering. Proust’s hero discovers that the
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recurrence o f physical sensation is capable o f triggering memory, but this effect is
fundamentally a chance occurrence,61 and it is the ultimate chance occurrence, the
unforeseeable event of our death which threatens any identity with annihilation, while at
the same time seemingly fixing identity by closing the process o f recontextualization.
Being the story of a life, the narrator’s death is the moment towards which the
text must inevitably point; yet this death is forever deferred by the circularity" o f the
novel: the end o f which corresponds to the moment when the narrator takes up the pen
to begin writing. There is a Proustian logic in which writing is equivalent to a kind o f
death. As he finally begins to write, he describes the process o f writing as a “tiresome
obligation:” “Cette idee de la mort s’installa definitivement en moi comme fait un
amour,” (TR 349) “The idea of death took up permanent residence within me in the way
that love sometimes does.” Why is writing here so linked to the idea o f death? The
narrator’s great fear is that he will not have enough time to finish his work. Writing thus
becomes a race against time, against. It is only death which can put an end to the
perpetual becoming o f the work: Tidee de mon oeuvre etait dans ma tete, toujours la
meme, en perpetuel devenir,” “che idea o f my work was inside my head, always the
same, perpetually in process of becoming” (III: 1099-1100). This perpetual process o f
becoming is nothing more than what Rorty calls recontextualization.
Proust seeks to master and reveal the involuntary memory in the belief that it
contains the essence o f lost time. The narrator fetishizes the object which provokes the
involuntary memory, so that this object symbolizes and makes present that past moment.
The object thus becomes a link to the past. From its original chance association through
proximity" (metonymy) to the events being remembered memory, the seemingly
insignificant decor, the object stands now in a metaphorical relation, a relation of
necessity, to memory. The object contains the essence o f that memory.
61 “II y a beaucoup dc hasard en tout ceci" (S 43).
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As noted above, Gilles Deleuze has characterized A la Recherche du temps perdu
as a novel o f “ apprentissage,” a bildungsroman which gives us a portrait o f the education
and formation of the central character. But the novel does very little to suggest growth or
progress in the hero’s life either as an artist or as a respectable young man, and one o f the
lessons that he will learn is clearly that o f the seemingly arbitrary variability of the
phenomena of identity, personality, and social values. Proust’s narrator is never able to
give a complete or coherent portrait o f other characters, because they are all capable o f
displaying heretofore unknown aspects or behavior at different times or in different
contexts. At the beginning of A l’ombre des ieunes ftlles en fleurs. the narrator makes a
remark that is echoed again and again throughout the novel: “il etait arrivee qu’au «fils
Swann» et aussi au Swann du Jockey, 1’ancien ami de mes parents avait ajoute une
personnalite nouvelle (et qui ne devait pas etre la derniere), celle de mari d’Odette” (3).
“What had happened was that, to the original ‘young Swann’ and also to the Swann o f
the Jockey Club, our old friend had added a new personality (which was not to be his
last), that o f Odette’s husband” (I: 465). The appearance o f a second, and even a third
Charles Swann signals as much a long term transformation in the narrating subject as in
the character of Swann; the sudden fashionableness o f the salons o f Odette Swann or
Mme Verdurin, the transformation o f Charlus from the caricaturishly zealous
representative of a patriarchal dynasty to a “an old queen” (“une vieille tame”), and the
transformation of the entire social hierarchy after the Dreyfus affair and the war
represent ever-accelerating, and ever more pronounced changes. T he rapidity and the
unpredictability' (that is to say, the arbitrariness) o f these changes demonstrate the lack o f
solid foundations for social identities, and values, and thus for any identity, including
that o f the narrator. His story can never be folly told, never exhausted, for the characters
are continually modified as it progresses. Rather than having the details o f their
personality' “filled in,” these characters are progressively “hollowed out,” emptied o f their
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consistency as individuals. The loquacity o f Proust’s narrator betrays 2 logophilia which is
none other than a desire for completion, for consistency where none is possible.
In spite o f all his efforts to understand the hidden nature o f people and o f art and
to transcend time itself by the discover}" o f some great, hidden philosophical truth (S
176-77) It is, instead, a nearly divine revelation, a deux ex machina that will break the
camel's back o f lost years with a flood of memories and revelations. The narrator does
not build gradually his understanding o f truth; instead it comes all at once, unexpectedly
and unpredictably. It is the completely fortuitous events at the Princesse de
Guermantes’s matinee, the involuntary memory awakened by his stumbling on the
uneven paving stones o f their courtyard, a kind o f deux ex machina., which enables the
narrator to begin writing, by freeing him from the necessity o f a telos.
A la recherche du temps perdu is a narrative governed by chance, and as such is
emblematic o f a general trend in twentieth-century thought to a reconsideration and
revaluation ofcomplex or chaotic behavior in conscious and unconscious processes. What
is put to the fore is its involuntary, mechanical or arbitrary functioning. The supreme
effort o f the will is inferior to the chance revelations o f time..
In this Proust may well have been ahead o f his time, scientifically speaking.
Researchers exploring the nature of the brain and human consciousness have come to
conclude that, rather than being stored in some location o f the brain, simply awaiting
retrieval by consciousness, memory is akin more to dynamic interaction with
consciousness. The normal human brain apparendy does not store fixed memories.
Rather, a healthy hum an mind continually reinvents memories from sensations and
feelings. Since much o f what we consider to be our “identity” is bound up in our personal
experiences and memories, it is clear then that “identification” is a contingent, ongoing
process which only arbitrarily appears to be fixed. There are few exceptions to this rule.
Though people who have suffered some forms of brain damage do exhibit fixed
memories, this is because they are no longer capable o f forming new ones.
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Nothing in Proust’s novel is ever definitive, including and especially personal
identity as it is reconstructed by memory or narration. The ultimate example o f this in
Proust’s novel is the hero’s obsession with Albertine, whom he sequesters in his parents
apartment in order to know as much as possible about her daily activities, thoughts and
desires. To his dismay what he discovers is that scrutiny only amplifies the mystery o f
being. The closer one looks the more Albertines one can find. This does not mean,
however that Proust is ready to completely abandon the quest. His opus is just such an
effort. The lengths to which he went to unify and structure his novel display the
Cartesian subject’s desire to master and overcome the chaos of his own patterns o f
thought. William Faulkner, writing two decades after Proust seems to have more readily
assimilated the lessons illustrated in Proust’s novel. The link between these two authors is
this attempt to represent the patterns of thought, an attempt which ultimately
demonstrates the paradoxical nature of both representation and being.
Social Fluidity in Faulkner
The thing that Quentin has difficulty accepting is the realization o f the
inevitability of such social promiscuity. It is this promiscuity which threatens the sanctity
of the Compson family as well, since Q uentin’s exposure to life at Harvard comes at the
price o f the Compson land. It is the promiscuity o f Caddy which leads to Q uentin’s
obsession with virginity, and his frustrated desire to preserve and to violate that sanctity.
Quentin Com pson’s world is divided into castes by several factors, including
race, sex, money and class. As in Proust, the aristocracy, as represented by families such
as the Compsons or the Guermantes, is in decline, as much from its own weaknesses as
from the illegitimacy o f their own pretentions. T he difference in the world o f
Yoknapatawpha is that the Southern planter aristocracy wasn’t nearly as well-established.
While the Civil W ar might be cited as the external reason for the downfall o f the
Southern aristocracy, their demise in Absalom. Absalom! and The Sound and the Furv is

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Ill

depicted as the result of the internal weaknesses and flaws o f the Sutpen, Compson and
Sartoris families.
T he Proper Name
In Absalom. Absalom! Faulkner dramatizes the failure of the patriarchal system
to be a guarantor o f identity, through the perpetuation of the proper name and the
family property. While Sutpen is a self-made man, his “design” for his children is
predicated upon their submission to his plan, the production o f a male heir. Mr
Compson claims that Sutpen named all o f his children.
Sutpen’s design includes the acquisition o f names. His marriage to Ellen is
described by Mr Compson (in chapter II) as the result, not o f a romantic courtship, but
o f a business deal consisting o f the formal exchange of titles: “Miss Rosa was righter than
she knew: he did want, not the anonymous wife and the anonymous children, but the
two names, the stainless wife and the unimpeachable father-in-law, on the license, the
patent. Yes the patent with a gold seal and red ribbons too if that had been practicable”
(AA 59).
Mr. Compson’s insistance that Supen named all of his children himself seems
incongruous with the choice o f names. The origins that Sutpen ascribes to himself in the
tale o f his nomadic childhood in the Appalachian mountains o f Virginia seem hardly
conducive to his aquisition of the education necessary to understand the significance of
the names he chose. Mr Compson sees Sutpen’s choice o f name for his mulatto offspring
as the mistake o f a semi-literate man:
Yes, Clytie was his daughter too: Clytemnestra. He named her
himself. He named them all himself: all his own get and all the get o f his
wild niggers after the country began to assimilate them. [. . .] H e named
Clytie as he named them all, the one before Clytie and Henry and Judith
even, with that same robust and sardonic temerity, naming with his own
m outh his own ironic fecundity o f dragon’s teeth which with the two
exceptions were girls. Only I have always liked to believe that he intended
to name her Cassandra, prompted by some pure dramatic economy not
only to beget but to designate the presiding augur o f his ow n disaster,
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and that he just got the name wrong through a mistake natural in a man
who must have almost taught himself to read). [. . .] (AA 73 - 74)
In naming his children he has chosen names from the Old Testament, such as
Judith, or names inspired by Greek mythology such as the Queen Clytemnestra, wife o f
Agamemnon, who led the Greeks against Troy. Mr. Compson claims that the name
Clytemnestra was a mistake, as he really meant to name her Cassandra, the slave and
prophetess of doom who is witness to the death and destruction in the house of Atreus.
So that Sutpen would have mistaken the queen for the servant. At the time of the Mr
Compson’s conversation with Quentin in the sum m erof 1910, Clytemnestra is the only
known remaining inhabitant o f Sutpen’s plantation.
Faulkner’s choice o f names for these characters places their story in the context o f
Greek tragedy, a context in which M r Compson explicitly places them. While Miss Rosa
depicts Sutpen as a demon, Mr Compson wants to see Sutpen as a tragic figure.: “And
what [Miss Rosa] saw then was just that ogre-face o f her childhood seen once and then
repeated at intervals [. . .], like the mask in Greeek tragedy interchangeable not only
from scene to scene but from accor to actor and behind which the events and occasions
took place without chronology or sequence” (AA 74).
Faulkner’s Yoknapatawpha novels depict a breakdown in social hierarchies, in
which prestigious land owning families such as the Sarto rises and the Compsons are
supplanted by interlopers such as the Snopses, in which the South which must come to
terms with the intermingling o f cultures and races, with a generalized principle o f mixing,
creolization, or metissage. This principle ofcreolization is shown to have been already
present at the heart o f the plantation system, in the fruit o f the slaveowner’s promiscuity,
but with the demise o f the O ld South the sytstem of exclusion on which the institution
depended is unmasked.
In an action which mirrors Supen’s own repudiation o f his first wife and child,
Henry disavows his birthright and disappears (perhaps taking an assumed name?), thus
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undoing the father’s plan from within by abdicating his role as perpetuator o f the family
name. His murder o f Charles Bon at the gates o f the Sutpen plantation is an extreme
form o f the encounter in which the young Sutpen is refused entrance to the big house.
The exclusion o f the other is a demarcation o f property through the denial of access to an
outsider. In both cases, the outside is in one respect assimilable to the inside, since it is
the young white boy who is refused entry to the white m an’s mansion, and it is Sutpen’s
son (Bon) who is excluded. The exclusion marks the other as other, instituting or
affirming a defference against the danger o f an improper mixing.
Bon’s exclusion from Sutpen’s Hundred is a is a denial o f incest in which Henry
plays the role of his father in relation to the unrecognized son. It is thus also a symbolic
act o f denial of paternity: It is Thomas Sutpen, the father, refusing to recognize his son.
In the words of Iidouard Glissant, “the novel suggests that, in the South, one might
admit —conceive o f—incest, but not the intrusion o f black blood which is nevertheless
there.”62
Absalom. Absalom! tells o f a perversion of legitimacy and paternity. Sutpen
repudiates his first wife and their child because he discovers that she was an octoroon.
Though he has children by his slaves, the “design” that Miss Rosa and Mr. Compson
attribute to him meant the birth o f a white male heir who could perpetuate his name.
Instead his child by the first marriage, Charles Bon, returns to court Sutpen’s daughter,
Judith, from his second marriage. When Sutpen informs his legitimate son, Henry, o f the
twin threats of incest and miscegenation, the latter murders Bon at the gates of the
plantation, repudiates his inheritance and disappears.
Sutpen’s own origins are unknown. The history o f the family lines is blocked by
the impossibility of finding the origin. Sutpen is a man who “appeared” in
Yoknapatawpha County “out o f no discernible past” (9), and with “a name that none o f
62 “le roman suggercqu'on pourrait ici (dans leSud) ad meet re -concevoir-rinceste, mais non pas I'intrusion
du sang noirquiest pouttant la." Fdouard Glissant. Po&ique de la Relation. (Paris: Gallimard, 1990) 70.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

114

them had ever heard, and origin and purpose which some o f them were never to learn”
(35). He tells General Compson o f his ignorance about his own father’s origins.His
attempts to found a lineage on the 100 acres of land he mysteriously acquired are ruined
by the “mixing” of races and cultures, the perversion o f patriarchal lineage.
Absalom. Absalom! employs gossip, hearsay, speculation, a multiplicity of voices
and a cyclical structure. The same events are recounted repeatedly, each time revealing
new connections and details about the circumstances o f crucial episodes, such as the
murder o f Charles Bon by Henry Sutpen. The reader is informed of the major events
almost from the very start o f the novel, so that the emphasis is not on the recounting o f
the action, but on the revelation o f facts, on speculation about the facts. The story too as
it is told by first Rosa Coldfield, and then Quentin Com pson’s father, is presented as
something mysterious and inexplicable.
While much about the man remains a mystery to the inhabitants o f Jeffersoneven those such as Rosa Coldfield, who has family ties through his marriage to her sister-Quentin and Mr. Compson are the beneficiaries o f supplemental information about
Sutpen’s origins, thanks mostly to Quentin’s grandfather, General Compson, in whom
the man seems to have confided a great deal. It is through General Compson that one o f
the earliest scenes in the novel, and thus perhaps a great deal o f Supten’s motivation, is
revealed. The pretext for this important revelation is the occasion of the French
architect’s flight into the woods, first recounted in chapter II, but only elaborated by
Quentin to Shreve in chapter VI (AA 219 - 56). This event further strengthens the
association of the Compsons with Sutpen, since it was information that seems only to
have been confided to General Compson:
“He told grandfather about it,” said Quentin, “that time when the
architect escaped, tried to, tried to escape into the river bottom and go
back to New Orleans or wherever it was, and he [. . .] sent word in to
grandfather and some others and got his dogs and his wild niggers out
and hunted the architect down and made him take earth in a cave under
the river bank two days later” (AA 272).
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What Sutpen told Q uentin’s grandfather on that night was o f his origins in the West
Virginia mountains, and o f the origin ofhis plan to establish a plantation. According to
Quentin, this plan grew out o f the child’s sudden realization ofhis family’s stature, which
occurred in his early adolescence, during his family’s nomadic existence, moving from
town to town, and back and forth from the mountains to the plains, with “niggers
working in the fields while white men sat on fine horses and watched them, and more
fine horses and men in fine clothes, with a different look in the face from mountain men
about the tavern where the old man was not even allowed to come in by the front door
and from which his mountain drinking manners got him ejected.“‘And the man was
there who owned all the land and the niggers and apparently the white men who
superintended the work, and who lived in the biggest house he had ever seen and who
spent most o f the afternoon (he told how he would creep up among the tangled
shrubbery o f the lawn and lie hidden and watch the man) in a barrel stave hammock
between two trees, with his shoes off, and a nigger who wore every day better clothes
than he or his father and sisters had ever owned and ever expected to, who did nothing
else but fan him and bring him drinks’” (AA 228).
The young man imagined himself no different from the white men on horses,
until he was sent by his father to the big house o f the plantation on which his family
lived.
a boy either thirteen or fourteen, he didn’t know which, in garments his
father had got from the plantation commissary and had worn out and
which one o f the sisters had patched and cut down to fit him, and he was
no more conscious o f his appearance in them or o f the possibility that
anyone else would be than he was o f his skin, following the road and
turning into the gate and following the drive [. . .] (AA 286)
His unconsciousness about the significance ofhis appearance in worn-out, second-hand
garments is an ignorance about the significance o f such outward signs, about the way in
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which they mark him as different from the rich white man who he imagines will welcome
him. This ignorance is postulated as an “innocence” by Quentin:
he told Grandfather how, before the monkey nigger who came to the
door had finished saying what he said, he seemed to kind o f dissolve and
a part o f him turn and rush back through the two years that they had
lived there, like when you pass through a room fast and look at all the
objects in it and you turn and go back through the room again and look
at all the objects from the other side and you find out you had never seen
them before (AA 286 - 87)
This encounter is described as a moment o f clairty o f vision in which the child’s
understanding ofhis own place in the social pecking order is altered, or rather, in
which the child first becomes aware o f the existence of a pecking order among
white men.
[. . .] he never even remembered what the nigger said, how it was the
nigger told him, even before he had had time to say what he came for,
never to come to that front door again but to go around to the back (AA
290)
The rebuff which he suffers at the door of the big house is a m oment o f revelation, in
which the boy is introduced to the symbolic order ofsocial class. He sees himself for the
first time, in the image reflected back to him by the servant’s reaction. The servant,
taking the place o f the absent proprietor o f the house, plays the role o f father, which the
young man’s drunken father apparently is incapable o f doing.
“He had never thought about his own hair or clothes or anybody else’s
hair or clothes until he saw that monkey nigger, who through no doing o f
his own happened to have had the felicity o f being housebred in
Richmond maybe, looking-(“O r maybe even in Charleston,” Shreve
breathed)”—at them and he never even remembered what the nigger said,
how it was the nigger told him, even before he had had time to say what
he came for, never to come to that front door again but to go around to
the back” (AA 232)
This incident is told to by Sutpen to General Compson as a rationalization for his
renunciation ofhis first wife in Haiti:
“that little boy who approached that door fifty years ago and was turned
away, for whose vindication the whole plan was conceived and carried
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forward to the moment o f this choice, this second choice devolving out
o f that first one which in its turn was forced on me as the result of an
agreement, an arrangement which I had entered in good faith, concealing
nothing, while the other party or parties to it concealed from me the one
very factor which would destroy the entire plan and design which I had
been working toward (AA 274).
This crucial scene is not related in the early parts o f the novel. Miss Rosa notably seems
to be ignorant of Sutpen’s background. As far as the rest o f the inhabitants o f Jefferson
are concerned, Sutpen seems to have come out of nowhere.
The Precariousness of History
In authors which are held up to be some kind o f quintessential representative o f a
“national” literature (and therefore o f a national identity) such as Marcel Proust or
William Faulkner, these voices are over determined by the events, the names, and the
social and political pressures and habits o f people in particular places at particular times:
the American South in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, or Paris and the
French provinces at roughly the same time. But the great pride that many Frenchmen
take in Proust, or the pride Americans (or Southerners) may take in Faulkner might well
be attributed to their failure to have read these novels. Far from portraying some kind of
essenrial national identity, these novels demonstrate the precariousness o f such
constructions, their dependence on ever-changing contexts and ongoing processes of
narration.
The notion of a purely mechanical process, itself indifferent to the contents o f
perception and memory, to a consciousnessor a personality which would function as
individual essence, is central to this reading o f these two works. T hat is not to say that the
contents are not important, but rather that their choice is somewhat arbitrary. The
cognitive functioning of memory and perception, is at least just as important. Absalom.
Absalom! is as much about the construction o f the narrative o f the Sutpen family
fortunes and its effect on the figure o f Quentin Compson as it is about Thomas Sutpen
himself.
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What these novels demonstrate is the way in which time transforms beings, and
how human perception impedes true “objective” knowledge of others—and therefore o f
the self-how in fact perception and consciousness must continually recontextualize time
and character through constructions akin to never-ending narratives. The Proustian
narrator’s attempts to give an adequate portrait o f the characters which people his world
run up against the realization that “meme au point de vue des plus insignifiantes choses
de la vie, nous ne sommes pas un tout materiellement constitue, identique pour tout le
monde et dont chacun n’a qu a aller prendre connaissance comme d ’un cahier des
charges ou d ’un testament; notre personnalite sociale est une creation de la pensee des
autres,” “even from the point o f view o f the most insignificant things in life, we are not a
materially constituted whole, identical for everybody and of whom one needs only be
informed, as you’d look up information in a ledger or a will; our social personality is a
creation oi other people’s thoughts” (18-19). In the logic o f Proust’s novel, the unstable
fluctuations o f consciousness and personality mirror a larger social instability'. It remains
impossible to determine which came first, although the narrator of the Recherche
postulates a general rule which would determine both. That law is instability itself;
“intermittences.” A law, however, normally implies both something predictable and a
proscription or command concerning intentions. But a law o f intermittences obeys
neither of these conditions. It does not pretend to proscribe behavior, and is virtually
useless as a predictive tool. Such a rule would imply the breakdown o f law and order.
In the attempt to represent consciousness as an unstable mechanism o f narrative
production, many novelists may well have long intuited what science has since attempted
to formulate in more rigorous terms: As Margaret E. Gray notes* neurological studies
seem to suggest that personal memory (or consciousness) is not normally fixed, but is
instead continually modified, recast, rewritten. In A la Recherche du temps perdu, says
Gray, “Narration as the knowledgeable display o f memory’s contents [. . .] might more
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properly be read £...] as the incessant invention and revision o f those contents.”63She
finds interdisciplinary support fora shift from the notion o f memory as fixed record to
memory as ongoing invention:
At the ‘micro’ level, new developments in neurology imply that a
mechanics o f memory-the ceaseless reorganization o f material [. . .]
through new relationships among mental maps are tantamount to the
ongoing elaboration o f fictions. At the ‘macro’ level o f organization, one
might cite historiographic arguments for the tropological structuring o f a
historic past. The past, whether personal or historic, is increasingly
formulated as a retrospective creation cast from the present.
Many readers have likewise noted Faulkner’s concern with the ongoing (re)writing o f
history. In Absalom Absalom! he is equally concerned with the effects o f that continual
creation o f memory on the central narrator, Quentin Compson.
In a book presenting neurological studies o f the question o f human consciousness
of self, Israel Rosenfield claims that consciousness is an ever-changing relation between
present sense perceptions and past memories. Consciousness takes place in time, and the
alteration o f any one aspect of memory or perception (e.g. partial brain damage, the loss
of a limb or o f a sense, such as eyesight) can radically change the nature o f that
individual’s consciousness—to such an extent that we are led to affirm that s/he "is no
longer the same person.” This judgment is often based upon that person’s altered
behavior and, especially, his or her altered use o f language. O ur use o f language is
intimately connected with who we are. Proust knew this; that is why he takes care to
remark each o f his character’s idiosyncratic ways o f expressing themselves, from the
maid Francoise’s bastardizations and mispronunciations to Dr. C ottard’s awkward,
exploratory use o f cliches. Similarly, the (ab)uses o f language in literary texts can lead us
to affirm that the English o f a Joyce or a Faulkner, or the French o f Rabelais or Cdine, is
no longer the same language. These authors have come to be identified with a certain
kind o f language. But an identity that is based in a certain style o f language is far
63Gray, Margaret E. Postmodern Proust. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992).
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different from an identity based on an immutable, essential self. Questions about the
status of the work o f art or o f the significance o f style are ultimately both versions o f the
questions concerning the nature o f idenity.
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Chapter 5: The Role of Art: Mise en Abyme in Proust and Faulkner
One seemingly obvious difference between Faulkner’s novels and that o f Proust is
the degree to which the Recherche explicitly reflects upon the nature of itself as
narrative, but Faulkner’s novels are also concerned with their status as narrative. The
language o f both of these novels is characterized by self-referentiality. Such, then, is
consciousness, continually reflecting (upon) itself. The self-reflective moments in
literature is known in French as a mise en abyme, a heraldic term whose use in reference
to literature was first suggested by Andre Gide. Gide claimed to prize in literary texts a
feature long recognized in pictural representation: that o f the mirror or “painting within a
painting,” the reduplication in miniature o f the work of art as a whole. Lucien
Dallenbach’s book-length study o f the mise en abyme, is an attempt to isolate a technique
recognized in many different art forms, including painting, sculpture, and literary texts.
Dallenbach is at pains to categorize and define the various types of mises en abyme, and
his efforts illustrate the diffiiculty o f strictly defining the term. A mise en abyme is
essentially a pan of a work o f art which reflects the act or the product o f artistic creation
itself, and, by extension, its reception or interpretaton. It is usually understood as a
smaller pan within a whole which bears a relation of similarity to the whole. It is, then, a
representation of representation. Such a movement eventually negates the validity of
representation altogether; negates the possibility of presenting anything. The assumed
link between “reality” and the artistic rendering o f that reality is called into question, as
what is made obvious is the inability to retrace the route from a representation to that
which is represented.
Dallenbach employs the linguistic distinctions of Roman Jakobson to distinguish
three different kinds o f self-reflexivity according to whether a text points to the
enunciated, the enunciation or the linguistic code itself, that is, to the content, the act o f
composition, or the medium o f a work o f art (“une reflexion est un enoncd qui renvoie a
Tenoned, a lenonciation ou au code du rdcit”). The mise en abyme is characterized by
121
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the equivocal nature of its language. It continues to function in the story just as any other
element, but it also takes on metatextual meaning, in which the work of an takes itself as
its own theme (Dallenbach 62).
Part o f the difficulty o f such a definition is the ambiguity o f the word “reflect.”
A reflection can be anything from a detailed reproduction o f a work of art to an allusion
to it or art in general. An allusion to or an image of its creator, or even to the act of
artistic creation itself can also be considered mises en abyme. T o reflect can also simply
mean to meditate on or think about something. With so many connotations, is is no
wonder that Gide sought another term to precisely describe what he aimed at in his
works. The key notions o f reproduction or repetition coupled with visibility or
appearance to the eye or mind. The idea o f a reflection is indissociable from that of the
origin or source. Without a source there can be no reflection, or, in other words, a
reflection must reflect something.
The self-reflective nature o f writing can be seen in texts from nearly every period
. Indeed, self-reflexivity seems to be the rule, rather than the exception. When one begins
to seek out such moments o f self-reflection, they can be found on almost every page o f A
la recherche du temps perdu. The text abounds in reflections of, and upon, the acts o f
writing, reading and artistic creation in the narrator’s discussions with other characters
and in his own solitary reflections on literature, music, painting, theater, and the act o f
reading. This is not surprising given the fact that the book concerns itself, in a large
mesure, with a kind o f “portrait o f the artist” as apprentice, a would be poet or novelist.
The acts o f composing, o f reading or interpreting a work o f art, as well as the artist and
the object itself are put en abyme on nearly every page o f Proust’s novel. The analyses o f
Balzac and Bergotte’s writing styles, the pastiche of the G oncourt lournal. even the
descriptions ofVinteuil’s music or o f Elstir’s painting lead to the direct discussion o f
aesthetic values which inevitably invite the reader to apply them to the novel he is
reading. The narrator’s description o f himself reading before falling asleep is an
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exploration o f the obscure boundaries between waking and sleep, fact and fantasy, which
evokes the strange reciprocal relationship that exists between the dream world o f fiction,
the world o f dreams, and the world o f intentional thought processes. There are several
more passages specifically focused upon the act o f reading scattered throughout the
novel. This culminates, in Le temps retrouve. with the hero’s realization that the
difficulties he has in recognizing the people he once knew, at the Princesse de
Guermantes’s party, is not unlike his inability to remember the stories of the characters in
one of Bergotte’s novels:
Car je ne me rappelais plus bien ce qui etait arrive a ces personnages, ce
qui ne les differenciaient d ’ailleurs pas des personnes qui se trouvaient cet
apres-midi chez Mme de Guermantes et dont, pourplusieursau moins, la
vie passee etait aussi vague pourmoi que si je 1’eusse lue dans un roman a
demi oublie. Le prince d ’Agrigente avait-il fini par epouser Mile X ... ?
Ou plutot n’etait-ce pas le frere de Mile X ... qui avait du epouser la soeur
du prince d’Agrigente ? Ou bien faisais-je une confusion avec une
anceinne lecture ou un reve recent ? (TR 221)
For I no longer have any clear recollection o f what happened to these
characters, though in this respect they are scarcely to be distinguished
from the men and women who were present this afternoon at Mme de
Guermantes’s party and whose past life, in many cases at least, was as
vague in my mind as if I had read it in a half-forgotten novel. The Prince
d ’Agrigente, for instance: had he ended by marrying Mile X-? O r was it
rather the brother o f Mile X—who might have married the sister o f the
Prince d’Agrigente? O r was I confusing it all with something that I had
read long ago or recently dreamed. (Ill: 952)
In this passage, the existential status o f reality is shown to reside on the same level o f
doubt or certainty as fictions or dreams.
Le reve etait encore un de ces faits de ma vie, qui m ’avait toujours le plus
frappe, qui avait du le plus servir a me convaincre du caractere purement
mental de la realite, et dont je ne dedaignerais pas 1’aide dans la
compositionde mon oeuvre. (TR 221)
Dreams were another o f the facts o f my life which had always most
profoundly impressed me and had done most to convince me o f the
purely mental character o f reality, and in the composition o f my work I
would not scorn their aid. (Ill: 952)
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On this view, the work o f an creates the real, just as real human beings become Active
characters.
Proust multiplies the references to works o f art and literature to such an extent,
that one begins to find everywhere allusions to the problem of meaning, interpretation,
intention and signs in general. The many passages in Sodome et Gomorrhe and La
Prisonniere which relate the narrator's effo ns to research the gowns o f Fortuny or the
discussions o f passages in Balzac, which themselves are descriptions of texts, that is to say
of textiles, woven fabrics, designed by human hands: the toilettes of the Princess de
Cadignan are also some o f the many opportunities Proust uses as pretexts for discussions
of aesthetics and artistic practice. Even a discussion o f battlefield strategy with St.-Loup
and his fellow soldiers during the narrator’s visit to the army base of Doncieres becomes
a discussion o f reading and interpretation: “He bien! par exemple, tout ce que vous iisez,
je suppose, dans le recit d’un narrateur militaire, les plus petits faits, les plus petits
evenements, ne sont que les signes d’une idee qu’il faut degager et qui souvent en
recouvre d’autres, comme dans un palimpseste” (CGII 102; II, 108 - 09).
Saint-Loup goes on to elaborate a theory of hermeneutics which could very well
serve as a reader’s guide for A la recherche du temps perdu: “De sorte que, si tu sais lire
I’histoire militaire, ce qui est recit confus pour le com m un des lecteurs est pour toi un
enchainement aussi rationnel qu’un tableau pour 1’amateur qui sait regarderce que le
personnage porte sur lui, tient dans les mains, tandis que le visiteur ahuri des musees se
laisse etourdir et migrainer par de vagues couleurs. Mais, comme pour certains tableaux
ou il ne suffit pas de remarquer que le personnage tient un calice, mais ou il faut savoir
pourquoi le peintre lui a mis dans les mains un calice, ce qu’il symbolise par la, ces
operations militaires, en dehors meme de leur but immediat, sont habituellement, dans
1’esprit du general qui dirige la campagne, calquees sur des batailles plus anciennes qui
sont, si tu veux, comme le passe, comme la bibliotheque, comme I’erudition, comme
letymologie, comm e 1’aristocratie des batailles nouvelles” (104). To the alert reader, this
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whole passage is a suggestion to look beyond the text, to read between the lines and
discover a hidden order in the novel he is reading. It is the context o f history, tradition
and scholarship which provides the context. The image of a palimpsest is a literal
rendering of the superimposition and dependence o f the new upon the old, or as as T.S.
Eliot might say, “Tradition and the Individual Talent.”
Proust’s entire novel also places itself en abyme when it takes as its subject the
story o f its coming into being. While the narrator may be in search of lost time, the hero,
his distant self, is shown to be forever on the lookout for some “great philosophical truth”
upon which to base a novel (S 176 - 77). The narrator, reflecting back upon his youthful
aspirations, invariably remembers the afflictions he felt at “not having the disposition for
letters, and having to abandon the idea o f ever becoming a writer.”
It is in Albertine Disparue that the hero finally succeeds in getting his work into
print, but he ironically, and significantly, misrecognizes it as the work o f another:
“J’ouvris Le Figaro. Quel ennui! Justement le premier article avait le meme titre que celui
que j’avais envoye et qui n'avait pas paru” (148).
Faulkner’s Self-reflective Text
While fewer obvious references to art and literature can be discerned in
Faulkner’s novel, it is significantly focused on the act of storytelling, which is emblematic
of writing and reading simultaneously. Indeed, Miss Rosa suggests a future as a writer to
Quentin in her first interview with the boy on the second page o f the novel:
Because you are going away to attend the college at Harvard they tell
me,” she said. “So I dont imagine you will ever come back here and settle
down as a country lawyer in a little town like Jefferson since Northern
people have already seen to it that there is little left in the South for a
young man. So maybe you will enter the literary profession as so many
Southern gentlemen and gentlewomen too are doing now and maybe
some day you will remember this and write about it (AA 6)
But the reason Rosa gives for such a choice is hardly inspiring. She appeals only to the
pecuniar}' aspect o f authorship: “You will be married then I expect and perhaps your wife
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will want a new gown or a new chair for the house and you can write this and submit it to
the magazines” (AA 6). Miss Rosa herself is said to have written “over a thousand odes to
southern soldiers:” She is “a woman who even in his (Quentin’s) father’s youth had
already established (even if not affirmed) herself as the town’s and the county’s poetess
laureate by issuing to the stern and meagre subscription list o f the county newspaper
poems, ode eulogy and epitaph, out o f some bitter and implacable reserve of undefeat”
(8). It is significant that Miss Rosa’s artistic achievements have been imparted to Quentin
as a result, not o f ambition or inspiration, but “undefeat,” the negation o f a negation,
rather than a forward-looking effort at artistic accomplishment. The odes to southern
soldiers, eulogies and epitaphs, are manifestations of mourning the repetition of which
reveals a morbid obsession with death and loss. These odes, as manifestations of a
traditional poetic form to which Miss Rosa adheres, are further evidence o f of the
rigidness and immobility of her thought. This immobility is already suggested by the
setting and her posture as described in the opening pages and repeated throughout the
first chapter of the novel.
The decision to frame the Sutpen story with the mechanism o f the story’s re
telling to Quentin, and through him to the outside world, represented by the Canadian,
Shreve, foregrounds the act o f storytelling itself.
Storytelling in Absalom. Absalom!
In Absalom. Absalom!. Faulkner’s text reflects indirectly upon the modality o f its
own operation in the idiosyncracies o f storytelling which are attributed to Thomas
Sutpen himself. Sutpen’s taciturn nature renders all the more significant in the few scenes
in which he does speak. General Compson having seemingly been his sole confidant in
Yoknapatawpha county, their interviews are In chapterVII, Quentin tells Shreve about
his grandfather’s conversation with Thomas Sutpen, over the campfire on the night o f
their hunt for the fleeing French architect who was overseeing the building o f the Sutpen
plantation. It is in this conversation that Sutpen revealed to General Compson some key
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derails o f his origins in the Virginia mountains and his first marriage to a creole woman
in the French West Indies. The information obtained by Quentin’s grandfather makes
the Compsons privy to knowledge which the other residents ofYoknapatawpha do not
have.
General Com pson seems to have been struck by the detached manner in which
the man spoke about his experiences: “and I reckon Grandfather was saying ‘Wait, wait
for God’s sake wait’ about like you are until he finally did stop and back up and start
over again with at least some regard for cause and effect even if none for logical sequence
and continuity” [. ..] Sutpen’s style resembles that o f the novel itself with repetitions,
chronological displacements and lack oflinear, logical development. The novel presents
scenes which are interrupted only to repeated and continued in later passages of the text,
just as Sutpen’s conversation with General Compson is interrupted and unexpectedly
continued thirty years later: “It was thirty years before he told Grandfather any more o f
it” (301).
The manner in which Sutpen told his story seems to have been that of an
impartial, detached observer, depicting events from the oustide. The description
Quentin gives o f Sutpen’s attitude as he told his stoy to General Compson, suggests an
impartiality and detachment from his own life’s story: “he telling it all over and still it
was not absolutely clear—the how and the why he was there and what he was-since he was
not talking about himself. He was telling a story. He was not bragging about something
he had done: he was just telling a story about something a man named Thomas Sutpen
had experienced, which would still have been the same story if the man had had no name
at all’ ” (308 - 09). The story he tells is unimbellished, factual and bare-bones. He
supplies a minimum o f details, giving the essential elements o f his itinerary:
He went to the West Indies. T hat’s how he said it: not how he managed
to find where the West Indies were nor where ships departed from to go
there nor how he got to where the ships were and got in one nor how he
liked the sea and it must have been hardship indeed for him, a boy o f

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

128
fourteen or fifteen who had never seen the ocean before, going to sea in
1823 (AA 299).
He gives no motivation or explanation for his actions, none o f the “how and why” which
preoccupies the other storytellers in the novel (and the reader). He mentions his first wife
and child only in passing: “No more detail and information about that than about how
he got from the field, his overseeing, to [...] than how he got from the rotting cabin in
Virginia to the field he oversaw [...] a very condensation o f time which was the guage o f
his own violence, and he telling it in that pleasant faintly forensic anecdotal manner
apparently just as he remembered it” (AA 312). For lack o f any solid clues, the strange,
indifferent and elliptical manner o f his telling becomes symbolic o f the man’s singleminded approach to his “design.”
There are many parallells which can be drawn between Sutpen’s described
manner of storytelling and the style o f the novel itself: The repetitive and a-chronological
presentation o f the novel mimics the style Quentin attributes to Sutpen.
He pulls his plantation out o f the swamp, but he does not do it by himself: he has
recourse to a French architect to produce the outward form ofhis design. This architect
is a comical figure, as he is described by Mr. Compson to Quentin, with his “formal coat
and his Paris hat and his expression o f grim and embittered amazement.” Perhaps
Sutpen’s need for the French architect is a figure for Faulkner’s own debt to continental
writers, the “tricks o f the trade” that he alluded to in the interview mentioned above.
The allusions to French and European art Faulkner’s novel always emphasize the concern
for style, for empty form. The French architect only constructs the facade, the empty
shell of the home, the interior of which Sutpen must then finish and furnish.
This emphasis on appearance and empty form can be sen in Mr Com pson’s
description o f Charles Bon, whom he depicts in the guise o f a decadent European, an
effeminate aesthete, with the “Frenchified cloak and hat which he wore, or perhaps (I like
to think this) presented formally to the man reclining in a flowered, almost feminised
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gown” (AA 117). Mr Compson’s portrayal of Bon’s funeral is filled with allusions to
various forms ofart and representation: Judith’s mourning dress is “ceremonial
widowhood’s bright dramatic pageantry.” The appearance of Charles Bon’s octoroon
mistress and child ar his graveside “must have resembled a garden scene by the Irish
poet, Wilde” (AA 241). The whole scene is described in terms o f theatricality, the
tombstones “looking as though they had been cleaned and polished and arranged by
scene shifters who with the passing o f twilight would return and strike them and carry
them, hollow fragile and without weight, back to the warehouse until they should be
needed again.” The octoroon herself is described as “a woman created o f by and for
darkness, whom the artist Beardsley might have dressed, in a soft flowing gown designed
not to infer bereavement or widowhood but to dress some interlude of slumbrous and
fatal insatiation, of passionate and inexorable hunger of the flesh” (AA 242). The
allusions to Wilde and Beardsley place everything surrounding Bon into a context o f
“decadence.”
Being and Art: The Death of Bergotte
The work of art is traditionally considered a means for the artist to achieve a kind
of immortality. Proust’s text will put to question the thesis of an as a means o f
overcoming time without completely abandoning it. The Recherche is often read as a
supreme example of a modernist esthetic which elevates and affirms the power o f the
artist and the value of the work o f art. Indeed, in one passage o f Le temps retrouve the
narrator proclaims paradoxically that “La vraie vie, la vie enfin decouverte et eclaircie, la
seule vie par consequent pleinement vecue, c’est la litterature” (202), “Real life, life at last
laid bare and illuminated-the only life in consequence which can be said to be really
lived-is literature” (III: 931). The importance given to art and literature by the narrator is
counterbalanced by an acute awareness o f the mutability of the work ofart, which is
finally just as fragile and mortal as the human being who created it. The death o f the
fictional novelist Bergotte is an occasion for such reflection.
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The question the narrator raises in the opening pages is left: hanging for most of
the novel, and will never be definitively resolved, although he does return to it at least
once. It is unexpectedly taken up again in the fifth volume, in the presentation o f the
illness and death o f the author Bergotte, who, is described as a “dying planet.”
II allair ainsi se refroidissant progressivement, petite planete qui offrait
une image anticipee des derniers jours de la grande quand, peu a peu, la
chaleurse retirera de la Terre, puis la vie. Alors la resurrection aura pris
fin, car si avant dans les generations futures que brillent les oeuvres des
hommes, encore faut-il q u ’il y ait des hommes. Si certaines especes
animales resistent plus longtemps au froid envaihisseur, quand il n’y aura
plus d’hommes, et a supposerque la gloire de Bergotte air dure jusque-la,
brusquement elle s’eteindra a tout jamais. (P 173)
Thus he went on growing steadily colder, a tiny planet offering a
prophetic image o f the greater, when gradually heat will withdraw from
the earth, then life itself. Then the resurrection will have come to an end,
for, however far forward into future generations the works o f men may
shine, there must none the less be men. If certain species hold out longer
against the invading cold, when there are no longer any men, and if we
suppose Bergotte’s fame to have lasted until then, suddenly it will be
extinguished for all time. (Ill: 182)
Bergotte’s death comes after after an attack he suffered upon his visit to an exposition
featuring the Dutch painter Vermeer.61
un critique ayant ecrit que dans la Vue de Delft de Ver Meer (prete par le
musee de La Haye pour une exposition hollandaise), tableau q u ’il
admirait et croyait connaitre tres bien), un petit pan de mur jaune (qu’il
ne se rappelait pas), etait si bien peint qu’il etait, si on le regardait seul,
comme une precieuse oeuvre d ’art chinoise, d’une beau re qui se suffirait a
elle-meme.
an art critic having written somewhere that in Vermeer’s View o f Delft
(lent by the Gallery at T he Hague for an exhibition o f Dutch painting), a
picture which he adored and imagined that he knew by heart, a little
patch ofyellow wall (which he could not remember) was so well painted
that it was, if one looked at it by itself, like some priceless specimen of
Chinese art, o f a beauty that was sufficient in itself (III: 184 - 85)

61This passage is apparently one that Proust wrote and added very late in the publication process ofthe
Recherche, after his own visit to a Dutch exposition at the Jeu de Paume in 1921, during which time he
suffered an attackofvertigo.
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When he sees the painting in the museum, he is struck by a detail that the reviewer
described, and which he previously hadn’t noticed.: “Enfin il fut devant le Ver Meer qu’il
se rappellait plus eclatant, plus different de tout ce q u ’il connaissait, mais ou, grace a
l’article du critique, il remarqua pour la premiere fois des petits personnages en bleu, que
le sable etait rose, et enfin la precieuse matiere du tout petit pan de mur jaune.”
The exquisite detail o f this “petit pan de m ur” stands in opposition to the “pan
lumineux” which the narrator associates with his voluntary memories o f Combray.
Bergotte, like Swann, is a double for the narrator, whose desire to be a writer is part o f his
fascination with the work o f art and the world o f the artist. Bergotte’s reaction to the
painting, influenced by the critic’s review, shows him the weakness of his own powers o f
observation. Comparing the work of the Dutch artist to his own, he regrets his own lack
of attention to detail.
«C’est ainsi que j’aurais du ecrire» disait-il. Mes derniers livres sont trop
secs, il aurait fallu passer plusieurs couches de couleur, rendre ma phrase
en elle-meme precieuse, comme ce petit pan de mur jaune.» Cependant la
gravite de ses etourdissements ne lui echappait pas. Dans une celeste
balance lui apparaissair, chargeant 1’un des plateaux, sa propre vie, tandis
que 1’autre contenait le petit pan de mur si bien peint en jaune. II sentait
qu’il avait imprudemmenr donne la premiere pour le seconde. (P 176)
“T hat’s how I ought to have written,” he said. “My last books are too dry,
I ought to have gone over them with a few layers o f color, made my
language precious in iteself, like this litde patch o f yellow wall”
Meanwhile he was not unconscious o f the gravity o f his condition. In a
celestial pair o f scales there appeared to him, weighing down one o f the
pairs, his own life, while the other contained the little patch o f wall so
beautifully painted in yellow. He felt that he had rashly sacrificed the
former for the latter. (Ill: 185)
The novelist’s feeling o f despair at this realization mirrors the hero’s own incessant
expression of regret at his inability to accurately observe and understand the world
around him.
The episode o f Bergotte’s death is the occasion for a return to the question o f
death and immortality that was asked in the “Combray:” “Un nouveau coup 1’abattit, il
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roula du canape par terre oil accoururent tous les visiteurs et gardiens. II etait mort. Mort
a jamais? Qui peut le dire? ” (P 176 - 77), “A fresh attack struck him down; he rolled
from the settee to the floor, as visitors and attendants came hurrying to his assistance. He
was dead. Dead forever? Who can say? (Ill: 185 - 86). This is exactly the same formula
used in the “Ouverture,” in the reflections on the role of chance in human existence, and
initiates a reflection upon the significance o f the work of art and its power to express the
unicity of the artist’s vision.
As Bergotte is buried, the image o f his novels in shop windows is the occasion for
a meditation on the role o f work o f art in conferring immortality: “O n l’enterra, mais
toute la nuit fonebre, aux vitrines evlairees, ses livres, disposees trois par trois, veillaient
comme des anges aux ailes e'ploye'es et semblaient pour celui qui n etait plus, le symbole
de sa resurrection” (177). This image is incongruous with the narrator’s earlier statement
that Timmortalite n ’est pas plus promis aux hommes qu’aux oeuvres.” The question of
art’s ability to transcend death remains unresolved until the hero’s second major
revelatory experience o f involuntary memory in Le temps retrouve.
Voice, Interweaving, Intertextuality
The m otif of the written letter can also serve as a form of literary self-reflection.
In Faulkner’s work, it is also through the use of letters and the dramatization of
storytelling as an oral practice that he self-references his work as text. The novel portrays
the circulation o f the letter in the passage o fthe story from mouth to ear and from hand
to hand. One might say that it is the status o f the letter which is at stake in Thomas
Sutpen’s efforts to establish a lign o f dukes which might perpetuate his family name. The
novel portrays the circulation o f the letter in the passage of the story from mouth to ear
and from hand to hand. According to Patrick McGee, there are a total o f eight missives
mentioned in Asbalo m . Absalo m !. two o f which are reproduced in their entirety in the
novel: Mr. compson’s letter to Quentin at Harvard, in which he informs his son o f Miss
Rosa Coldfield’s death (217 - 18, 470), and Charles Bon’s unsigned letter to Judith
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Surpen during the Civil War, which Judith is said to have given to Q uentin’s
grandmother (AA 160 - 63). These letters function as mirrors for the novel itself. The
letter from Mr Compson to his son is reproduced in two parts which are separated by
252 pages o f text. Its conclusion is held in suspension for half the novel, like many o f the
actions detailed in the story.
In the letter Judith Sutpen receives from Charles Bon, which she subsequently
gives to Quentin’s grandmother, As Pat McGee notes, “Absalom. Absalom! analyzes a
language that has been diverted from its end.” Written with stove polish on paper which
was equally plundered from Yankee troops.
Mr Compson imagines the letter “to embody the thing he looks for by narrating,
the missing explanation.”Gl In chapter IV, he speculates about what Judith said when she
entrusted Quentin’s grandmother with the letter she had received from Charles Bon.
‘Yes,’ Judith said. ‘O r destroy it. As you like. Read it if you like or don’t
read it if you like. Because you make so little impression, you see. You get
born and you try this and you don’t know why only you keep on trying it
and you are born at the same time with a lot of other people, all mixed up
with them, like trying to, having to, move your arms and legs with strings
only the same strings are hitched to all the other arms and legs and the
others all trying and they don’t know why either except that the strings are
all in one another’s way like five or six people all trying to make a rug on
the same loom only each one want to weave his own pattern into the rug;
and it can’t matter, you know that, or the Ones that set up the loom would
have arranged things a little better, and yet it must matter because you
keep on trying or having to keep on trying and then all of a sudden it’s all
over and all you have left is a block o f stone with scratches on it provided
there was someone to remember to have the marble scratched and set up or
had time to, and it rains on it and the sun shines on it and after a while they
don’t even remember the name and what the scratches were trying to tell,
and it doesn’t matter.’ (AA 157-58)
In this speech, Judith expresses a relationship to the letter in which the subject is born into
a a social web, in which her place is determined by others.The metaphor of the loom is a
figure for the social “fabric” which connects her to others. It is also an image o f
('SPat McGee. Tcllinp thcO then The Question ofValue in Modern and Postcolonial Writing. (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press. 1992) 44.
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textualiry, o f language, which is “woven” by one and ail, but in which autonomy is
difficult. Judith Sutpen admits the subject’s inability to control the status o f the letter by
giving it to Mrs Compson. As a woman, Judith certainly enjoys much less autonomy
than her father, or brother, on whom she is dependent for the realization of her own
goals. Likewise, she does not speak in the text o f the novel. Her voice is caught up in the
voices of Mr. Compson, General Compson and the General’s wife. This soliloquy on the
transfer of Bon’s letter is an expression of the intertextuai nature of existence in the letter.
The moment of passage o f the letter is thus highly sym bo lie.
In Judith’s speech, Faulkner expresses the intersubjective nature of human
existence. The weaving o f the loom is an image used by Richard Rorty, who urges us to
think of human minds “as webs o f beliefs and desires, of sentential attitudes-webs which
continually reweave themselves so as to accommodate new sentential attitudes” [. ..]. He
goes so far as to suggest that “there is no self distinct from this self-reweaving web. All
there is to the human self is just that w eb.^’The metaphor o f the web is appropriate for
narration, which has long been associated with the act of weaving. Consciousness can thus
be thought o f as the ongoing rewriting of the self; or better, the act o f writing itself.
Identity is an unfinished text, artificially and arbitrarily fixed by the closure o f the book,
the finality o f death.6^
It is possible to read Mr. Compson’s own fatalism in this speech he attributes
retrospectively to Judith. The faded writing on the tombstones is also a figure for the
work of art as a text, and in light o f our reading o f Faulkner through Proust, it echoes a
Proustian metaphor: “un live est un grand cimetiere ou sur la plupart des tombes on ne
peut plus lire les noms effaces” (TR 210) “a book is a huge cemetery in which on the
majority o f the tombs the names are effaced and can no longer be read” (III: 940).
66“Inq uiry as Reco ntex rualizatio n: A n A nti-d uaiist Acco un t o f Inccrpretatio n,” Obiecrivitv. Relativism, and
Truth: Philosophical Papers, vol. 1, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 93’ Walter Benjamin claims chat “Death is the sanction ofeverything that the storyteller can tell. He has
borrowed his authority from death” (94).
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The French Architect
The plantation and especially the house built by Sutpen, with the help ofthe
French architect, is a symbol for the writer’s creation, the book itself. The architect is
described as an artist by General Compson: “[.. .] he was a good architect. Q uentin
knew the house, twelve miles from Jefferson [.. .]. And not only an architect, as General
Compson said, but an artist since only an artist could have borne those two years in order
to build a house which he doubtless not only expected but firmly intended never to see
again” (AA 43). This would make the house a work o f art, a mise en abyme for the
literary edifice constructed by an author such as Faulkner. The novel suggests this
possibility when the ghost o f Sutpen is said to inhabit Miss Rosa’s voice “where a more
fortunate one would have had a house” (AA 4). Narrative, or rather “voice” is here shown
to usurp the function o f the house, the place o f residence for beings, or being in general.
Here artistic creation is predicated on renouncement of any desire for prestige or
immortality. He is a comical figure “in his formal cout and his Paris hat and his
expression o f grim and embittered amazement.” His finery is juxtaposed with Sutpen
and the wild Haitians caked in mud as protection against mosquitos. He is out o f his
element —more o f an absolute other in the context o f Yoknapatawpha than the Haitians
themselves: Sutpen certainly gets along better with the Negroes than with the architect,
working alongside them and engaging in sportive fist fights with them. Roles seem to
have been reversed when we see Sutpen and the slaves tracking the runaway architect with
bloodhounds through the swamps.
Architecture is also used frequently in Proust as a metaphor for the work ofart:
In the lengthy development of the esthetics of his novel in Le temps retrouve. the book
the narrator hopes to write is likened to a cathedral:
Et dans ces grands livres-la, il y a des parties qui n’ont eu le temps que
d ’etre esquissees, et qui ne seront sans doute jamais finies, a cause de
1’ampleur meme du plan de 1’architecte. Combien de grandes cathedrales
restent inachevees! O n le nourrit, on fortifie ses parties faibles, on le

Reproduced with permission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

136
preserve, mais ensuite c’est lui qui grandic, qui designe notre combe, la
protege contre les rumeurset quelque temps contre I’oubli. (TR337 - 38)
And in long books o f this kind there are parts which there has been time
only to sketch , parts which, because o f the very amplitude o f the
architect’s plan, will no dobt never be completed. How many great
cathedrals remain unfinished! The writer feeds his book, he strengthens
the parts o f it which are weak, he protects it, but afterwards it is the book
that grows that designates its author’s tomb and defends it against the
world’s clamourand for a while against oblivion. (Ill: 1089)
Here again it is notable that one of the main points of similarity between the cathedral
and the work ofart as conceived by the narrator, is its essentially unfinished nature. The
enormity o f such an undertaking will mean an unending task for the artist. The work
demands a superhuman effort which, when is inevitably interrupted by the death. The
(un)finished work “designating” the absence o f the artist in its missing elements, has the
function o f a grave marker.
Art is finally overpowered by the forces o f nature in the form o f death, and the
forces o f entropy which resist and erode the structures imposed on its elements. Sutpen
pulls his plantation out of the primal mud, but is unable to insure its perpetuation.
Similarly, Miss Rosa, Mr. Compson, Quentin and finally Shreve all attempt to construct
a narrative about Sutpen, but no one o f them is able to adequately put all the pieces
together. T he inability of the various narrators to adequately reconstruct the Sutpen
legend is, as many critics have noted, a commentary on the status o f history itself.
History, like memory is not immutable; it is subject to all the effects o f forgetting and
revision o f conscious memory. As we have seen, Proust spends whole volumes explicitly
reflecting on the fragility of memory, in the slow progression of the hero’s forgetting
about Albertine. Miss Rosa also laments the fading o f memory: “Ay griefgoes, fades; we
know that—but ask the tear ducts i f they have forgotten how to weep. ’’But Miss Rosa has a
morbid obsession with preserving memory which prevents her from adapting and living
in the present. This is underscored by her description in the opening pages o f the novel,
by the rigidity o f her posture and the stillness o f the setting in her “office.” She is in an
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arrested state of mourning, in the “eternal black which she had worn for forty-three years
now, whether for sister, father, or norhusband none knew, sitting so bolt upright in the
straight hard chair that was so tall for her that her legs hung straight and rigid as if she
had iron shinbones and ankles, clear ofthe floor with that air o f impotent and static rage
like children’s feet” (AA 3-4). The immobility o f Miss Rosa, dwarfed by the chair in
which she sits, suggests her mentally and emotionally frozen attitude.
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C onclusion: The Identity Crisis o f Literary Studies

The crisis o f identity which I have been illustrating in the novels o f William
Faulkner and Marcel Proust is a problem that also feces what we call literary “studies,”
which seek to differentiate themselves from the fictional texts and documents upon
which it operates. Inquiry into the nature o f identity is itself subject to the
recontextualization which “research” engenders. Any inquiry into the meaning o f being
must quickly find itself confronted with the question o f the meaning of meaning. It is
inevitably the way we formulate the question which will determine the answers we find.
Indeed all we ever seem to be able to do is continually reformulate the question
according to the ever-changing contexts from which we approach it.
It is difficult, from our perspective, to understand the novelty of Proust’s work.
We are a generation which has been weaned on the billboard, the sound bite and the
video clip. Proust’s poetics become our poetics-a poetics o f continual revision, and
recontextualization.
Richard Rorty calls Proust and Nietzsche “ironists” because, he says, they “are
quite aware that what counts as resolution, perfection, and autonomy will always be a
function o f when one happens to die or to go mad. But this relativity does not entail
futility. For there is no big secret which the ironist hopes to discover, and which he might
die or decay before discovering. There are only little mortal things to be rearranged by
being redescribed. If he had been alive or sane longer, there would have been more
material to be rearranged, and thus different redescriptions, but there would never have
been the right description. For although the thoroughgoing ironist can use the notion o f a
‘better description,’ he has no criterion for the application o f this term and so cannot use
the notion o f ‘the right description.’ ”68 Proust’s hero is portrayed as continually being

68 Richard Rorty, Contingency. Irony and Solidarirv. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 99.
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the victim of the desire to discover a big secret. One o f the ways o f distinguishing the
“hero” from the “narrator” is the way in which the latter itonizes about this desire.
Marcel Proust corresponds perfecdy to Rorty’s description o f the “thoroughgoing
ironist.” His narrator’s ideas about people and places are continually subject to correction
and re-interpretation. Although he is said to have announced with joy to his housekeeper
the moment when he wrote the word “fin” on his manuscript, he actually continued
revising, rewriting and rearranging little bits and pieces of his novel right up until the
moment of his death; and, while “Marcel” attempts to identify himself thro ugh the
repetition and construction of a narrative about his specific historical and cultural
context, identity and contexts are ultimately shown to be unstable consrructscontinually
woven out o f the disparate shards o f memory and language. Identity is always
incomplete, requiring a supplement o f narration, of writing. Being as well as meaning in
this narrative is forever differed, qualified, contingent, and reversible. It is dependent on
contexts which themselves are forever changing. This is what Proust refers to as “le
kaleidoscope social” (CG I, 181).
Much o f what we consider our identity is a response to inquiry, a set o f questions
and answers about our past and present conditions-a narrative. The answers may not be
the same in every circumstance. Our story cannot fully be told. It is not only
inexhaustible, but continually “self-modifying” (that is to say that it modifies itself,
which is our “self” in the very act of telling that self). It is an act of self-creation. It is us
writing our selves, a kind o f fiction in which fiction becomes reality. Signs become beings
or vice versa. It is this same being we allude to when we talk about the style of Marcel
Proust. But an identity that is based in a certain style o f language, in a certain
manipulation o f signs, say, in what you say or wear, in the letters you write, is far
different from an identity based on an immutable, essential self. What this style shows is
not the idiosyncrasies o f some “individual” consciousness, but rather the melding o f
idiosyncrasy into the impersonal stream o f unconscious mechanisms: mechanisms o f
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condensation and displacement, o f association and combination, o f synchrony and
diachrony in other words, of language.
Identity is in a practical sense indistinguishable from narration, that is from the
active functioning of language as it unceasingly constructs and deconstructs memory,
consciousness or history. There can be no essence to identity; it can never be definitive
when it is seen as a function o f language. N or can identity be grasped as a whole,
complete and self-sufficient. The conscious narrative reconstruction o f personal identity
is never complete, never satisfactory. It always requires further development, more
narration, more text. Hence the exponential growth o f Proust’s work. It’s safe to say that
A la recherche du temps perdu is a novel that Proust worked on all his life. But Proust
remains undaunted by the theoretical impossibilities of a definitive text. Indeed, Proust’s
narrator expresses an admiration for the “great unfinished works” o f the nineteenth
century (P 150; III: 157). The novel remains much more fragmented and inconsistent
than we like to admit.
Nearly every time Proust’s narrator alludes to great art o f the past, whether it be
the art of the eighteenth or the nineteenth century, he admires in it its broken,
unfinished, asymmetrical character, which nevertheless follows a rigorous, if hidden, plan
and attempts to adhere to a definite structure. It is the deformation o f that structure,
and its need to be recuperated in an act o f reading, which he admires.
The description of the Hubert Robert fountain, early in the narrator’s entry into
the salon of the Princesse de Guermantes at the beginning o f Sodome et Gomorrhe is
just one among many examples o f the kind o f mise en abyme o f the work o f art which is
repeated again and again in the novel:
Dans une clariere reservee par de beaux arbres dont plusieurs etaient aussi
anciens que lui, plante a l’ecart, on le voyait de loin, svelte, immobile,
durci, ne laissant agiter par la brise que la retombee plus legere de son
panache pale et fremissant. Le XVIIIe siecle avait epuree I’elegance de ses
Iignes, mais, fixam le style du jet, semblait en avoir arrete la vie; a cette
distance, on avait l’impression de 1’art plutot que la sensation de 1’eau.
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It could be seen from a distance, slender, motionless, rigid, set apart in a
clearing surrounded by fine trees, several o f which were as old as itself,
only the lighter fall of its pale and quivering plume stirring in the breeze.
The eighteenth century had refined the elegance o f its lines, but, by fixing
the style o f the jet, seemed to have arrested its life; at this distance one
had the impression of art rather than the sensation of water.
The fountain is set apart from its surroundings, a relic o f a past age with no apparent
connection to the present. The fixity o f its appearance denotesa coldness and a
lifelessness which Marcel associates here with eighteenth century an.
The fountain becomes symbolic for the narrator, o f the artistic heritage o f the
eighteenth century: “Le nuage humide lui-meme qui s’amoncelait perpetuellement a son
faite gardait le caractere de lepoque comme ceux qui dans le ciel s’assemblent autour des
palais de Versailles.” “Even the moist cloud that was perpetually gathering at its sum m it
preserved the character of the period like those that assemble in the sky round the palaces
o f Versailles.” The dyad of an and nature, set up by this passage, is reversed by an optical
effect dependent upon proximity, which reveals details not seen from a distance, thus
contradiciting the assertion that it “can be seen” from a distance. The view the narrator
has from a distance is arguably not sight, but blindness. The ability to see is critically
dependent on the ability to see the details.
M aisde pres on se rendait compte que tout en respectant, comme les pierres
d’un palais antique, le dessin prealablement trace, c etait des eaux toujours
nouvelles, s elan^ant et voulant obeiraux ordres anciens de 1’architecte, ne les
accomplissaientexactement qu’en paraissant les violer, leurs mille bonds epars
pouvant seuls donner a distance I’impression d ’un unique elan. Celui-ci etait
en realite aussisouvent interrompu que leparpillement de la chute, alors que.
de loin, il m ’avait paru inflechissable, dense, d ’une continuitesans lacune. (SG
56)
But from a closer view one realised that, while it respected, like the stones o f
an ancient palace, the design traced for it beforehand, it was a constantly
changing stream o f water thatspringing upsards and seeking to obey the
architect’s original orders, performed them to the letter only by seeming to
infringe them, its thousand separate bursts succeeding only from afar in
giving the impression o f a single thrust. This was in reality as often
interrupted as the scattering o f the fall, whereas from a distance it had
appeared to me dense, inflexible, unbroken in itscontinuity (II: 680)
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The description o f this fountain alludes to the French Revolution and to characteristics of
the Baroque architecture of the period, with its adherence to certain traits o f classical
architecture, but which displayed increasingly broken and asymmetrical feaures as the
century progressed. The allusion to eighteenth century art’s form and asthetics, through
the sculpted waters o f this fountain, has immediate relevance and impact upon the
Proustian text in which it is placed. This fountain is a work of art whose “roots” are said
to be plunged deep into the character o f the century: Like the art of that century it
displays a definite form a “pre-inscribed design” which is nevertheless broken and
disrupted by the “thousand scattered splashes” o f water, only giving the impression o f a
completed whole “from a distance.” T he image o f clouds gathering in the sky above the
Palace o f Louis XIV at Versailles opposes the orderly chaos o f the natural process o f
cloud formtion with the period’s architectural triumph in the grandiose building and
gardens. It opposes the order imposed by man to the chaotic order o f the natural, which
is framed and domesticated by the buildings and gardens. Again and again, the narrator
expresses his admiration for this melding o f order and disorder, o f artifice and nature, in
the work o f art.
The Figure o f the Author
The desire to write about the novels o f Marcel Proust and William Faulkner was
brought about as much by a fascination with the figures of Faulkner and Proust as with
the texts themselves. In spite of all formalist injunctions to concentrate on the text, and
nothing but the text, to study a novel by one o f these authors is almost invariably at
some point, to study the figures of the authors themselves. Proust and Faulkner as proper
names are caught up in a series o f cultural significations and connotations which often
find their way into the writings o f biographers, historians, and critics. We are assured by
all those who propose to speak about them that the authors themselves sought a kind o f
invisibility, stepping back to let their works speak for themselves. Proust actively denied
that any models were to be found in reality for the characters in his novels. Yet his efforts
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were to be in vain, as there continues to be a general preoccupation with biographical
details, one that can be seen in the success of biographies as well as books containing
interviews, personal correspondence, tales of the publishing history of their works, and
even photographs of people who are supposed to have served as models for some o f
Proust’s characters.
The wealth of books devoted to these authors testifies to a kind of fascination
with them which shows no signs of waning. This fixation on biography ironically mimics
the very obsession o f their main characters with others in the novels.
What is peculiar about the twentieth century is not so much the desire, as the
availability o f access to the personal letters, details and anecdotes o f the famous. Thus
the author who mocked Sainte-Beuve for judging an artist’s life rather than his work and
who went out of his way to insist that the characters in his book were purely fictitious,
that the Recherche was not a roman a clefs, is the object o f “pilgrimages” to the little
village o f Illiers-Combray, site o f one o f Proust’s aunt’s house, and the “Musee de T ante
Leonie” named after the fictional aunt o f the narrator of the Recherche. In Normandy,
the Grand Hotel of Cabourg, supposed to be the model for the “Grand Hotel de
Balbec,” touts its “chambre Marcel Proust” its Restaurant Balbec, and its “petites
madeleines.” As Gray demonstrates, these mass cultural appropriations of Proust
invariably act to simplify, to tame the alterity o f the monstrous Proustian text, reducing
it to the simplest of images: that o f the petite madeleine.
Proust added to the confusion, not only by twice inserting his own given name in
the definitive version o f the novel, but also in his letters and interviews, by freely speaking
in the first person of the narrator o f the Recherche, and especially by using events which
he actually experienced in the narrative. Faulkner, too, seems to justify such biographical
approaches when he affirms that “every time any character gets into a book, no matter
how minor, he’s actually telling his own biography, talking about himself, in a thousand
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different terms, but himself’ [.. .] (FIU 275). According to this theory, narration is
itself, by definition, autobiography.
There is a certain interpretation of the literary object in which the illusion o f being
as presence is maintained, through the figure o f the author as origin and master o f his
work. Heidegger speaks o f this in “The Origin o f the W ork o f Art”
On the usual view, the work arises out o f and by means of the activity o f
the artist. But by what and whence is the artist what he is? By the work;
for to say that the work does credit to the master means that it is the work
that first lets the artist emerge as a master o f his art. The artist is the origin
o f the work. The work is the origin o f the artist.69
The author is the origin o f the work, through which he expresses himself. Proust’s
narrator’s conclusion in Le temps retrouve is that the work o f art is a work of art because
it is the expression o f a unique universe, the vision o f the individual artist. We cannot,
however look to the historical figure of Proust to understand his text. To do so would be
to betray him, for it is precisely for this sort o f interpretation that he reproached the
predominant nineteenth century French critic Sainte-Beuve. It is, instead, through the
work o f art, that the artist becomes himself.
The figure o f the author inevitably manifests itself, and even seems to be
inscribed in the language that must be employed to speak about their works. The
vocabulary of criticism posits the “Faulknerian” and the “Proustian” characteristics o f
their object texts, as if there were a unique Proustian or Faulknerian style, a textual form
which functioned as essence. Yet A la recherche du temps perdu demonsrrares through
pastiche that style remains impersonal, because, as a mere function of discourse it is
available to appropriations, and/or assumed almost unconsciously from the corpus o f
common knowledge.70
69 Martin Heidegger. Basic Writings. Ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1977). 149.
70Aiexandrc Leupin argues this in his introduction to Lacan and the Human Sciences. “Proust proved by the
pastiche that style has nothing to do with the subject assuch. since it can be integrally repeated: hence the
Recherche, which is disconnected from style and literature. In other words there is a Proustian program
according to which the disappearance ofliterarure should be the rise ofthe pure letter” (p. 40).
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Language and Chaos
The fascination with the man seeks to mask, or to remedy the complex,
intertextual nature o f subjectivity in these novels. The author is invariably posited as the
controlling gaze that brings into being the cosmos portrayed in his texts. 1T he belief in
the existence o f the author as a controller o f the world he has created, as the god which
breathes life into his characters, provides a convenient identity on which to ground the
figural play in the novels, since the narrators’ gazes in these works are decidedly not in
control o f the worlds they are narrating. It is rather voice, as a manifestation o f
impersonal discourse, as the functioning of the symbolic, which controls them. The
“consciousness” o f these characters is a fluctuating narrative construction o f memory and
sensation, remembered voices and remembered texts. Kowledge of the self, o f who one
is, is shown to be contingent upon the tenuousness o f memory and sensation.
We nevertheless continue to speak o f the authorial “voice” in the texts concerned.
The difficulty with which different voices can be distinguished from one another in these
novels is often obscured by the attribution o f the enunciation as a whole to this authorial
voice. The “Faulknerian” and the “Proustian” serve as metaphors for the writer as
controlling subject/presence “behind” or “inside” his work. The invocation o f the
author’s name serves to rescue the concept o f individuality and the subject at the same
time. Thus, even if subjectivity in these novels is represented as “decentered,” “fractured”
or even lost, the “world” of these novels is seen as a harmoniously assembled whole, built
out o f an authorial vision, a “universe.” It is “Faulkner’s” Yoknapatawpha, “Proust’s”
France.
In spite o f all formalist criticism’s claims to study the text, it is difficult to ignore
the context o f the author’s life. It is obviously impossible due to the laws o f copyright, to
reproduce or to represent a text without linking it to its proper author, as if the text were
'O n the author’s “controlling gaze” see Philip M. Weinstien, Faulkner’s Subject: A Cosmos No O ne Owns.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
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somehow the property of the author: “William Faulkner, sole owner and proprietor.” Is
there anyway for criticism around this blind spot? Would be possible to speak of
Recherche without mentioning the name o f the author? Not without a complete
reconsideration o f the concept of the “work” as well. In the introduction to his
structuralist analysis of Proust’s work* Genette affirms that “In its debate with literary
history, modern criticism [__] has attempted to separate the concepts o f work and
author with the completely understandable tactical approach o f opposing the former to
the latter, which has been the cause of so many excessive and sometimes worrisome
activities. Now we have begun to understand that they are mutually dependent, and that
every form o f criticism is necessarily caught up in the circle of their reciprocal
movement.72Yet Genette insists, as well he should, that the study o f the author’s
biography, the research into sources, and influences, as well as into the genesis and
destiny o f the works, remains secondary to (“a cote de”) the main interest o f literary
studies. The fundamental interest says the formalist, is the text. But the formalist must
constantly make reference to the author. The author as a construct o f critical or even
biographical discourse has the same status as any character in the work, whether they be
the “hero” the “narrator” or other characters. These figures are constructs of language,
produced by texts. The person of the author, as a historical entity, is always absent from
his creation. “He who writes the work,” says Marice Blanchot, is set aside:
It closes in around his absence as the impersonal anonymous affirmation
that it is—and nothing more. This is what is meant by the observation that
the writer, since he only finishes his work at the moment he dies, never
' “Dans son debat avec 1’histoire litteraire, la critique moderne depuis un demi-siecle s’est appliqueea separcr
les notions d'oeuvre ct d'auteurdws ledessein tactique fort comprehensible d'opposerla premiere a la
seconde, responsable de tant d'exccset d’activitesparfo is oiseuses. On commence a percevoiraujourd’hui
qu'elles ont partie lice, et quc toute forme de critique est necessairement prise dans le cercle de leur renvoi
reciproque" “In its debate with literary history, modem criticism fora half-century has attempted to separate
the norionsofauthorand work with the very understandable tactical goal ofopposing the latter to the former
which is o ften respo nsible fo r so many excesses and sometimes bothersome activities. T oday we begin to see
that they are linked to oneanotherand that any form o f criticism is necessarily caught in the circle of their
mutual return" (Figures HI 10). My translation.
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knows o f his work. One ought perhaps to turn this remark around. For
isnt the writer dead as soon as the work exists?73
the author is dismissed from it as soon as it is created. Once the work has entered the
world, it has an autonomous existence. “The writers only real relation to what we call the
work,” says Blanchot, is his inability to read it (23).
The definition o f the “text,” however, is also open to question. No longer can
criticism afford to ignore the social, cultural and historical contexts in which literature is
situated and in which it attempts to situate itself. If we are to accept the implications o f
what Derrida affirms in “Structure sign and Play” or what Barthes suggests in his
theorization o f the “readerly” and the “writerly,” the field o f textual “play” opened up
by

these works increases considerably. As Hayles puts it in her discussion o f

deconstructive criticism: “As books became texts, they were transformed from ordered
sets of words to permeable membranes through which flowed the currents o f history,
language and culture. Always already lacking a ground for their systems of signification,
texts were not deterministic or predictable. Instead they were capable o f becoming
unstable whenever the slightest perturbation was introduced” (2).
The way that we read these novels, like the ways we identify the literary figures
Marcel Proust and William Faulkner, is itself constantly changing, being, as it is, the
absorption and transformation o f other people’s previous readings coupled with our own
previous knowledge ofother texts. The pursuit o f a correct, or “appropriate” reading o f
such texts (or the truth about the author’s life), is a useless endeavor, and no one knew
that better than the writers themselves. The models o f interpretation and reading
presented in these texts emphasize this again and again, yet we continue to speak o f the
men Marcel Proust and William Faulkner as if we had failed to learn the lessons about
identity contained in their novels: “every reading where consideration o f the writer seems

73Maurice Blanchot T he Space o f Literature, trans. Ann Smock, (Lincoln: University ofNebraska Press,

1982) 22,23.
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to play so great a role is an attack which annihilates him in order to give the work back to
itself: back to its anonymous presence, to the violent, impersonal affirmation that it is”
(Blanchot 193). The William Faulkner and Marcel Proust we produce in our own critical,
historical or biographical narratives are often little more than constructions fashioned in
order to make some point about literature, history or art.
My interest in these writers is ultimately due to the canonical status they hold in
their respective national literatures. It grew from the suspicion that this status is due to
the projection o f something essential, solid and unchanging about their works, about the
figures Marcel Proust and William Faulkner, and about identities, whether they be
thought o f in terms o f nationality, race, culture, language or individual personality. It is
my argument that this kind of reading o f these texts, o f the men, or o f history betray the
lessons which can be learned from their texts.
The central figure in each of these novels attempts to reconstitute a coherent
point of view, a subject position which will enable him to make sense of the series o f
unstable narratives which envelop him. Their desire for the “truth” is continually deferred
and hampered by the ever-shifting nature of their perceptions and the symbolic field
itself. In other words they seek a way clear through a “chaos” of perceptual and symbolic
phenomena.
The reader o f either of these two works is presented with lacuna and anachronies
which signal not unity, but the fragmentation and artificiality of memory. It is as if the
authors of these novels set about purposely confounding chronology in order to
demonstrate the total indifference o f conscious mechanisms to linear time.
Consciousness is susceptible to the fluctuations, inconsistencies and degradation o f time,
but the latter is just as often an illusion invented by the former.
Faulkner, like Proust, shows how individuals are thrown into an ever-fluctuating sea
o f sign systems, especially those of language and narrative. They demonstrate that being
in the world is not based in some essential self, but in the absorption and transformation
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of a certain number o f discourses, the continual reworking of histories both personal and
communal. The self in these works is thus permeated by language, by what
p s y c h o a n a ly s is

calls “the field of the other.” These novels are thus concerned with

representing, not beings engaged in concrete actions, but the process o f remembering as
it structures consciousness Or, to put it another way, they attempt to represent
representation. Consciousness is treated as phenomenon: the mechanisms o f perception
are inseparable from that which is perceived. The self is constructed by the field o f its
own perception. The model o f consciousness which emerges is altogether different from
the concept o f the individual as unique, or self-knowing, and calls into question the
subject as well as the object o f thought.
Identity in Proust and Faulkner is a function o f narrative. The story o f the self is
produced in the act o f storytelling. The individual is never able to “master” these
discourses, just as no one is able to mastet the narrative of Thomas Sutpen in Absalom.
Absalom!, m uch as they may try. Similarly, Proust’s narrator spends most o f his time
and most o f the novel looking for the “essence” of art, and for the mystery o f other
people’s “true” identities. The discovery Proust’s narrator makes is that through writing,
by actively recreating the world, he can (re)arrange his own story. But this final
arrangement cannot be definitive. This explains the repetitive, revisionist nature o f his
texts.
The structures o f Proust and Faulkner’s novels bear some striking resemblances.
Both texts work by the accumulation of details rather than the presentation o f facts. The
syntagmaric, diegetic narrative plays a m uch less significant role than in Proust’s novel,
which is partially the story o f the hero’s education, and therefore retains a chronological
organization. In T he Sound and the Furv, the various sections are deliberatley given out
of chronological order. In Absalom. Absalom, the diegetic framework is weak,
consisting mainly o f people talking. Quentin first listens to Miss Rosa and his father tell
him the story, in Mississippi. Then he tells the same story to his Canadian roommate at
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Harvard several months later. The actions o f this frame narrative take place in a very
limited time period.
In place o f a chronological development, there is an uncontrolled proliferation of
narrative. This narrative is repetitive-the same events are retold innumerable times, while
in Proust, repeated actions tend to be told in the synthetic mode, as exemplary, a kind
of summary o f repeated events. Things that used to happen repeatedly are told once.The
logical or chronological development o f action from beginning to end is not as important
as the potentially infinite series o f repetitions and variations. This type o f structure is
based not on logic and necessity, but on association and contingency. The privileging o f
association over causality or chronology is equivalent to the privileging o f paradigm over
syntagm and o f chance over necessity, and opens up the narrative to multiple readings
and interpretations. What Proust and Faulkner have done is to suggest the infinite
complexity and unpredictability o f hum an behavior.
The study o f literature is often subject to its own form o f identity crisis, one
which is not unrelated to the very instability that I seek to point out in my chosen texts.
It would seem then that, at the risk o f betraying the works concerned, criticism must be
condemned to a kind ofschizophrenia. W hat is the object o f literary criticism? O f
literary history (of any history)? The text? the context? the reception? the genesis? the
author? the intertext? all of these are, in different ways, valid answers. T he multiplicity o f
the “object” o f literary studies can not but help bring about a fragmentation o f the
subject (the “voice” o f the critical text itself). Critical texts must now simultaneously
interrogate themselves as well as their chosen “primary text.” The choice o f a certain
perspective from which to interpret the literary text inevitably will determine the type o f
interpretation produced. Proust, too, made this danger explicit in passages which dissect
the act o f reading: (“En realite, chaque lecteur est quand il lit Ie propre lecteur de soi\
meme n ).
a
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Are we then condemned to see only ourselves in the “mirror” o f the text? The
opposite danger is also present: like Borges’ Pierre Menard attempting to write (not to
rewrite) Cervantes’ Don Quixote, we may find ourselves attempting to follow the text so
closely that we are condemned to repeat it word for word, identifying our discourse with
it much as the young Marcel identifies himself with “a church,” “a quartet,” or “the
rivalry between Francois I and Charles Quint.”
It is inevitable then that we begin with the conclusion. We write, as Proust did,
the beginning and the end at the same moment, and fill in the middle as a function of
our end. The danger here is that we might only be capable o f seeing only what we have
posited. Proust knew this. T o read is to produce a text from what we have internalized
through previous experiences o f other texts. So full o f this previous input are we, that
everything we read seems ripe with meaning: “A partir d’un certain age nos souvenirs
sont tellement entre-croises les uns sur les autres que la chose a laquelle on pense, Ie livre
qu’on lit n’a presque plus d’importance. On a mis de soi-meme partout, tout est fecond,
tout est dangereux, et on peut faire d ’aussi precieuses decouvertes que dans les Pensees
de Pascal dans une reclame pour un savon” (AD 124). “After a certain age our memories
are so intertwined We have put something of ourselves everywhere, everything is fertile,
everything is dangerous, and we can make discoveries no less precious than in Pascal’s
Pensees in an advertisement for soap” (Ilk 553 - 54).
From which point o f view must we approach these texts? The answer to this
question must inevitably influence the nature of what will be found. Is it possible to delve
into the text without any preconceived notions of what is to be found there, without
imposing an order so as to discover order? Perhaps only if the order we impose is
simultaneously disorderly, if it contains the possibility of its own unraveling?
For the would-be “Faulknerian” or “Proustian,” critic, and in a world in which
the scientific pursuit o f the “T ruth” o f the text, its correct reading, is no longer credible,
the sanction for undertaking yet still another study o f these seemingly well-worn texts
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can only be its effectiveness as performance: “T he sanction o f the critic,” as Roland
Barthes points out in Critique et verite. “is not the meaning o f the work, it is the
meaningfulness o f what he says about the work” (65). 4 Le sens here must be understood
not only as meaning but as coherence. All o f these terms are themselves disappointingly
vague. What exactly does “coherence” imply? Its meaning can be (at least) double:
Firstly, the critical or text must agree with its object text. It must not stray too far from
the “letter” o f that text. The “close” reading is an exercise which partakes in this attem pt
to reduce the distance between art and interpretation and to insure the validity o f the
latter by somehow anchoring it in the former.
This requirement betrays its dependence upon a traditional metaphysical
presupposition which unites the spirit and the letter in the “logos.” The spirit o f the
interpretation is the letter o f the original text. T he critical task is that o f an translatorvtho
must be faithful to the original, to reproduce faithfully and without distortion, to be
transparent. It is in this sense that Barthes’s statement secretly reintroduces the criterion
of truth-value into the critical endeavor. Contemporary critical theory is postulated on
the assumption o f the radical absence of, or at least the inability to determine,
philosophical truths. The metaphysical presuppositions upon which the “T ruth” is often
established must be taken as presuppositions, that is, subject to revision. The “T ru th ,” in
the singular and with a capital, is perhaps a dangerously fascist notion. The field o f
speculative knowledge is made up of a multitude o f “truths,” more properly called
“hypotheses” which form a web of constantly shifting relations, and which therefore
resists the logic o f completion. T ruth is now seen as contingent, relative, and reversible. It
cannot easily be consumed and digested, for it is continually reproduced.
The problem o f identity in these novels, and the resultant unreliability o f their
narrative voices, do not leave the fields o f textual criticism or history unaffected. T he
4 My translation.
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critic or literary historian’s task is also to chart a path through the confusing and
sometimes contradictory disorder o fth e text. If only for the purpose o f constructing a
coherent commentary, the critical text cannot permit itself the licence o f the literary
text. Faced with the work of literature, the critic is in much the same position as the
central character in each of these novels: Quentin Compson trying to reconstruct and
understand the Sutpen story, and the insomiac “Marcel” attempting to identify himself
and his surroundings. Both are intent on producing a masterly version o f a discourse o f
identity. T he extent to which they, and we, are confronted with what seems like chaos
can be seen in the kind of trouble Proust had in convincing his early readers that there
was indeed a hidden order to be found in the seemingly random associations o f his
narrative. In a letter to Paul Souday in 1919 he deplores this assumption: “Je vois des
lecteurs s’imaginer que j ecris, en me fiant a d’arbitraires et fortuites associations d’idees,
l’histoire de ma vie,” “I see readers imagining that I’m writing my life’s story, entrusting
myself to arbitrary and fortuitous associations o f ideas.” Later on in that same year he
writes to Jean-Louis Vaudoyer, complaining o f reviewers who, he says, failed to
recognize the tight composition o f his work, and seemed to be saying that he had written
his memoirs following the tenuous thread o f his recollections, “meconnaissant la
composition serree de mon ouvrage, on t Fair de dire que je fais des Memoires et ecris au
fil de mes souvenirs!”75
The Thread o f Association
The difficulty many first-time readers encounter with Proust can be described as
an impression o f the “chaotic” nature o f the text. The intricate embedded sentences and
perceived lack o f plot direction has no doubt caused many readers to abandon the text
after only a few pages.

75 Q td. in Thierry Lagct, Thierry Lager prfeenrc Du cotSde chez Swann de Marcel Proust. (Paris: Gallimard
[Folio] 1992) 29-
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What is generally the reproach made in this case? That the plot has no direction,
or more precisely, that it advances through an arbitrary pattern “au fil des associations.”
It is not so much the associations which are disturbing, as the “thread.” It seems
fortuitous, arbitrary, haphaxard, unmotivated. But it is precisely the genius of Proust to
demonstrate that the motivation comes after. It is only a function o f a “conscious” (and
thus artifical) retrospective reconstruction. The waking sleeper has no idea which room he
is in; he has no idea in which rooms he has slept until after they have risen to his
consciousness. The present is only a function of that act o f remembering which brings the
“past” into the present. This is what he admired in the compositional sryle of Ruskin,
who, he said, “goes from one idea to the next without any apparent order. But in reality
the fancy which leads him follows his deep affinities which impose upon him, in spite of
himself, a superior logic. So that, in the end, he seems to have obeyed a secret plan,
which, once revealed, imposes retrospectively a kind o f order upon the whole and makes
it seem magnificently arrayed to lead to its final apotheosis.” W hat Proust proposes here
is a means o f reading his own text, and that of Faulkner as well. The “superior logic,” the
“secret plan” is one which appears chaotic, random, fantastical, but which retrospectively
reveals “a kind o f order.”
This kind of retrospective recognition of order is precisely the way in which
“chaos” scientists are forced to proceed. One of the features o f fractal geometry is the
unpredictability of the behavior exhibited in systems regulated by the simplest o f
equations. Given a minimal set o f variables it remains impossible to determine a priori
their values at any point in time. It is only retrospectively that a kind o f order can be
observed in what at first appeared to be absolutely random behavior. This also describes
the work ofthe critic. Often the task is to discover the “hidden” patterns o f meaning in
the text, especially when this meaning seems to contradict the expressed meaning. This is
what Paul De Man has done in his masterful demonstration o f the metonymical
functioning ofthe Proustian text, in spite o f its expressed preference for metaphor over
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metonymy. Such hidden meanings are often referred to as the text’s “unconscious.” T he
desire to study, the desire to thoroughly “cover” the works o f Proust or Faulkner is
finally the desire to suture a fragmented textual spectrum into a coherent, unified
meaning. The desire to make sense betrays the senselessness o f the mechanical
production and repetition o f text in the novels themselves. “Mechanical” here must be
understood to imply arbitrary, contingent, reversible, meaningless, material, fragmentary
and metonymic, as these terms are usually opposed to more privileged ones: motivated,
necessary, meaningful, conscious, complete, and metaphorical. These two series o f terms
are summarized in the opposition o f nature, to artifice.
The explorers of psychology, sociology, history, literature, philosophy and
anthropology have all been strangely attracted to the same sorts o f models. Again and
again we can see the reappearance of the axes o f combination and selection, metaphor
and metonymy, synchrony and diachrony, condensation and displacement etc., which
all seem to indicate similarity between the various fields o f research. This same
phenomenon has occurred in the “hard” sciences. T he “fractal” nature o f models o f stock
market and population fluctuations, cloud and star formation, liquid and gas flow
patterns, and the branching patterns in plants and o f veins and arteries in animals, all
reveal a strange similarity among the seemingly chaotic behavior o f natural systems.
Katherine Hayles has forcefully argued that the similarities to be seen between scientific
and humanistic disciplines is due to a shared epistemology, one which breaks with the
historical valorization o f order over disorder: “When a dichotom y as central to Western
thought as order/disorder is destabilized, it is no exaggeration to say that a major fault
line has developed in the episteme” (16). Hayles is careful to speak of a fault line and not
a complete break, for, as she acknowledges, the emphasis in scientific circles is on the
presence o f order in seemingly disorderly systems, while in literary theory and practice,
it is the “cohabitation” of order with disorder, the fact that chaos is always already
present within orderly systems, which is o f most interest.
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Order hidden in randomness seems to be the guiding principle of m uch modern
literature, from Baudelaire’s challenge to the readers o f Les Fleurs du mal. to the chaotic
narrtion o f James Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake and beyond. Proust explicitly acknowledged
his debt to Baudelaire in Le temps retrouve (TR 226).
This problem is even more complex that it at first may seem. N ot only must the
reader or literary critic deal with the texts themselves; increasingly they must also take
into consideration the multitude of “satellite” texts, such as variants, commentaries,
biographies, and other critical assessments. W hether it be a blessing or a curse, literary
scholars now have the possibility of consulting the twenty-one volumes o f Proust’s
personal and literary correspondance, in addition to the volumes upon volumes o f
studies, essays, analyses and exegeses o f his work. As the corpus of studies and exegeses
grows, our picture o f the novelists and their creation is constantly changing.
It is also difficult to establish a definitive edition o f the texts in question, in light
ofthe unfinished nature o f the works. Philip M. Weinstein points out that the very
“object” which is the Faulknerian text is subject to questioning (97). In the case o f
Sartoris. which was published much against the author’s wishes, as a pared down version
of his original Flags in the Dust, the manuscript o f which no longer exists, but which has
been “reconstituted” from various typescript and manuscript fragments, this question
must remain unresolved. In the case o f Absalom and The Sound and the Furv. the
addition of appendices, a chronology and a map to various versions again presents the
problem o f marginalia which can profoundly affect any reading of these novels.
Faulkner’s recourse to time lines, appendices and cartography seems to be an
attempt to harmonize the often incoherent narration. Quite often, however, these
adjuncts contribute to the incoherence o f the “world” they attempt to circumscribe; the
chronology o f Absalom. Absalom! for instance specifies that Judith and Charles E. St. V.
Bon die o f smallpox in 1884. Yet the text o f the novel claims it was not smallpox, but
yellow fever. Likewise, in the 1939 appendix to T he Sound and the Furv. the Indian
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Ikkemotubbe is said to have traded his people’s land to Quentin Com pson’s great-great
grandfather in exchange for “safe passage to Oklahoma” (in other words, a good horse,
407). This is said to have taken place in 1813. Yet in Absalom, written in 1936, Sutpen is
said to have mysteriously acquired his land from Ikkemotubbe in 1833. Mr. Compson
suggests that this was done in an underhanded manner: “until that Sunday when he came
to church, if he had misused or injured anybody, it was only old Ikkemotubbe, from
whom he got his land” (50). It is Mr Com pson who is narrating this event to his son
Quentin in 1909, so the possibility for subjective distortion could be argued to justify
this inconsistency. The extent to which the information about Sutpen is unreliable can be
inferred from the multiplicity o f voices. Nearly all we know about the man is filtered
chrough the second, third and sometimes fourth-hand narrations of Miss Rosa, Mr.
Compson, Quentin and even Shreve. A large part o f each o f these narrators’ stories are
mere speculation. The appendix to Absalom, added by Faulkner several years after the
original publication seems, by virtue o f its very position to be an authoritative,
supplementary gloss on the characters and events of the novel, added by the author in
order to clear up the shady events o f the novel. However, it contradicts the text on
several points; it is thus an open question as to what extent the appendix is to be taken as
authoritative.
Each o f these works attempts, in dissimilar ways, to render whole a fragmented
universe, while simultaneously calling attention to its own fragmentation. Faulkner
employs, among other strategies, that o f topography in the map o f Yoknapatawpha
county which he includes at the end o f Absalom. Absalom!, to portray a totalizing vision
of the “universe” in his novels. Yet the text o f the novel itself is fragmentary and
repetitive, there are huge gaps in our knowledge o f the story, and most o f what we do
know is finally attributable only to conjecture. Cleanth Brooks has done an excellent job
of demonstrating this in his appendix to William Faulkner: The Yoknapatawpha
Country.
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Most o f the action in Proust’s novel seems likewise to be restricted to a limited
topography. Yet the wealth of inconsistencies and contradictions make it an impossible
one. One example is the ever-changing itinerary of the little train at Balbec (SG), another
is the uncertain or fluctuating location of Tante Leonie’s home. Originally Proust wanted
to place it near Chartes, East o f Paris; when the novel expanded to include the war years
Proust decided to move Combray to the West, to the Champagne region, where it
would be occupied by the Germans and the church destroyed. Inconsistencies remain in
the novel, and most critics assume that Proust would have tidied them up had he lived to
see the publication of the final volumes, but such a task would have been monumental,
and given Proust’s tendency to continually embellish his text, he might never have
finished, even if he had lived another decade. The sheer momentum o f the text itself,
with its periodic, serpentine sentences, seems to splice together the disparate parts o f the
narrative.
This incompleteness corresponds to the esthetics propounded by Proust’s
narrator, who admires the “great art” o f the nineteenth century, those unfinished works
whose unity is only recognized after the fact: Tunite apres coup des grands oeuvres du
dix-neuvieme siecle”(P 150; III: 157). It is only in the act o f reading that the unity is
produced. Unity and order are constructions formed by the viewer or reader of the
work.
A phenomenon is manifest in the study of literature which seems to parallel what
scientists know as the Butterfly effect, which postulates that small changes in initial
conditions are capable of producing large effects. Scholars of Marcel Proust, as with any
modern author, are obliged, not only to attend to the details o f the Recherche, but also
to take into account the author’s earlier writings and correspondence along with the
various manuscript versions o f the novel. The novel remains unfinished-this in spite of
Proust’s writing the word “fin” after Le Temps retrouve-because he never completed the
revisions which were under way at the time o f his death.
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Thus, if only for purely practical purposes, there can be no definitive reading o f a
“text.” Indeed, the way in which one generation interprets a literary phenomenon may
well say more about that generation than it does about the work concerned. This is why,
as David Carroll puts it, the object o f literary history “must also include the history o f
various theories used to analyze and explain [literature’s] form and sense.”'6 In other
words the object o f literary history includes literary history and criticism. It becomes
virtually impossible to distinguish one from another, literature from the criticisms and
exegeses which “situate” literature for us, and the literary object itself.
The problem o f subjective perception as represented'm the novels affects the
reader’s interpretation by calling attention to and problematizing his perception o f the
text. It is the crucial function o f the detail which gives its weight to all that which,
though perhaps marginal, nevertheless provides a very real context for any particular
reading. We as readers approach any given text with our knowledge of other texts, or
sign-systems, including those o f popular culture.3 In a sense, and as Barthes implies in
SI Z. we are an amalgam o f all our reading experiences, and these we use to understand
the Faulknerian or Proustian texts, which are themselves “intertexts,” with their own
built-in references and allusions to other texts. The very terms text, context and writing
must all be taken very broadly to include any manifestation o f an instituted trace,
including an, architecture, even tool. In this sense geography itself, the setting o f these
novels in Paris or Southern Mississippi is an intertextual reference to everything
associated with these particular marks on the map, with these names.
A simple example is the last image of Caddy, given in the appendix to The
Sound and the Furv “a photograph in color clipped obviously from a slick magazine-a
picture filled with luxury, money and sunlight-a Cannebiere backdrop o f mountains and
palms and cypresses and the sea, an open powerful expensive chromiumtrimmed sports
6 David Carroll. T he Subject in Question: The LanpuagesofThcorv and the StrategiesofFiction, (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1982)9.
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car, the woman’s face hacless between a rich scarf and a seal coat, ageless and beautiful,
cold serene and damned: beside her a handsome lean man o f middleage in the ribbons
and tabs o f a German “staffgeneral” (415). Caddy’s association with a Nazi officer, and
the name “Cannebiere” (the main street in the French port town o f Marseille) all carry
connotations reinforcing the idea o f her decadence suggested also by the “luxury, money
and sunlight,” the sports car, the “rich scarf” and seal coat and the “cold” “damned”
face. Her association with the enemy marks her as a traitor. The fact that she is last seen
in Marseille, a port on the Mediterranean is also suggestive of a certain exoticism.
Through the connotations of its constituants, this simple image o f Caddy standing with
the enemy is charged with symbolism.
Scaling effects
Writing involves making choices. A critic who undertakes a piece ofcriticism
invariably chooses to concentrate on certain aspects, on certain sections o f text, thus
taking an intentionally myopic view o f the whole when it comes rime to generalize about
authorial intention, textual meaning or even critical method. The nature o f critical
writing itself demands such general statements (if only in introducing concepts or
concluding). W hat would be a critical text which consisted o f nothing but details? It
could be nothing more than a collection o f extracted quotations from the object text
with no commentary possible.
All critical assessments of the A la recherche du temps perdu m ust necessarily
operate by means o f an analysis in which a part (an excerpted section o f the text) stands
for a whole. Doubrovsky employs this strategy with the simple assertion that “Narrative
micro-structures reproduce the global structure o f the narrative” [“Les microstructures
narratives reproduisent la structure globale du recit”].77Genette makes a similar move,
but qualifies it by admitting that “U va de soi qu’une analyse [au niveau du
" Serge Doubrovsky. La place de la madeleine: Ecritureet fantasme chez Proust. (Paris: Mercure de France,

1974) 33.
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macrostructure] ne peut tenir compte des details qui relevent d’une autre echelle, et
quelle procede done d’une simplification des plus grossieres” (85), “It goes almost
without saying that an analysis [at the level o f the macro-structure] cannot take into
account details perceived at another scale, and that it is therefore based on a gross
simplification.” In spite o f the admitted oversimplification, the metonymical relation o f
part to whole must then be demonstrated to metaphorically represent the whole. What is
introduced as a contingent, arbitrary excerpt must be shown to necessarily and
sufficiently justify the exclusion o f the rest. This then allows the critic to enlarge his
argument to include that whole. T he passage from the specific to the general, from the
partial to the holistic and from fiction to theory is equvalenr to the passage from signifier
to signifed, from letter to spirit and from the mechanical, the automatic and the
meaningless to the conscious, the intentional and the fullness o f meaning. All o f these
oppositions are binary and hierarchical. The logic of our chosen texts is multiple and
equivocal.
The crisis o f western identity is thus one of a loss o f a “master” context, the
social, ideaiogical and poetic master discourses which determine the kinds o f narratives
or pronouncments about identity and personality which are recognized as “truthful” or
somehow “definitive.” If there’s one experince that characterizes modernity, it might
well be the experience of the ever-changing contexts of everyday life.
One of these theories which has had a great deal o f influence on critical
approaches to these two texts is psychoanalysis. Indeed, it hardly seems possible to speak
of identity, the self, consciousness or subjectivity without grappling with the enormous
psychoanalytical apparatus attached to these terms. This would not be altogether
inappropriate, not only because Faulkner expressed an oven admiration for Freud, but
also because o f the general familiarity o f such theories to practically anyone writing since
the turn of the century. It is no coincidence that Proust was writing his masterpiece at the
same time that Freud was developing theories of the self which postulated a psyche split
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into an “ego,” a “superego” and an “unconscious.” Research and speculation on
psychological functioning had been going on all throughout the nineteenth century.
Freud did not appear out o f the blue. He built on the work of predecessors and
contemporaries. Proust probably hadn’t read Freud, but that doesn’t mean he wasn’t
privy to the kinds of speculations going on at that period. It is likewise doubtful that
Faulkner really grasped Freudian theory, in spite o f his expressed admiration for it. It is
undeniable, however, that such ideas were “in the air.” Writers, artists, critics and
scientists were speculating on these topics at the time Proust and Faulkner were writing.
What is portrayed in the Recherche and in Absalom. Absalom! might be described as
two forms o f the “talking cure,” two attempts to articulate the mystery o f personal
identity, to bring to light the hidden motives and desires o f characers, especially those o f
the narrators as they are revealed in the language and the structure o f their narration. The
link between Faulkner, Proust, and Freud is their concern with the structuring function
o f language in the very deepest recesses of memory and “consciousness.”
That which we call “personality” is dependent upon the impersonal system o f
language, even before we are born we are integrated into the linguistic economy when we
are given a name. The naming process is the very movement o f identification. This is as
true in the hard sciences as it is in everyday life. It is part o f a process which divides the
world into small, assimilable, “identifiable” units. It is a way o f separating, o f cutting the
substance of reality into manageable components. This is o f course the first step in the
Cartesian method. Another way o f saying this is that subjects as well as objects are
creations o f language. But, as noted in the introduction to this dissertation, the naming
process is potentially infinite.
In this respect, the weaving o f many voices is an example a kind o f
intertexruality. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari provide a useful (and interesting)
metaphor which might best describe the kind o f “chaotic” process at work in these
novels. In the language o f Deleuze and Guattari, Marcel’s discovery could be said to
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represent the resurgence o f a circular, rhizomatic proliferation in the hierarchical
branching structure o f the (family) tree. A rhizome, they claim,
ne commence et n’aboutit pas, il est toujours au milieu, entre les choses,
inter-etre, intermezzo. L’arbre est filiation, mais le rhizome est alliance,
uniquement d alliance. L’arbre impose le verbe «etre», mais le rhizome a
pour rissu la conjonction«et . . . e t . .. et . . . ».
neither begins nor ends, it is always in the middle, in between things,
inter-being, intermezzo. The tree is heredity, but the rhizome is alliance,
uniquely by association. The tree imposes the verb “be,” but the rhizome
is formed with the conjunction “and . . . and . . . and”
(36)
Ross Chambers has also identified this as the potential for diversion, mis-direction, or
bifurcation inherent in traditional narrative. He calls it the “etc. principle.” Texts that
work “episodically” or which tend to be digressive, to indulge in long descriptions, work
against the linear progression o f traditional narrative, which attempts to drive inexorably
toward closure.78
Roland Barthes recognizes this explicidy in Proust. He characterizes Proust’s text
as an infinitely explorable space or galaxy o f signification
une des grandes cosmogonies que le vingtieme siecle, principalement, a su
produire [. . .] dont le caractere, a la fois statutaire et historique, est
precisement celui-ci: qu'elles sont des espaces (des galaxies) infiniment
explorables: ce qui deporte le travail critique loin de route illusion de
«resultat» vers la simple production d'une ecriture supplementaire, dont le
texte tuteur [. . .] ne serait que le pre-texte.
one o f the great cosmologies that the twentieth century, primarily, was
able to produce [. . .] the statutory and historical character o f whis is
precisely this: that they are infinitely explorable spaces (galaxies), which
displaces critical work far from any illusion o f “results” to the simple
production o f a supplementary writing, for which the target text [. . .]
would merely be the pre-text.79

78“The Etc. Principle." Lecture sponsored by the Department o f French and Italian and the Center for
French and Francophone Studies. Louisiana State University. Baton Rouge. 29 Mar. 1993. See also
Loiterature (Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1999).
“Une idee de recherche” in Recherche de Proust. (34 - 39). My translation.
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Discription has always been the “other” o f narration. It is essential, yet it is an
inertial factor resisting the forward m omentum o f plot. As Barthes noted in a speech
given to the College de France in 1978: “chaque incident de la vie peut donner lieu ou a
un commentaire [...] ou a une aftubulation qui en donne ou en imagine 1’avant et I’apres
narratif’ (8), “each incident in life can give rise to a commentary [...] or to a fabrication
which would give or imagine the narrative before and after.”®
O ur perception ofthe texts we encounter as readers (and I include here that
particular form o f reading which is the writing o f the critical text), can likewise be
pursued along any number of paths, but the possibility of expansion inherent in the
“opening u p” o f any o f the details we encounter along the way implies an infinitely
detailed network. Such a network o f relations would be mote than two dimensional. It
would display all the characteristics o f a fractal dimension. As in a fictional narration
when the forward motion o f the story’s action is slowed down to allow for a detailed
description o r an a chronological “filling in” o f details, such procedures have the potential
to allow for infinite detail.
Recontextualization
Richard Rorty has made the case that the quest for truth should be considered as
“recontextualization.” That is to say that the notion of “T ruth” as an absolute should be
discarded. History has shown that what one generation considers to be “T ru th ” the next
has abandoned as myth or superstition. “T he truth” is inevitably what people have come
to agree upon as the truth. It is formed by consensus, and thus is subject to revision.
Rorty, in urging us to think of human minds as self-reweaving webs o f sentential
attitudes, says that “T o view beliefs as habits o f action is to view the self from the outside
[...]” (93). His point is that this outside is all we can pretend to know, yet it is not fixed
once and for all: “As one moves along the spectrum from habit to inquiry—from
instinctive revision o f intentions through routine calculation toward revolutionary science
® My translation.
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or politics—the number of beliefs added to or subtracted from the web increases. At a
certain point in this process it becomes useful to speak o f ‘recontextualization.’ The more
widespread the changes, the more use we have for the notion o f‘a new context’ ” (94)
There is a very real sense in which these two novels are about this process even as they
enact recontextualization in their very form, in their myriad “visions and revisions.”
This study has been an attempt to “recontextualize” the novels o f these to
authors, to draw a connection or establish a relationship between them in themes and
techniques which signal a particular approach to the representation o f consciousness,
subjectivity, or personality. Identity is seen in Proust as an ongoing process o f textual
weaving. T he infinite detail and complexity o f this weaving is what these novels enact.
Paradoxically, the sheer volume o f writing devoted to the same life-long project
produced by these authors testifies at once to the inexhaustibility o f such processes, and
to the will to exhaust, or we might also say, to thoroughly “cover,” a subject. Their
efforts bear witness more to the desire than to the possibility of such a totalization. There
is a very real sense in which each o f these novels is, as Roland Barthes might say, a tribute
to the “infinite dilatory power” o f the proper name. As a result, the worlds these texts
“portray” remain irreducibly suggestive, plural and open to interpretation-in spite of the
remarkable efforts at explication and summarization which are the perhaps inevitable
endeavors o f criticism or literary history as such.
Such efforts are inscribed within an ontological/epistemological project which is
effectively undermined by the literary works concerned. Literary critics or historians who
undertake to explicate, interpret, comprehend or elucidate the coherence o f these textual
universes run up against the same problems as the authors themselves. The text which
thoroughly “exhausts,” which might completely “cover” the subjects o f these works
(again, both their topos, as well as the figure o f the narrating subject portrayed in them:
“Marcel” or “Je” and “Quentin Compson,” and we might just as well include the
authorial figures Marcel Proust and William Faulkner) is non-existent, cannot exist as a
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unified whole, not without distorting or betraying the irreducibly enigmatic nature o f
the works and o f the human beings concerned.
The genius o f these novelists may well consist in restoring to consciousness the
complexity that realist fiction had often denied. Balzacian characters (for example) are
often perceived as remaining true to the nature they are described as having from the
very start ofthe novel. Human nature in such fiction is seen as immutable, following
nearly inflexible laws o f behavior. The error o f Proust’s hero, the one which he will spend
much o f the novel failing to learn-is the belief in the possibility of discovering such laws:
The narrator describes himself as a young man in seacrch o f some great “abstract
philosophical truth” to be the subject o f a “great literary work” (S 176-77). His only real
discovery' is a law o f chaos, o f contradiction and vacillation. In this respect one o f the
work’s original working titles, “Intermittences o f the heart” (“Les intermittences du
coeur”), is very telling. The intermittences he referred to are not merely the caprices
which are normally associated with “affairs o f the heart.” What Proust perhaps had in
mind is more closely related to a specific physical affliction known today as heart
“murmurs,” the unpredictable ways in which the heart fails to beat in a constant or
regular rhythm. W hat the narrator has learned, by the time he takes up the pen to write,
is that he must abandon the quest for essences, for the definitive work o f art, one which
would embody some great philosophical truth.
Complexity is a Value
Proust’s narrator expresses the need to restore to life the complexity which
certain deterministic views of human behavior effectively masked: “nous sentons que la
vie est un peu plus compliquee qu’on ne dit, et meme les circonstances. Et il y a une
necessite pressante a montrer cette complexite” (TR 223). “We feel merely that life is a
little more complicated than it is said to be, and circumstances too. And it is absolutely
necessary that we should portray this complexity” (III: 956). Why did Proust feel that
there was such a pressing need to show this complexity? His novel is a reaction to the

Reproduced with permission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

167

positivist attitude which sought to arrive at a simple, scientific explanation o f human
behavior. Literary theory may do well to look to metaphors and theories from other
disciplines, such as the theories o f fractal geometry. The recent growth o f the internet
and hypertext seem to confirm, or at least lend credence to much o f post -structuralist
thought about the web ofintertextuality and intersubjectivity.
This desire for completion, for universality for the fin a l word seems to drive or at
least to have driven a great deal o f literary historians and critics to write on these two
authors. T he present text participates in this desire in as far as its ambition is to connect
Proust and Faulkner with scientific, philosophical and political theories and paradigms,
to connect readings o f textual “samples” to general statements and extrapolations about
language, history and society based on those readings. It breaks with such a desire in its
recognition o f such generalizations as strategies or processes which allow for new
understandings o f these texts, rather than “methods” o f arriving at definitive results.
Criticism participates in the process by which texts are continually modified to signify
on our terms. Indeed, such processes are themselves not unlike the mechanics o f
consciousness at work in Absalom. Absalom? or A la recherche du temps perdu.
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